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ABSTRACT

To meet the continued demand for educational reform, the state of Florida enacted
legislation in 1998 that required school boards to base a portion of the salary for school
administrators and instructional personnel on performance. Although ahead of the required
statutory timeline, the School District of Lee County implemented a teacher performance pay
plan during the 1998–1999 school year as a result of Florida’s legislative direction.
The problem of this study was to determine the perceptions of Southwest Florida schoolbased certified staff regarding the implementation of teacher performance pay in a school district
where performance pay had been in operation for the five years prior to this study. The
population of this study consisted of the certified school-based personnel employed by the
School District of Lee County, Florida. A random sample of 1,000 members was selected from
the instructional population. Additionally, this study included the entire population of 176
school-based administrators for an overall sample of 1,176 members. Participants were asked to
complete the survey instrument, Teacher Performance Pay Attitudinal Survey designed by the
researcher. This instrument was developed to fit the unique requirements and specific nature of
this study.
Although intended to motivate teachers, the teacher performance pay plan examined in
this study was perceived by instructional staff and administrators as not motivating. Findings of
this study also show that most teachers and other instructional respondents disagree that teacher
performance pay provides an incentive to work harder toward improving student achievement.
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Additionally, a majority of the instructional respondents did not agree that performance pay
encouraged them to participate in staff development or motivated them to change their
instructional practice. Finally, most respondents, both instructional and administrative, did not
agree that the current performance pay system was fair. These findings suggest that the
performance pay program of the current study may have fallen short of its intended goal.
This study also found many differences in perceptions of teacher performance pay among
the demographic variables. These differences were particularly significant in several survey areas
to include the respondent’s years of experience, union status, and position.
Findings in this study suggest that performance plan design should clearly connect the
compensation reward to performance so that educators understand the performance level
required. The findings of this study also suggest that improving the alignment between the
performance pay plan and school goals should be a consideration in any future plan revision.
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CHAPTER 1
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH DESIGN

In 1983 the National Commission on Excellence in Education released A Nation at Risk:
the Imperative for Educational Reform, setting off a national debate about the quality of
America’s educational system (Ballou & Podgursky, 1997). As a direct result of this debate,
many educational policy-makers across the nation began massive educational reform efforts
centering on the creation of state standards and goals (Kelley, Heneman, & Milanowski, 2000).
Many of these reform movements also embraced the idea of performance-based pay plans that
link rewards and sanctions to student achievement (Fuhrman, 1999).
Performance-based programs are intended to align individual or school performance to
monetary incentives (Kelley, Heneman, & Milanowski, 2000). Many past attempts to link pay to
performance were quickly abandoned by school districts, raising questions about the
effectiveness of these systems (Odden & Kelley, 1997). Absent from many of the existing
incentive pay programs was a critical link to research (Hodge, 2001). According to Packard and
Dereshiwsky (1988), many failures of early reform initiatives can be directly “attributed to the
lack of a research base” (p. 2). The recent emergence of performance pay programs contributes
to this linkage problem because an adequate research base for these programs is insufficient or
simply does not exist. Since many of these programs were in their embryonic stage, insufficient
study had been conducted to provide the conclusive evidence required for policy development
(Hodge, 2001).
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This study examined the perceptions and attitudes of school-based, certified educators in
a school district where performance pay had been in operation for the five years prior to this
study. The purpose of this study was to extend the current research base by revealing key aspects
about the cultural environment in which performance-based systems operate while determining
the motivational impact of performance pay plans on those they were intended to influence.
Evidence gathered in this study may be useful in the design of future performance-based pay
systems.

Background Information for Study
Historical Perspective

Since the 1800s, there have been at least three major teacher compensation methods:
boarding-around, grade or position-based salary schedule, and the single-salary schedule
(Protsik, 1996). Arguably, each method fit the requirements of the time period during which it
was the dominant compensation form (Odden & Kelley, 1997). By the 1950s, the single-salary
schedule had emerged as the dominant pay model in the United States, and it remained as such at
the time of the present study (Kelley, 1996; Lipsky & Bacharach, 1983).
One major challenge to the single-salary schedule can be traced back to the 1980s. The
Reagan presidential campaign sparked national interest in the concept of merit pay in regards to
compensating teachers for the quality of their performance (English, 1992). A Nation at Risk
(1983) also questioned established pay systems by calling for salaries to be “professionally
competitive, market-sensitive, and performance-based” (National Commission on Excellence in
Education, 1983, p. 30). The debate about the state of American education ignited by this
publication brought national attention to the issue of educational reform (Schlechty, 1997).
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As the clamor for reform grew, educational productivity continued to suffer from rising
costs, coupled with flat or slowly rising student achievement (Odden & Busch, 1998). Between
1960 and 1990, revenue per pupil rose more than 200% in inflation-adjusted dollars (National
Center for Educational Statistics, 1994). Despite this substantial increase, student achievement in
the core subject areas rose only slightly (Odden, 1991).
The reason behind these modest gains in improvement may be linked to how the
additional funds were spent. Findings of several major studies showed that the bulk of new
educational dollars were spent hiring specialists, providing more out-of-class services, and
lowering class size rather than directly impacting student achievement (Allington & Johnston,
1989; Odden & Busch, 1998; Slavin & Madden, 1989).
Regardless of how revenues were spent, it was improbable that future resources would
follow the rising trend over 30 years. Educational expenditures rose only a modest 4.2% from
1990 to 1997, marking a shift in the previous trend of substantial growth (Odden & Busch,
1998). In his study of school revenue, Gold (1995) found that this new trend of slow growth was
unlikely to change in the immediate future, causing policymakers to look elsewhere for the
student achievement gains they sought.

State and District Background Information

To meet the continued demand for results, policymakers across the nation turned toward
implementing a teacher performance pay model. The state of Florida added its name to the
growing list of states by enacting legislation that required a portion of a teacher’s pay be based
on performance. In 1998, the Florida Legislature enacted Section 230.23(5)(c), Florida Statute,
which required that a portion of a teacher’s salary be performance-based. The next legislative
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session saw the 1998 language expanded to provide school districts increased direction. Written
to address issues of educational accountability, the Florida Legislature passed HB751 in 1999
(Miller & Young, 1999). Signed into law by Governor Jeb Bush, this bill required school boards
to base at least 5% of the salary for school administrators and instructional personnel on annual
performance. Those individuals demonstrating outstanding performance must be allowed to earn
5% above their individual base salary. Coupled with this new requirement was a financial
penalty for noncompliance. School boards failing to adopt a salary schedule with a provision for
paying the five percent incentive by June 30, 2002, would have their disbursement of the
Educational Trust Fund held until compliance was verified (Florida Education Standards
Commission, 2003).
Although ahead of the required statutory timeline, the School District of Lee County
implemented a teacher performance pay plan during the 1998–1999 school year as a result of
Florida’s 1998 legislative direction. Working collaboratively with the Teachers Association of
Lee County (TALC), the District developed a system to compensate teachers for performance
based on a matrix developed around two key variables: individual performance and school
achievement of school improvement plan objectives. A teacher qualifying for performance pay
received a single pay bonus that was paid over and above the individual’s base salary. The
amount of performance pay an individual educator received was dependent upon a number of
variables, including how his/her entire school performed overall and how many other district
teachers qualified for the performance incentive. To be eligible for the performance bonus, the
teacher had to receive a performance evaluation (See Appendix A) with three or more ratings of
exceeds with no below standard rating. School performance was based on the school
improvement plan. The more school improvement objectives met or exceeded by an individual
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school, the more performance pay that school’s teachers would become eligible to receive. Due
to the finite nature of the allocation, the amount of the reward per individual decreased as more
teachers became eligible for performance pay.
The amount of performance pay a teacher received varied from year to year. The
performance award paid out was not only dependent on the number of teachers who received the
award but also on the amount allocated for performance pay.
During the 1998–1999 school year, the School District of Lee County allocated $500,000
for performance pay with a maximum amount paid out for performance pay of $400 per
qualifying individual. For the school year of 1999–2000, the allocation increased to $2.2 million.
The highest amount paid, slightly over $800, was given to any teacher who received a
performance evaluation with three or more ratings of exceeds who had been assigned to a school
that made exceptional progress on the school improvement objectives.
As in the previous year, the District allocated $2.2 million for performance pay for each
of the 2000–2001 and the 2001–2002 school years. A high percentage of eligible teachers
received an annual performance award ranging from $400 to $800 during this time period.
According to District records, 94% of the 3,457 eligible teachers received an award in 2002 with
over 56% receiving the maximum $850. Similarly in 2003, 96% of the 3,616 eligible teachers
received an award with 59% receiving the maximum award of $745. This system of performance
pay continued until the end of the 2002–2003 school year.
Although the School District of Lee County had been one of the first districts to
implement a new performance pay plan in response to the 1998 legislative initiative, the actual
negotiated plan did not meet the new 5% incentive requirement. Bound by a three year
negotiated contract and armed with a four year history of successful implementation, District

5

officials collaborated with the teachers union to lobby the Florida Department of Education to
approve the District’s current plan. These efforts failed, forcing the District and the Union back
to the negotiating table in the spring of 2002. A new tentative agreement was reached in May
that met the new 5% requirement but made earning the award more difficult. Teachers would
now be required to earn 11 out of 12 exceeds ratings on their evaluation to receive the bonus.
Ratification efforts failed, although the vote was almost evenly split. Negotiations reconvened in
July in an attempt to win ratification while ensuring the new plan was compliant with statutory
requirements. The District agreed to allocate an additional $300,000 and reduce the evaluation
requirement from 11 to 10 exceeds ratings. Bargaining unit members voted against the plan by an
even greater margin than the previous vote. Union officials cited the new requirement of 10
exceeds ratings was too difficult to achieve when compared to the 3 exceeds requirement of the
last four years. According to Union officials, many teachers also expressed resentment over the
state mandated requirement and voted against the plan in an effort to send a message to
legislatures regarding their dissatisfaction about performance-based plans in general. Other
reasons cited for the negative vote were the emphasis the plan gave to the principal’s evaluation
of the teacher and the lack of principal support for the plan. Principals overwhelmingly
expressed concern over being placed in the position of gatekeeper between the teacher and
performance pay.
With two failed ratifications and a rapidly approaching statutory deadline, the bargaining
teams reconvened negotiations. After three months of difficult talks, the teams reached a
tentative agreement on a jointly developed plan. Called the Outstanding Teacher Performance
Pay Plan, the new incentive program awarded a 5% bonus to teachers based on five components:
student learning gains, school-wide leadership, district leadership, staff development, and awards

6

and recognition. Teachers were rated on a rubric based on these five components. Participants
submitted applications and supporting documentation to an independent committee composed of
representatives from the district, the union, retired educators, and community members. The
teachers who received the highest score based on the rubric were awarded performance pay
equivalent to 5% of their base salary. For the 2002–2003 school year, the program was funded
with $300,000. During this school year only, the award received from the Outstanding Teacher
Performance Pay Plan was combined with performance pay earned from the older school
improvement based plan to combine for the required 5% award. This combination of two
performance pay awards was used only during this year to transition between the old and new
plan. Only 115 teachers of the approximately 3,500 eligible teachers participated in the new
program during the 2002–2003 school year, and all but 5 participants received performance pay.
During the negotiation of the new contract, the teachers’ union and District officials
agreed to eliminate the previous performance pay plan in favor of the recently negotiated and
state compliant Outstanding Teacher Performance Pay Plan. The negotiating team also agreed
to shift $2 million from performance pay into the regular salary schedule to provide teachers
with a larger increase in base pay. The remaining $500,000 was allocated to fund the
Outstanding Teacher Performance Pay Plan. Over 330 of the approximately 4,175 teachers
applied for the award during the 2003-2004 school year of which 232 participants received
performance pay.
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Statement of Problem

The problem of this study was to determine the perceptions of a Southwest Florida school
district’s school-based certified staff regarding the implementation of a performance pay
component to the current compensation system.

Research Questions

1. What are the perceptions of certified school-based personnel regarding teacher
performance pay in regard to:
a) individual efficacy and goal attainment?
b) individual impact on performance?
c) implementation of process?
d) value and equality of reward?
2. Are the perceptions of certified school-based personnel regarding teacher
performance pay associated with years of experience, association membership, level
of education, school level, past receipt of performance pay, or position?
3. What are the perceptions of certified school-based personnel regarding the impact of
teacher performance pay on their workload?
4. What are the perceptions of certified school-based personnel regarding the impact of
teacher performance pay on their performance?
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Definition of Terms

The following definitions were terms used in this study:
Administrator – school-based or district office certified personnel responsible for
supervision and evaluation of teachers and other staff members.
Association Membership – belonging to the recognized employee organization or
teachers’ union.
Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT) – the major tool for assessing student
academic achievement in the State of Florida is the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test
(FCAT). This test is an important component of the Florida Statewide Assessment Program
which measures the student’s achievement of the Sunshine State Standards in mathematics,
reading, science, and writing.
Performance Pay – any compensation system that seeks to link pay to individual, group,
or organizational performance usually based on achievement of pre-determined criteria, goals, or
objectives. In the case of Florida educators, these goals and objectives are often based upon
student achievement on the FCAT.
Professional Services Contract – a contract that continues to be renewed each year unless
the Superintendent charges the teacher with unsatisfactory performance. A teacher is eligible for
a Professional Services Contract after three successful years of service.
School Advisory Committee – a committee required by Florida Statute which develops
and approves the School Improvement Plan. It is a statutory requirement that this committee be
composed of no less than 51% non-school board employed personnel and reflect the school’s
ethnic and cultural diversity.
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School Improvement Plan – a document developed as a requirement of Florida Statute
which outlines specific goals and objectives for school improvement. This plan is developed and
approved by the School Advisory Committee and is submitted to the district school board for
final approval. In the School District of Lee County, the School Improvement Plan was once a
component of teacher performance pay.
Teachers – school-based instructional personnel responsible for direct instruction of
students.

Assumptions

1. It was assumed that the respondents to the survey, as employees of a district
implementing a performance pay component, were knowledgeable about performance
pay issues.
2. It was assumed that respondents answered survey questions honestly, accurately, and
after careful consideration. The responses were therefore considered to be valid and
useful.
3. It was assumed that the respondents’ answers to the survey provided adequate
information regarding their perceptions of performance pay as a component of the overall
compensation plan.

Conceptual Framework Overview

Although teacher compensation consumes more than 50% of each educational dollar, it
continues to be overlooked in most reform strategies (Odden, 1998). In the reform rush, many
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organizations have neglected or mishandled what could well be one of the most effective
motivating strategies – compensation (Flannery, Hofrichter, & Platten, 1996). Understanding the
validity of this claim requires an examination of the theoretical or conceptual framework
underlying motivation and the connection to compensation.
Three prominent theories explaining employee motivation were used as the conceptual
framework for this research study. The first theory is Expectancy Theory. Expectancy Theory
asserts that individuals are motivated by internal and external conditions. Motivated performance
requires a conscious decision, and people are motivated to do what they believe will result in the
reward of highest value or probability. Expectancy Theory assumes that persons work to
optimize their expectations of attaining a valued outcome and that predictions can be made
regarding their behavior if the factors that influence behavior can be quantified (Vroom, 1964).
According to the expectancy model, the decisions people make are governed by three
quantifiable factors. The first factor, valence, is the perception of a positive or negative outcome.
A positive outcome is achieved when the individual feels the reward is worth the perceived effort
required. The second factor is governed by the likelihood of achieving the outcome after
performing a particular behavior. Called instrumentality or performance to outcome, this
important factor determines how closely employees see their behavior as connected to the final
desired outcome. The third factor is expectancy, or effort to performance, which is the
individual’s perception of whether or not the behavior required is achievable. Employees must
perceive goals as realistic and believe they [employees] have the ability to achieve them (Odden
& Kelley, 1997; Rhodes & Ogawa, 1992).
The educational applicability of Expectancy Theory is of particular interest. Miskel,
McDonald, and Bloom (1983) found that when the three factors outlined in the theory were
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present, employee effort increased and so did student achievement. Also applying Expectancy
Theory, Kelley, Heneman, and Milanowski (2000) derived a model of motivation that was
adapted to the context of school-based performance awards. Central to the model are the
teachers’ perceptions of the degree to which their effort will influence student achievement and
the likelihood that meeting achievement goals will produce the desired outcomes or rewards. The
final element in the model is the relationship of the positive or negative value of these rewards or
consequences to the overall motivation of the teacher to expend effort. According to the model,
the teacher effort expended is linked to the belief about how likely that effort will result in the
attainment of student achievement objectives. The more closely the teacher perceives work effort
as linked to the desired reward, the greater the teacher’s motivation to expend effort.
The second theory used in the conceptual design of this study is Goal-Setting Theory.
Goal setting can be an important source of motivation (Bandura, 1977). More specifically,
Latham and Locke (1979) found that setting explicit goals is better for motivating behavior than
setting general goals. Furthermore, as the person becomes increasingly capable, setting more
difficult goals leads to greater performance and determination. According to Goal-Setting
Theory, employees are motivated by goals that are specific, challenging, beneficial, and
achievable (Locke & Latham, 1990).
Equity Theory is the third theoretical construct used in the design of this study. This
theory focuses on whether an individual feels his or her treatment is fair in relation to the
treatment of others. As it relates to compensation, Equity Theory purports that dissatisfaction
results when individuals perceive they are unfairly remunerated when compared to other
individuals (Frohreich, 1988). This perception is a result of an internal and subjective calculation
performed by individuals as they compare their perceived work input and resultant output to the
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perceived work input and output of others. Inputs include such factors as hours worked,
expertise, skill level, seniority, difficulty, level of responsibility, and education. Outputs include
compensation, promotion opportunities, responsibility, job security, recognition, work schedule,
and work flexibility. When an individual perceives that their input exceeds the input of other
individuals in relation to the resultant output, the conclusion that one has been treated unfairly
may occur. The perceived inequitable treatment can impact employees’ loyalty, organizational
citizenship, and motivation (Adams, 1965).

Rationale for Performance Pay

A compensation strategy can be highly effective at driving organizational change if it is
implemented in alignment with the goals, values, and culture of the organization. Individual
compensation components should be analyzed to determine the relative contribution of each
toward organizational goals and producing desired behaviors (Flannery, Hofrichter, & Platten,
1996). According to Lawler (1990), compensation structures must be in alignment with strategic
organizational initiatives to produce desired results.
Schools could accelerate reform efforts by linking compensation more directly to
educational productivity (Odden & Massy, 1992). Alignment could be achieved by replacing the
single-salary schedule with a knowledge- and skills-based schedule that includes annual bonuses
connected to educational outcomes. These bonuses would be provided to educational groups or
schools to foster collegiality and cooperation. A redesigned compensation structure that is
aligned with reform initiatives could provide incentives for improving educational productivity
and professional development (Odden & Clune, 1995).

13

Research Findings on Teacher Performance Pay Models

Although the single-salary schedule remains the primary method for teacher
compensation, researchers have suggested that there are examples of effective performancebased models. Several models were becoming popular at the time of this study (Kelley, Odden,
Milanowski, & Heneman, 2000).
Researchers Odden and Kelley (1997) have pointed out that a carefully aligned, groupbased performance award system has been effective in both the private sector and in educational
organizations. Group-based awards encourage staff to work cooperatively toward a common
goal such as improving student achievement (Kelley, 1996; Kelley, Odden, Milanowski, &
Heneman, 2000). Clotfelter and Ladd (1996) found that the group-performance award system of
the Dallas school district had a positive impact on test results when compared to similar districts.
It was important that the goals of the performance award system be consistent with other
organizational goals (Kelley et al.).
Kentucky began using a group performance-based reward system after the State Supreme
Court of Kentucky ruled the state’s educational delivery system was unconstitutional. At the time
of this study, schools were awarded funds every two years if they exceeded their specific
performance improvement goals. These funds could be used for salary bonuses, professional
development, or school improvement. During the first year of implementation, 38% of schools
met their targets (Odden & Kelley, 1997). In a more recent study, Heneman (1998) analyzed
teacher motivational reactions in the group performance award program in CharlotteMecklenburg and similar programs in Kentucky. Teachers in both study areas had concerns
about higher future goals and indicated monetary rewards were less motivating than helping
students meet achievement targets.
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Although performance awards require further research, preliminary evidence indicated
that they were found to be superior to merit pay plans. Group performance awards were aligned
with teacher motivation, especially in the area of improving student achievement (Firestone,
1994).
Contingency pay is another type of performance pay that provided rewards or incentives
contingent upon the person or group achieving a pre-determined target, goal, or behavior. The
Douglas County, Colorado, model provided a good example of this type of system. Schools
participating in the program identified and implemented activities that required pre- and post-test
documentation. Bonuses were awarded to schools that successfully completed the activities
identified (Odden & Kelley, 1997). Preliminary evidence revealed that overall student
achievement scores are expected to continually increase following the introduction of the
Douglas County model, particularly for targeted students perceived at-risk. The plan was
successfully ratified four times between 1995 and 1998 (Kelley, 2000).
Research on three different school-based performance award programs by Kelley,
Heneman III, and Milanowski (2000) showed that these systems focused teacher attention on
school goals and committed staff to the achievement of these goals at a higher level when
compared to other types of reform. Further, the researchers found that teachers who believed
performance awards would be paid and who placed a greater value on the performance award
reported higher levels of goal understanding and commitment to achieving school goals. Their
research also demonstrated that the effectiveness of the performance pay system was dependent
on whether the teachers felt that they could attain the specified goal or objective. The
effectiveness was also dependent on whether or not teachers perceived they had the resources or
support required to achieve the stated performance objectives.
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Obstacles to Implementation of Teacher Performance Pay

Studies show that one of the largest obstacles to implementing teacher performance pay
is resistance from teachers. A study by Fine (1998) examined the impact of mandated state
testing and teacher performance pay. Teachers indicated that they felt increased pressure as a
result of the testing and did not feel student performance was an accurate gauge of their ability.
Additionally, the teachers in this study disagreed with the concept of differential performance
pay. A more recent study by Kelley, Odden, Milanowski, and Heneman III (2000) found that
while there was increased pressure and stress as a result of the school-based performance award
program, “teachers believed that payment of a bonus was appropriate for improvements in school
performance” (p.5).
In a study of Virginia school districts, Brandt and Gansneder (1992) found that the
majority of teachers were not in favor of incentive pay even in districts where it was supported
by the community and school board. Researchers investigating Kentucky’s accountability and
performance program had similar findings. Although there was evidence that some Kentucky
teachers did change their instructional strategies, most in the study resented the overall program
and felt it overemphasized rewards and punishments (Kannapel, 1996).
As the chosen representative body for teachers, most teacher unions are resistant to
teacher performance pay (The National Center for Policy Analysis, 1999). The National
Education Association, the largest teachers’ union in the United States, has openly opposed
performance pay for many years. The American Federation of Teachers has also adopted a
stance against performance pay although its overall platform on the issue is more moderate
(English, 1983/1984; Lieberman, 1997). Similar to unions in the United States, the National
Union of Teachers, as well as many other smaller unions in the United Kingdom, has frequently
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asserted that performance pay is unfair and fails to address the real compensation problem
plaguing education - poor salaries (BBC Online Network, 1999).
Another obstacle to teacher performance pay is the perception that the evaluative
instrument used to assess teacher performance is unfair or biased (Brandt & Gansneder, 1992).
Opposition to North Carolina’s performance plan by the state teachers’ union was based
primarily on disagreements over the appropriateness of the evaluation system. Merit pay
problems of the past were often linked to difficulties with the evaluation process (Hetzel, 1992).
Odden and Kelley (1997) cited building trust in an evaluation process as a key component of
implementing a new teacher compensation system.
A final obstacle in the implementation of performance pay is the amount of the award. If
the performance pay amount is too small, it may not provide enough incentive for the teachers to
be motivated by it and in some cases may even be viewed negatively. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
educators complained that the small amount of the performance award ($400 - $600) did not
compensate them adequately for the extra workload necessary to achieve the required objectives
(Kelley, Heneman III, & Milanowski, 2000).

Methods
Type of Research

The type of research for this proposed study is quantitative in nature. According to Guba
(1981), quantitative research is controlled, rationalistic inquiry. Randomized selection of
subjects and administration of a standardized instrument are examples of the quantitative
methodologies utilized in this study.
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Population and Participant Selection

The population of this study consisted of the certified school-based personnel employed
by the School District of Lee County, Florida. A list of all certified school-based personnel was
obtained from the Personnel Services Department. All instructional personnel, guidance
counselors, and other members of the bargaining unit included in this population were eligible
for teacher performance pay. Additionally, school-based administrators were included in this
survey. Administrators were not eligible for teacher performance pay but were eligible for
performance awards based on the same objectives as the teacher performance pay plan.
A random sample of 1,000 members was selected from the instructional population. The
sample was representative of the target population in terms of association membership, school
type, job classification, educational level, and years of employment. Demographic data were
provided by the Personnel Services Department of the School District. Additionally, this study
included the entire population of 176 members of the school-based administrators for an overall
sample of 1,176 members.
Members of the selected sample were sent the survey instrument, consent letter, and an
envelope with return address and postage provided by the researcher. Upon completing the
survey, respondents were requested to return their responses by U.S. mail to a Florida Gulf Coast
University (FGCU) address set up specifically for this survey. Surveys were separated from the
consent letters by FGCU staff with the letters being filed and the surveys turned over to the
researcher for analysis. This process was implemented to preserve the anonymity of the
participants.
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Instrumentation

Data for this study were collected using a survey instrument, Teacher Performance Pay
Attitudinal Survey (see Appendix B), designed by the researcher. This instrument was developed
to fit the unique requirements and specific nature of this study. The instrument was developed
after a review of the literature and was reviewed by a panel of experts selected for their
knowledge of compensation and pay systems in Florida public schools. Additionally, the survey
was reviewed by experts in survey research at the University of Central Florida and Florida Gulf
Coast University prior to its administration.
A pilot survey was conducted with a sample of 50 certified school-based personnel
employed by the School District of Lee County. The purpose of this pilot survey was to field test
the instrument and check the validity and accuracy of responses.
The survey instrument consists of 28 questions. Questions 1–6 were used to collect
demographic data on certified school-based personnel and their specific school sites. Questions
7 and 8 focus on the respondent’s understanding of how performance impacts the process for
determining and distributing rewards. Expectancy Theory provided a basis for these questions
because according to this theory, the respondents’ perception of the likelihood of a desired
outcome impacts the level of performance.
Questions 9–14 focus on the respondent’s perception of teacher’s efficacy. The
theoretical framework underlying this series of questions is Expectancy Theory. Specifically
within the Expectancy Theory frame, these questions were based on the following factors: 1)
instrumentality, which determines how closely employees see their behavior as connected to the
desired outcome, and 2) expectancy, which relates to the individual’s perception of whether or
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not the behavior is achievable (Odden & Kelley, 1997; Rhodes & Ogawa, 1992). Additionally,
question 13 was connected to Equity Theory. This question examined the perceptions of
individuals regarding the chance of receiving performance pay as compared to others in the work
environment.
The respondents’ perception of the impact teacher performance pay has on real
performance is the focus of questions 15–22. The theoretical framework for these questions was
Expectancy Theory as they focus directly on the reward desirability or valence. Valence centers
on whether or not the individual perceives the expected reward as worth the effort required.
Research by Kelley, Heneman III, and Milanowski (2000) examining the impact of school-based
performance rewards on workload, work direction and stress provided the conceptual frame for
questions 18–22.
The next two questions (23–24) in the survey focused on the respondents’ perception of
whether educators should receive additional compensation for outstanding performance or for
performance which meets organizational goals. Research by Kelley, Heneman III, and
Milanowski (2000) on teachers’ perceptions of the appropriateness of performance pay is the
basis for Question 23. Equity Theory also supports this question because it examines educator
perceptions of whether or not an individual feels he or she is being treated equitably or deserves
special recognition based on the degree of input puts into the work. Goal-Setting Theory served
as the theoretical frame for question 24 by focusing on whether educators should receive
additional compensation for goal achievement.
Question 25 focused on the perceived fairness of the distribution of awards and whether
the plan was aligned with organizational goals. Equity Theory provided the theoretical
framework for this question. Additionally, Kelley, Odden, Heneman III, and Milanowski (2000)
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found that school-based performance awards achieved the best results when implemented in a
manner perceived as fair by employees and in a manner that provided amounts that were large
enough to provide incentive.
Goal-Setting Theory served as the theoretical frame for question 26. This question
centers on whether the performance pay plan structure was aligned with organizational goals.
The basis for the final questions, 27 and 28, was Expectancy Theory. These questions gather
information on the degree to which respondents value the reward.
In order to create a valid instrument, the Teacher Performance Pay Attitudinal Survey
was developed using the following process. The purpose of this survey was to obtain information
from certified school-based personnel regarding their attitudes and perceptions as related to
teacher performance pay. Once the purpose was identified, the behaviors that define the domain
were identified and used to provide a framework for the survey and the subsequent analysis.
After the initial items were prepared they were reviewed by experts in the area of survey and
educational research with Florida Gulf Coast University and the School District of Lee County,
Department of Research and Testing as well as a panel of experts in the field of educational
compensation. To increase validity, all questions were developed using the theoretical and
research framework as identified in the preceding section.
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Table 1
Survey Item Purpose, Theoretical Base, and Research Focus
Question

Purpose

Theoretical Base

Research
Question

1–6

Demographic Data

None

1, 2

7, 8

Assess knowledge

Expectancy Theory

1, 2

9-12

Perceptions of Efficacy,
Expectancy & Instrumentality

Expectancy Theory

1, 2

13

Perceptions of Equity

Equity Theory

1, 2

14

Perceptions of Efficacy &
Expectancy

Expectancy Theory

1, 2

15-22

Perceived impact on Workload,
Valence & Performance

Expectancy Theory

1-4

23

Perceptions of Appropriateness

Equity Theory

1, 2

24, 26

Perceptions of Goal Alignment,
& Appropriateness

Goal-Setting Theory

1, 2

27, 28

Perceptions of Reward Value,
& Proportion

Expectancy Theory

1, 2, 4

Instrument Reliability

An estimate of instrument reliability was obtained for the sample during the study. The
instrument was reviewed by experts, as stated previously, to secure this estimate. Items were
worded to present consistent meaning in simplified language for respondents. A pilot study was
conducted with 50 participants prior to implementation of the full study. From this pilot study, a
focus group of 7 participants was selected for an in-depth examination of the survey instrument.
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Participants were interviewed regarding the survey structure, question meaning, and ensure
consistent participant interpretation as intended by the researcher.

Data Analysis

The following provides a description of how data collected from the instrument Teacher
Performance Pay Attitudinal Survey were analyzed. While this introductory chapter contains a
brief description of how the researcher analyzed specific research questions, specific descriptions
of all analysis methods will be covered in Chapter 3.
The data analysis was designed to address the six key research questions through the five
sections of the research instrument: (a) demographics, (b) knowledge and understanding, (c)
individual efficacy and goal attainment, (d) impact on individual performance, and (e) teacher
performance pay implementation.
For Research Question 1, “What are the perceptions of certified school-based personnel
regarding teacher performance pay,” the data were presented in total to examine how the
population sample responded as a whole on each item. The response data were analyzed and
presented in percentage form for each item to display level of agreement as an entire sample.
For Research Question 2, “Are the perceptions of certified school-based personnel
regarding teacher performance pay associated with years of experience, association membership,
level of education, school level, past receipt of performance pay, or position?” the data were
disaggregated according to demographic information. An analysis of variance was performed to
analyze the relationship, if any, that existed among the demographic variables and the level of
agreement. This analysis determined if any particular demographic item, such as years of
experience or job classification, had a significant correlation with an individual’s perceptions on
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specific items related to performance pay. Relationships among items relating to perceived
efficacy and beliefs regarding teacher performance pay were examined.
The perceptions of certified school-based personnel regarding the impact of teacher
performance pay on the factors of workload and actual performance was the focus of Research
Question 3, “What are the perceptions of certified school-based personnel regarding the impact
of teacher performance pay on their workload?” For this question, the data were presented in
total to examine how the population sample responded as a whole on each item. The response
data were analyzed and presented in percentage form for each item to display level of agreement
as an entire sample. The extent to which specific demographic factors correlated with certain
perceptions of workload and performance was also investigated.
Research Question 4, “What are the perceptions of certified school-based personnel
regarding the impact of teacher performance pay on their performance?” examined individual
efficacy and whether there was a relationship among other variables in the study. Of particular
interest was the relationship of teacher performance pay to perceived efficacy.
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Table 2
Data Analysis for Research Questions
Research Question

Data Analysis

Question 1
What are the perceptions of certified
school-based personnel (CSBP) regarding
teacher performance pay?

Data presented as percentages for
responses on all items.

Question 2
Are the perceptions of CSBP regarding
teacher performance pay associated
with years of experience, association
membership, level of education, school
level, past receipt of performance pay,
or position?

ANOVA to identify relationships
and correlations among
demographic variables.

Question 3
What are the perceptions of CSBP
regarding the impact of teacher
performance pay on their workload?

Data presented as percentages for
responses on items 20-22.
ANOVA to identify relationships
among demographic variables.

Question 4
What are the perceptions of CSBP
regarding the impact of teacher
performance pay on their performance?

Data presented as percentages for
responses on items 15-18.
ANOVA to identify relationships
among demographic variables.

Delimitations

This study was delimited to certified, school-based instructional and administrative
personnel employed by the School District of Lee County. The School District of Lee County
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was chosen because in 2004 it was implementing a performance pay component as a part of its
overall compensation plan. Any inferences beyond this group should only be drawn after careful
consideration of the target population.

Limitations

1. This study was limited to one school district due to the specific nature of the performance
pay model currently being implemented. This limitation reduced the generalizability of
the study results.
2. The survey responses were limited to those obtained from participants who voluntarily
completed and returned the survey instrument.

Significance of Study
Significance to the Educational Profession

The criticism and scrutiny leveled at public education is greater than ever before.
Educators are under increasing pressure to achieve results that prove they are effective (Willis,
1999). With the outcry from public and government officials for schools to be more accountable
for producing results, many decision-makers have investigated the merits of teacher performance
pay. However, the single-salary schedule has remained the dominant method of compensation
utilized by a vast majority of school systems. This situation has created a scarcity of performance
pay models for study. As a result, much of the research on performance pay is based on business
practice and not on actual school-based study. This study will extend knowledge in this area by
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revealing teachers’ perceptions and attitudes regarding performance pay within a district that was
in this sixth year of performance pay implementation.

Significance to Understanding Organizational Culture and
Compensation Practices

This study reports educators’ perceptions regarding the use of performance pay as a
component of an overall compensation system. These perceptions provided evidence as to the
nature of the culture within which the performance pay plan must operate. Understanding
organizational culture is critical to the successful implementation of any new program (Deal &
Kennedy, 1982).
Developing a new salary system is a difficult and highly complex process requiring the
alignment of compensation with the organization’s goals and culture as well as factors that
motivate individuals within the culture. New programs often fail because they are designed
without recognizing the importance of the existing organizational culture and its perceptions,
values, and norms (Flannery, Hofrichter, & Platten, 1996). Avoiding these potential pitfalls
while designing a compensation system that is perceived as fair and equitable to all stakeholders
is a challenging task for all involved.
Although state and local policymakers have enacted several well-publicized efforts to
link teacher pay to performance over the last several years, many of these efforts were shortlived or unsuccessful (Odden & Kelley, 1997). One possible cause underlying these program
failures may be the lack of an adequate supporting research base. In a report examining effective
program designs, Packard and Dereshiwsky (1988) found that lack of a research base contributed
directly to program failure. In line with these findings, research by Odden (2000) showed that
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few existing incentive pay plans were based upon empirically derived evidence. This research
study adds to the current research base and may be useful in the design of performance-based
compensation systems in the future.

Significance to Theory of Workplace Motivation

Evaluating the motivational impact of performance-based systems on participants may
also be uncovered through an examination of the perceptions of educators. Policy-makers in the
field of human resource development are very concerned with the forces and processes through
which organizational participants develop perceptions and values concerning the organization
and how these states influence their behavior (Owens, 1991). Revealing these perceptions will
provide evidence regarding the degree to which motivational theory is predictive in explaining
the relationships that exist between performance-based compensation systems and the employees
they are intended to influence.

Summary

This chapter presents the background for the study to be discussed in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and
5. The concept of teacher performance pay has been introduced and a historical perspective
discussed in detail to provide the reader with study purpose and perspective. This chapter has
also focused on the development of the conceptual frame of the study as well as outlining the
experimental design and study significance.
Chapter 2, The Review Of Literature, contains a discussion related to performance pay
for school-based certified educators. Included in this chapter are literature reviews on the
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following topics: conceptual framework and theoretical base of performance pay, performance
pay in the non-school sector, recent research findings in the area of teacher performance pay and
performance pay models, teacher performance pay rationale, and obstacles to implementation of
performance pay.
Chapter 3, Methodology, reviews the research questions, describes the variables and
research population, details the instrumentation used to measure outcomes, and describes the
research procedures and methods of data collection of this study.
Chapters 4 and 5, Presentation and Analysis of Data, and Summary, Conclusions, and
Recommendations, present the study’s results and include a discussion of the relevancy of the
results to the research questions posed in this study.
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CHAPTER 2
THE REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Despite the many documented problems and difficulties across both the private and
public sectors, performance-based compensation structures for teachers are on the increase in the
United States and other parts of the globe (Storey, 2000). The first section of this chapter
examines the emergence of performance-based systems in the United States as related to the
most recent wave of educational reform. The next section focuses on the theoretical base of
performance pay by providing an overview of theory, empirical research as it relates to theory,
and application of theory in the educational setting. Performance pay in the non-school sector is
then discussed with an emphasis on recent trends, empirical research, obstacles, and
recommendations for performance pay plan design. The final section centers on performance pay
in the school sector. This section begins with a brief history of educational compensation
followed by a discussion on recent models implemented in the United States with a particular
focus on recent changes in Florida. Research findings on performance-based compensation in the
educational setting are then discussed focusing in the following areas: attitudes and perceptions,
motivation, performance, expectancy, and student achievement. The final section of this chapter
is a brief discussion of obstacles to implementing teacher performance-based systems.
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The Call for Educational Reform

In 1975, Presidential candidate Jimmy Carter ran on a platform which called for the
formation of a Department of Education. Four years later, his opponent Ronald Reagan called for
the elimination of that same department. Presidential attention to this issue of public education
raised it from a local and state issue to one of national prominence (Sarason, 1982). On the heels
of Reagan’s ascension to the Presidency came the publication of A Nation at Risk (1983)
bringing the debate over the quality of America’s public schools to the center of the national
agenda. The report charged that “if an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on
America the mediocre education performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as
an act of war” (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983, p. 1). Never before had
public education been exposed to such a threat, as concern about educational quality soared and
confidence in the nation’s educational institutions sank to a new low (Schlechty, 1997).
As a whole, A Nation at Risk gave a scathing assessment of the current status of
education in the United States. To support these assertions, the Commission on Excellence in
Education (1983) cited several indicators of declining educational quality including the poor
performance by American students in international comparisons on standardized tests, the
decline in achievement level over the previous two decades on the Scholastic Aptitude Test, a
steady decline in student achievement in science, and an alarming increase in the need for
remedial mathematics courses at public 4-year colleges.
The Commission also cited a need to attract more academically talented students to the
teaching profession, stating that too many current educators were recruited from the bottom
quartile of college students. The report also reported that teaching salaries were so low that
educators often had to supplement their income with part-time or summer jobs.
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To address the problems of attracting talented individuals to the teaching profession, A
Nation at Risk contained many sweeping recommendations in teaching compensation: “Salaries
for the teaching profession should be increased and should be professionally competitive,
market-sensitive, and performance-based” (National Commission on Excellence in Education,
1983, p.2). Further, the report recommended that salary, promotion, and retention decisions be
driven by the evaluation process that rewards excellent teachers and works to improve average
ones.
The public outcry resulting from this debate helped drive ambitious reform efforts in
many states resulting in increased educational funding during the 1980s. Overall, per-pupil
spending during this decade rose 30% in inflation adjusted dollars. While these financial
increases were significant, they proved to be enough to cover only growth and inflation.
Implementing the recommendations of A Nation at Risk called for an additional increase in perpupil spending of 20–25% by some estimates, which was too high a cost for most policy-makers
(Odden, 1992). Similarly, the Carnegie Forum on Education and the Economy recommended
increases of 26% in per pupil spending in the report A Nation Prepared: Teachers for the 21st
Century. Again, many thought this recommended increase was too high and favored lower cost
strategies in the quest for educational improvement (Odden, 1992).
Despite the substantial increases in educational funding during the 1980s, the
recommendations contained in the reports A Nation at Risk and A Nation Prepared: Teachers for
the 21st Century were never fully implemented (Odden, 1990). Many of the programs heralded to
produce major systemic reform during the 1980s actually produced very little in the way of true
results (Firestone, Fuhrman, & Kirst, 1989). With the 1990s came recession, sparking spending
cuts, downsizing, and reengineering in private industry. Public educators were also forced to
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streamline budgets and reduce runaway spending, causing policy-makers to begin looking at
alternatives to increased funding for the educational improvements they were seeking.
Despite these spending reductions, many researchers and policymakers believed that
there were ample financial resources within the existing public education system to achieve the
necessary reform. Improving the productivity and quality of public education, however, required
significant restructuring so that the educational dollar could be used much more effectively
(Odden & Busch, 1997). Seen by many as the best hope for successful reform, teacher
compensation emerged as a major focus of state policymakers with at least 22 states
implementing or developing alternatives to the existing teacher pay system in the early 1990s
(Odden, 1992). There were two primary reasons that accounted for this focus on teacher
compensation. First, teachers were recognized as extremely influential in impacting student
achievement (Darling-Hammond, 1984). In support of this assertion, research by Sanders and
Rivers (1996) found that teacher effectiveness had the largest impact on student achievement
when compared to other variables, including class size, materials, and instructional delivery. It is
reported that the student achievement differences attributed to teacher effectiveness can vary as
much as fifty percentile points over a three year period (Darling-Hammond, 2000). Second,
many political and educational leaders held the belief that highly effective teachers should be
paid more or rewarded for outstanding achievement. Toward this end, policy-makers
recommended changes in compensation in the form of career ladders, merit pay, and other
performance incentives to reward these outstanding teachers (National Commission for
Excellence in Education, 1983).
Defined as any system that seeks to link pay to individual, group, or organizational
performance (Milkovich & Widgor, 1991), performance pay has recently emerged as a central
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topic in both scholarly and political debates over how to best change compensation methods.
Heralded as an industry best practice and critical component to increasing productivity,
performance pay is often criticized for its impact on morale and employee cooperation. As
organizations face escalating cost and competitive pressure, decision-makers are increasingly
looking toward changes in how employees are paid as a means of reform. Compensation
typically comprises a significant portion of overall organizational costs. Since employee effort is
not necessarily fixed, the role of compensation in affecting this effort is seen as important to
organizational performance. Organizations are motivated to develop mechanisms, such as
performance pay, which encourage employees to work toward forwarding the goals of the
organization (Brown & Heywood, 2002).

Conceptual Framework

Performance pay and other financial incentives were not new concepts suddenly
emerging from the reform movements of the period. Organizational theorists have long
recognized that people are the critical component of every social organization (Barnard, 1938).
Organizations seek to motivate people to join the organization, perform assigned roles within the
organization, and work to achieve organizational goals even when it requires behaviors that
exceed their perceived role. To encourage these behaviors, organizations provide those who
perform the desired behavior with rewards in the form of financial incentives, benefits, and
social affiliation (Katz, 1964).
Of all these incentives for encouraging organizational membership and performance, pay
is one of the most powerful (Perry, 2003). There is no doubt that money directs behavior. People
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change jobs, invest revenue, trade stock, and even break the law to acquire it. Money also defines
and communicates identity, status, and personal value in Western culture.
Flannery, Hofrichter, and Platten (1996) asserted that organizations must closely link
compensation to people, their performance, and the overall organizational vision. Others would
agree with this assertion. Churchill and Pecotich (1982) found that money was the predominant
motivating factor of sales people in the United States. Pay in the form of financial compensation
is a primary incentive to work; however, money alone is not always sufficient to produce high
levels of performance (Latham & Locke, 1979). Understanding why pay is a strong motivator
requires a closer examination of the theoretical rationale behind performance based financial
compensation.
Performance-based compensation plans can be derived from several theoretical bases.
The Skinnerian approach is based on the premise that behavior can be altered by pay and other
motivating incentives that are found within the environment (Swanson & King, 1997). Although
relatively straightforward in its approach, this theory falls short in describing a complex set of
motivating factors influencing employee behavior. This study will instead focus on three
theoretical bases for developing strategies which link compensation to employee performance:
Expectancy Theory, Goal-Setting Theory, and Equity Theory.

Expectancy Theory

Expectancy Theory attempts to reconstruct the cognitive processes that motivate an
individual to strive toward meeting a particular goal or objective. The theory postulates that
individuals are more likely to strive for a certain level of performance if they expect to receive a
valued reward (Vroom, 1964). People are motivated to do what they believe will result in the
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reward of highest value or probability and make conscious decisions about their behavior as a
direct result of their beliefs. Expectancy Theory posits that persons work to optimize their
expectations of attaining a valued outcome and that predictions can be made regarding their
behavior if the factors that influence behavior can be quantified (Vroom, 1964).
The occurrence of a motivated behavior is dependent upon the interaction among three
important conditions (Vroom, 1964). First, individuals must think that they have a reasonable
probability of being able to accomplish a goal. Called expectancy, this condition is dependent
upon whether or not individuals feel that obtaining a specific goal or outcome is within their
control and that they have the necessary skills or talents required. The goal must be realistic and
within an individual’s perceived capability. In order to be realistic, the individual must perceive
that enough time, supplies, and support are available to expend on the effort.
The second condition, instrumentality, is the perceived connection between the individual
effort and receiving the reward. Also called line of sight or performance to outcome, this
condition or component of expectancy theory is governed by the perceived probability of
achieving a desired outcome after performing a particular behavior.
The third important condition is valence. Valence is the degree of preference that one has
for a potential outcome. Valence can be either a positive outcome such as a reward or a negative
outcome such as a consequence or punishment. Whether or not receiving the reward or avoiding
the consequence is worth the perceived effort is the key element of valence. If a perceived
reward is achievable but is not worth the anticipated effort required to achieve it, then individuals
would not be motivated to expend that effort necessary (Bass & Ryterband, 1979; Lawler, 1994;
Odden & Kelley, 1997; Perry, 2003; Vroom, 1964).
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Expectancy Theory provides an excellent model for analyzing an individual’s behavior
because it focuses on how the organization impacts employee performance in several ways. First,
it recognizes that an individual experiences motivation in varying degrees of intensity which are
dependent upon the complex interaction between valence and expectancy. If the task is difficult
the probability that the effort will result in task performance is low. If the task is easy the
probability is high, but often easy jobs are boring and unrewarding. Managers must strike a
balance so that the probability of success is reasonable yet not so easy as to be unchallenging.
Second, the equity and adequacy of the reward system influences the individual’s perception that
the effort will lead to a reward or consequence. If the allocation of reward fails to account for
differences in effort or input of different individuals, there will be an adjustment downward by
individuals to equate with the reward or output. Finally, the reward must be desirable in relation
to the perceived effort required to accomplish the necessary task. Managers must account for
these perceptions when planning any system used to motivate individuals to higher performance
levels (Klingner & Nalbandian, 2003).
The connection of Expectancy Theory to performance-based compensation is of
particular interest in this study. Numerous empirical research studies support compensation plans
established on the basic tenets of Expectancy Theory. The most notable research focuses on
instrumentality or the degree to which an individual views the receipt of a reward as connected to
his or her effort. Empirical research shows that the closer the perceived connection is between
effort and the compensation reward, the more effective the reward programs are at motivating
individuals (Cherrington, Ritz, & Scott, 1980; Heneman 1992; Lawler, 1990; Lawler, 1994;
Lawler, 2000; Odden & Kelley, 1997).
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Expectancy Theory has also been linked to the educational setting in empirical research
on teacher motivation. Kelley, Heneman III, and Milanowski (2000) developed a model for
teacher motivation based on Expectancy Theory. In the model a teacher’s motivation is a
function of expectancy, instrumentality, and reward value. The motivation of a teacher to expend
effort toward the goal of increasing student achievement is correlated to how likely the effort
will result in the achievement desired. The more a teacher sees his or her work directly
impacting student achievement, the greater the teacher’s motivation. The teacher’s perceived
strength of this connection between effort and student achievement is influenced by the teacher’s
perception of his or her own efficacy and other external support factors, such as the condition of
the learning environment, professional development opportunities, or administrative support.
The reward or outcome associated with the desired performance of a teacher is also
important. The teacher must see the reward as worth the effort in order to be motivated toward
the performance objective. Rewards such as extra compensation for reaching student
achievement objectives must be an amount large enough to be worth the perceived effort
required to attain the rewards. Negative consequences can also provide motivation if the
consequences are large enough to be of concern. Failure to receive a bonus, criticism from the
principal, a poor performance evaluation, and a threatened job security are all possible negative
consequences potentially motivating to teachers (Kelley, Heneman III, & Milanowski).
The theoretical model developed by Kelley, Heneman III, and Milanowski (2000)
demonstrates that performance-based rewards are highly complex. Teachers must value the
outcomes associated with the desired student achievement level and must think that they can
positively impact the result. They must also believe that the effort is worth the potential reward
or worth avoiding the negative outcome.

38

Goal-Setting Theory

Goal-Setting Theory is the second part of the conceptual design used in support of this
study. First forwarded by Locke (1968) as a theory on employee motivation, Goal-Setting
Theory asserts the importance of goals in the work environment. In order to be motivating, these
goals must be specific, clear, challenging, and achievable (Latham & Locke, 1979). In order for
individuals to be motivated, they must be able to understand the goal and be committed to
achieving it. Similar to Expectancy Theory, Goal-Setting Theory also asserts that goals that are
linked to desirable rewards are likely to gain a higher level of support (Kelley, Heneman III, &
Milanowski, 2000; Mento, Cartledge, & Locke, 1980).
It is possible to use Goal-Setting Theory as a part of a compensation system by linking
goal attainment to financial rewards (Odden & Kelley, 1997). Heneman III (1992) found that the
motivation is the greatest when goals and compensation for performance are linked. Further, the
importance of goal setting can be reinforced by increasing the amount of compensation for more
difficult and challenging goals.
Empirical research supports that goals are effective at motivating employees to higher
performance levels. Locke (1968) found a positive correlation between the difficulty of the goal
and the level of performance. Monetary incentives, time limits, and knowledge of results,
however, did not impact performance levels independent of the individual’s goals and intentions.
In a subsequent study, individual dissatisfaction with performance was also found to correlate
highly with the difference between the goal level and the performance level (Locke, Cartledge, &
Knerr, 1970).
A study of the logging industry found that clear production goals combined with
supervisory presence resulted in significant productivity increases (Latham & Locke, 1979).

39

Similarly, workers provided with clear goals reported greater satisfaction in their work, greater
motivation, and attended to greater attention and detail resulting in better performance (Locke &
Bryan, 1969). A study of typists also found that significant performance gains were realized
when specific goals are set (Latham & Locke, 1979).
Adapting this theory to the context of school-based performance awards, Kelley,
Heneman III, and Milanowski (2000) have asserted that student achievement objectives that are
specific and perceived as achievable will promote stronger expectancy and focus teacher effort.
Teachers are more likely to be motivated by programs where states and districts have clear,
specific, and achievable requirements or objectives.

Equity Theory

Equity Theory is the third and final part of the conceptual design used in support of this
study. Equity Theory helps explain the internal, cognitive processes which relate to how
individual perceptions are formed about whether the individual feels he or she is being treated
fairly or unfairly. The development of this perception is an internal and subjective calculation
based on comparisons made to another relevant person. This complex calculation compares
inputs to relative outputs in order to determine if an equitable balance exists between the two.
The person’s perception of equity requires that the outputs individuals receive balance the inputs
provided by those same individuals (Adams, 1965).
Outputs vary widely and include such factors as the amount of compensation or
recognition received or the responsibility given relative to other individuals. Job promotion,
security, work schedule, autonomy, office size, and location are all considered outputs. Inputs
are comprised of what an individual perceives he or she brings to the equation including such
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factors as experience, level of work difficulty, seniority, education level, and type of work.
Gender, political affiliation, age, and other non-merit factors such as the ability to get along,
organizational commitment and loyalty are also often included in this calculation (Adams, 1965).
There are two types of subjective comparisons that take place in an equity calculation.
The first comparison is the comparison of the degree of input to the resulting output. In this
comparison the person considers the amount of effort put forth and the qualifications he or she
brings to the amount of the resultant output such as compensation or recognition. If the input is
perceived by the individual as balanced with the output then it is considered equitable (Adams,
1965). If input provided is perceived as disproportional to the relative output, then the individual
is likely to feel the result is inequitable (Frohreich, 1988).
The second comparison is a comparison of outputs received by the individual in relation
to other outputs received by other individuals based on their inputs. In a similar comparison, the
individual compares the inputs of others to his or her input with the resultant outcomes received.
It is important to note that a perception of equity does not require equal outputs, only that outputs
are proportional to inputs and that individuals with comparable inputs receive comparable
outputs (Adams, 1965).
Equity Theory has wide application as it relates to compensation and other financial
rewards because these factors are basic to the internal comparison central in this theory. An
individual’s perception of compensational equity is formed from the perception of inputs both of
the individual and other individuals relative to the compensation received. This theory asserts
that individuals become dissatisfied when they perceive they are unjustly compensated in
relation to others (Frohreich, 1988). An individual’s perception of equitable treatment impacts
loyalty and motivation (Klingner & Nalbandian, 2003).
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The purpose of compensation is to influence behavior in such a way as to forward the
purpose and goals of an individual or organization. How compensation systems, including
performance pay, influence employee perceptions and motivation is critical to understanding
how these systems work. Expectancy Theory, Goal-Setting Theory, and Equity Theory all
provide insight into employee perceptions and motivations and are therefore the critical
conceptual frame upon which this study is based. Research findings in the area of performance
pay also contribute significantly to understanding the operation of performance pay. This review
now shifts to these findings as they relate to performance pay in both the non-school and
educational setting.

Performance Pay in the Non-School Sector

The non-school sector has linked pay to employee performance, knowledge level, and
skills for many years (Lawler, 1990). The ultimate goal in many cases is to align the interests of
employees with the goals of the corporation thus maximizing profit margins. Toward this end,
many organizations have implemented a variety of performance pay models.

Individual-based Performance Pay

One of the simplest and most widely used performance models is paying piece rates. In
this plan, the worker is paid based on a standard production or measurement for a particular job.
Piece rate systems were once very common in the manufacturing sector. Early studies showed
promising results. The Western Electric studies reported by Roethlisberger and Dickerson (1939)
found that production increased by 12.6 % when workers switched to a piece-rate plan.
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Piece-rate plans have experienced a significant decrease in utilization in recent years. An
American Management Association survey conducted during World War II reported that 62% of
direct producers were paid based on piece-rate or commission dependent on output (Lawler,
2000). More recently, however, utilization of this model has dramatically declined with the
increased complexity of work within the manufacturing sector (Lawler).
Part of the decline in the use of piece rate pay plans can be attributed to the inherent
weaknesses of these systems. In practice, these models are typically expensive to administer due
to the extensive bookkeeping and quality control requirements. These increased production costs
may actually counter any production increases rendering these systems ineffective. Furthermore,
conflicts about the piece rate standard may occur leading to dissension and dissatisfaction among
the work force. In the past, this dissatisfaction often stemmed from conflict over how standards
are developed and how performance was measured for piece rate systems (Lawler, 1994).
Workers feared management would raise output requirements and lower the per-piece incentive
and reacted by intentionally restricting their output despite the incentive. A study of one
American machine shop revealed that workers informally enforced self-imposed output
restrictions created to prevent some workers from increasing their output to earn the incentive.
The result of this tactic was a work day waste of as much as three hours (Roy, 1952). Similarly,
the Western Electric studies (Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939) uncovered a strict rule on output
restriction which was rigorously enforced by workers. Individuals who did not adhere to this rule
were subjected to consequences ranging from a hit in the arm to being degraded by other
workers.
Another form of performance pay is based on commission. These plans have been shown
to be highly effective at motivating salespeople. Unlike workers in the manufacturing sector,
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salespeople typically work in relative isolation and are, therefore, less likely to coerce each other
into artificially restricting productivity (Bass & Ryterband, 1979). Sales rates are usually not set
by management, instead employees compete against their own past performance.
The type of individual attracted to a sales position is also more likely to possess a high
level of initiative and internal work motivation. These characteristics are often closely aligned
with the typical commission system which rewards for individual effort (Bass & Ryterband,
1979). An example of a commission-based performance pay plan reported to be highly
motivating was the one implemented by EMC Corporation (Lawler, 2000). EMC Corporation
based 65% of the pay of sales executives on commission and placed no cap on productivity. As
a result, more than 600 of these executives earned an average of $250,000 a year, with the top
five performers earning more than $1 million. Goals for EMC representatives were set
extremely high and were coupled with severe consequences for poor performance. Lawler
(2000) reports that in 1997, more than 50 sales executives at EMC lost their jobs as a direct
result of not meeting their goals. EMC Corporation’s plan of high risk and high reward has been
shown to be highly motivating to its sales force.
Regardless of the form, organizations that offer individual performance pay were likely
to attract and retain more productive workers. In a survey of four case studies, Parent (2002)
reported a positive relationship between increased productivity and the use of performance pay.
A study by Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997) showed that performance pay plans
positively impacted productivity, though, only when used in combination with other effective
management practices. Supporting these results was a survey conducted by the U.S. Government
in 1945 (Lawler, 1994) of 514 pay incentive plans. The survey showed firms implementing
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performance pay plans demonstrated on average a 39% increase in production and an 11.6%
decrease in labor costs.
Performance pay systems that have a positive impact on productivity have been shown to
be motivating to employees. One characteristic often associated with these motivating plans are
reward systems that are valued by employees and connected or linked to productive behaviors.
One example of this type of reward system was reported in a study of Australian factories. The
researchers found that factory incentive plans closely connecting pay to individual performance
resulted in improved labor efficiency, increased employee earnings, and decreased supervisory
requirements (Bass & Ryterband, 1979).
The introduction of performance pay may not always be directly linked to productivity
increases of an organization. An extensive study on the impact of performance rewards on the
productivity of federal managers was conducted over a four-year period. During the first two
years of the study, the productivity of the managers was not linked to performance pay. The
third and fourth year, however, productivity was linked to pay. While productivity steadily
increased over the entire four-year period of the study, the researchers found no connection
between performance pay and the increased productivity. The introduction of the link between
pay and productivity caused no effect on the overall trend (Pearce, Stevenson, & Perry, 1985).

Group-based Performance Pay

Although not as common as individual-based performance pay, a significant number of
group-based performance pay plans have been attempted. Group-based plans base the pay award
on the performance of the organization or group on some measure of organizational effectiveness
(Lawler, 1994). A critical difference between group-based plans and individual-based plans is
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that group-based plans reward all employees within the group or organization regardless of
individual performance or contribution.
One extensively researched group-based plan is the Scanlon Plan. In this model,
employees receive extra compensation to the extent that performance improvements yield more
output while keeping overhead and labor costs neutral (Bass & Ryterband, 1979). A study of
nine firms implementing the Scanlon Plan reported productivity increases of 22.5% the first year
and 23.7% the second year (Puckett, 1958). Advantages include improved quality control and a
greater willingness for experienced workers to train new employees. The plan also eliminates the
tendency to restrict output often found in piece-rate plans (Bass & Ryterband).
Studies reporting on worker perceptions of performance-based pay report mixed results.
A study of British factory workers showed that 66% of workers interviewed reported
dissatisfaction with the group performance bonus plan. The survey indicated greater discussion
and communication about the bonus plan was needed to increase worker comprehension and
understanding. Conversely, a study of British automobile plants and metal-rolling mills reported
positive employee responses regarding group-based performance bonuses and group piece rates
(Bass & Ryterband, 1979).

Individual-based Compared to Group-based

Comparisons between individual-based performance pay plans and group-based
performance pay plans illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of both systems. A study of the
productivity of British factory workers showed a decrease in output as the size of the employee
group increased. Further, the researcher found that workers paid individual-based incentives
outperformed workers in even the smallest groups (Marriott, 1949). A study by Campbell (1952)
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suggests a possible explanation for this lower productivity in larger groups. While larger groups
were shown to be less productive than smaller groups, the larger groups reported less of a
connection between pay and their performance.

Individual-based and Group-based Combined

The Lincoln Electric Plan (Lincoln, 1951) combined both individual and group-based
incentives. The performance pay bonus paid to each employee was dependent upon company
profits and the individual employee performance rating. This plan attempted to motivate
employees to work together to forward organizational goals while also working to enhance their
individual performance rating. After implementation of the Lincoln Electric Plan, sales
increased dramatically while employee wages increased. During the same time period the
company experienced lower employment costs, lower staff turn-over, and no work stoppages
(Bass & Ryterband, 1979).

Incidence of Performance Pay in the Non-School Sector

Despite the voluminous literature on the topic, performance pay is far from the most
dominant and widespread means of compensation used in the non-school sector. Flannery,
Hofrichter, and Platten (1996) surveyed more than 500 companies and found that although many
were considering implementation of performance-based compensation, most had not yet done so.
Of the companies sampled, 19% had implemented profit sharing, 16% gain-sharing, and only
13% had long-term incentive programs.
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Obstacles and Challenges to Performance Pay in the Non-School Sector

Flannery, Hofrichter, and Platten (1996) have speculated that the reluctance of many
organizations to implement performance-based compensation plans is based in part on charges
by critics that performance-based incentives are ineffective or actually do more harm than good.
For example, Deming (1990) was critical of extrinsic rewards, stating that this method of
management stifled intrinsic motivation and the desire to learn new skills. Kohn (1993) asserted
that incentives discourage risk taking, pit employee against employee, destroy teamwork and
cooperation, and fail to address the real crux of the organizational problem. However, Lawler
(2000) argued that critics like Deming not only failed to acknowledge the motivating aspects of
performance-based pay, but they also have not provided a viable alternative to performancebased systems. Even though there remains a substantial amount of criticism, the belief in the
principles of performance pay compensation plans remains strong among managers and policymakers seeking to attain productivity gains (Milkovich & Wigdore, 1991).
Arguably, many of these attempts at implementing performance pay have fallen short of
intended outcomes. Despite general agreement around the motivating effect of pay, very little
psychological research has been completed on how pay actually operates as a motivating force
and how effective at motivating pay incentives are both before and after the incentive is earned
(Bass & Ryterband, 1979).
A careful examination of the literature that is available reveals common problems
associated with performance pay systems causing many compensation plans to fall short of
expectations. The most prominent of these problems are dysfunctional competition, inadequate
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reward, invalid data, inadequate performance appraisal and evaluation systems, and union
resistance (Lawler, 1994; Perry, 2003).

Dysfunctional competition

Dysfunctional competition among employees is one of the more common flaws of
performance pay systems. Research by Drago and Garvey (1998) examined helping behaviors of
workers under different compensation schemes. The researchers found that individual
promotion-based incentives and compensation prize incentives tended to decrease helping
behaviors or cooperation among workers.
Many of these performance pay systems that are competitive in nature are typically
designed to reward individual as opposed to group performance. This discriminating design
divides employees into two groups, those who receive the reward and those who do not.
Typically, more individuals are placed in the category of not receiving the reward simply due to
the limitations of the reward rather than actual employee performance. According to Meyer
(1975), the impact of not receiving a reward where evaluative feedback is implicitly connected to
the achievement of these reward is actually damaging to the employee’s self image and may
negatively impact productivity as a result.
Competitive performance rewards may also reduce the amount of time an employee is
willing to devote to activities which fall outside the boundaries covered by the performance pay
plan. Empirical research by Deci (1975) shows that extrinsic rewards, such as performance pay
bonuses, actually undermine intrinsic motivation and cause individuals to seek shortcuts to
achieving the reward. Additionally, performance pay may cause employees to avoid spending
time devoted to tasks not rewarded by the performance pay plan. Time spent on tasks not
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covered by the plan was found to be perceived by employees as a waste of valuable time
potentially causing a loss of ground to other employees vying for the same award (Perry, 2003).

Inadequate Financial Award

Another problem linked to performance pay is the lack of adequate financial reward.
Politicalization of the budget process, particularly in the public arena, results in reduced funding
for performance pay plans. Therefore, only the highest performers are therefore eligible for the
rewards and even among this elite category there may be only a few actually recognized. This
limitation has a demoralizing effect on employees. In a study of federal workers, Milkovich and
Wigdore (1991) found that insufficient funds were set aside to effectively motivate employees.
Further, it was found that performance appraisals were inflated and that employees questioned
the equitable distribution of the monetary rewards.
Inadequate funding often leads to another inherent problem with performance pay
systems. Since only a finite amount of monetary reward is allocated, many of the systems are
not only based on one’s individual performance but also where that performance ranks among all
eligible. Ranking effectively limits the reward to only those individuals above a certain rank.
The established cut-off rank or score for employees receiving the reward is often dependent upon
available funding. Employees come to understand that receiving a reward is not only based on
performance but also where one ranks in the overall performance evaluation system. Improving
one’s ranking requires lowering the ranking of others thus lowering the expectation that the
reward is actually truly connected to performance (Perry, 2003).
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Invalid Data

Performance reward systems often rely upon the evaluation of data for the determination
of who receives a reward. These systems may encourage the production of invalid data about
performance predictions and actual performance outcomes (Lawler, 1994). Case studies by
Whyte (1955) provide vivid examples of how workers intentionally lowered output to
manipulate the setting of the piece rate standard and then increased output to earn additional
performance pay. Similarly, Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939) found that workers reported
consistent daily production figures by overstating production data on days where production was
low and understating production data when production was high.

Inadequate Performance Appraisals and Evaluation Systems

Performance pay systems motivate individuals for performance in areas measured by the
performance evaluation or appraisal system. Unfortunately, many of these systems rely on
performance appraisals that do not adequately measure all necessary aspects of a job for overall
effectiveness. Interviews conducted with managers show that many of them found appraisals
difficult, time consuming, and inadequate at identifying superior performance. Difficulty in
quantifying and documenting performance differences often resulted in the demise of the
performance pay program (Perry, 2003).
Perry (2003) found that employees reported that attempts to objectify performance
resulted in a focus on goals that, although measurable, were trivial and of little consequence to
overall job performance. As a result, performance appraisals often did not focus on aspects of the
job that were truly important. It is unlikely that individual behavior will be influenced by
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performance pay if employees feel the reward is not adequately connected to performance. For
example, Pearce and Perry (1985) found that federal managers perceived that the criteria
measured by the appraisal instrument did very little to actually improve individual performance
or organizational effectiveness. Milkovich and Wigdore (1991) found that less than one-third of
federal employees rated their performance appraisal as effectively connecting performance to
pay.
Another flaw with performance appraisals is that they are often used to control the
compensation budget by limiting the number of employees receiving the reward. This artificial
deflation of appraisals to limit the amount of reward paid out to employees actually undercuts the
validity of the appraisal system and performance pay (Pfeffer, Hanzlik & Pearce, 1982). The
result of this artificial deflation may actually decrease the employee motivational response to
incentives (Perry, 2003).
Sometimes it is not the individual employee appraisal that is flawed, but instead it is the
method of evaluating overall organizational effectiveness. Like appraisals, organizational
evaluation systems linked to performance pay tend to motivate individuals in areas that are
measured by the performance evaluation system. These systems may or may not measure all
worker tasks or behaviors required. As a result, those tasks or behaviors not measured by the
appraisal may be poorly performed or not performed at all (Lawler, 1994).
In a study of Soviet plant managers, Berliner (as cited in Lawler, 1994) found that a
performance evaluation system that linked incentives to increased production caused managers
to ignore other job requirements such as restricting supply orders despite a tight supply system.
Managers over-ordered supplies, hoarded resources materials, and expended great resources
legally and otherwise toward the goal of keeping the plant supplied at all costs. A case study of
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department stores found that incentive pay systems did initially increase sales in the areas
measured by the evaluation system but also found that employees neglected other unrewarded
but necessary functions such as stock work and arranging merchandise (Babchuk & Goode,
1951).

Poor Connection Between Pay and Performance

Another flaw with certain performance pay systems is a failure to link the pay
adequately to the desired performance. If the connection between the performance and reward is
not evident, the individual may not be motivated to produce the intended outcome. A study of
the manufacturing industry examined the interactions of employee perceptions of valence,
instrumentality, and expectancy and the impact of these interactions on performance. In this
study, Schwab and Dyer (1973) reported the correlation between the perceived instrumentality of
pay and the employees’ performance was not significant. The authors in this study found little
connection between pay and the amount of work completed (Schwab & Dyer, 1973).

Union Opposition

As a general rule, most labor unions oppose performance pay (Heywood, Siebert, & Wei,
1997). Much of this opposition stems from the belief that performance pay mechanisms are
merely management schemes employed to hold down or lower employee base pay. The political
structure of most unions tends to create a climate which fosters solidarity in wages and,
therefore, discourages individual pay differentials based on performance. Unions also tend to be
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concerned with equitable treatment and often view performance pay as a compensation method
fraught with problems in this area (Brown & Heywood, 2002).
Although union opposition has appeared to impede the implementation, union coverage
and membership is declining. Coinciding with the decrease is an increase in the use of
performance pay bonuses over the same period, suggesting that the union decline has allowed
firms to offer more flexibility in compensation methods (Parent, 2002).

Recommendations from the Non-School Sector

Despite the many difficulties associated with performance pay, Flannery, Hofrichter, and
Platten (1996) asserted that the problems with performance-based plans stemmed from a lack of
understanding about compensation leading to a misapplication of the concept. Many of the
reported failures of these plans were traceable to errors which could have been corrected (Perry,
2003). Ample empirical evidence and reported experience clearly indicate the requirements for
an effective performance pay system (Lawler, 2000; Perry).
As noted earlier, inadequacies in performance appraisals and evaluation systems are large
problems often associated with performance pay systems. In many cases, these instruments are
employed without testing and validation leading to many unforeseen problems during
implementation (Perry, 2003).
Effective performance pay plans must have a comprehensive measurement system for
performance that is aligned with regular work activities. These performance measures must be
objective and perceived as credible with employees (Lawler, 2000). Development of appraisal or
evaluation systems of this nature require a significant amount of time and energy to design and
test. Latham and Locke (1979) asserted that an effective system may take three to five years to
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develop. Further, implementation must be gradual to allow participants to develop agreement and
support for the performance pay plan.
Performance pay plans must be developed in a manner adapted to the culture and values
of the organization. Frequently, compensation plans were not synchronic with the organization’s
values and processes and, therefore, often had implementation problems (Flannery, Hofrichter, &
Platten,1996). Performance pay plans are more likely to be effective if the organizational culture
is supportive. It is important that the organizational culture exist where values are aligned with
the pay system prior to implementation. Instead of leading the organizational change,
performance pay must follow, support and reinforce the change after it has already occurred
(Golembiewski, 1986).
Employees must be encouraged to participate in the design and administration of
performance pay plans. This active involvement fosters higher trust and approval while
facilitating patterns of interaction among organizational members who support the performance
pay plan (Golembiewski, 1986; Lawler, 1990).
Performance pay plans must operate in work environments that are dynamic and contain
contextual factors which may influence motivation. Pay plans should be flexible to change and
must be designed to account for these influences. Further, performance rewards must be
meaningful to the employee to be motivating (Perry & Porter, 1982).
The non-school sector has a long history of experimenting with the concept of
performance pay with varied degrees of success. A wide range of different models and plans
have been attempted toward furthering the goals of increasing worker motivation and
organizational productivity. While some of these models succeeded in increasing company
profits or worker output, many others had detrimental impacts on worker morale and
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cooperation. The experience of the non-school sector has helped shape and mold compensation
models applied in the educational sector. Education has long looked to business and industry for
effective models in management practice and worker compensation. Politicians and policymakers often turn to business and private industry for models of best practice as they struggle to
find ways to make public education more accountable and efficient. Performance pay for
educators is just one example of a practice taken from the non-school sector and applied in the
educational arena. Similar to its non-school counterpart, performance pay applied in the
educational setting has also been implemented using a variety of models that have garnered
mixed results.

Performance Pay in the Educational Sector

Although not an entirely new concept, performance pay for educators marks a dramatic
departure from the current compensation plan which has been in place for the last 50 years.
Historically, changes in compensation methods for teachers and other educators has been
evolutionary rather than revolutionary with only three major shifts in the last 200 years (Odden
& Kelley, 1997). An examination of this evolution provides both context and perspective on the
most recent movement to link teacher pay to performance. A historical review also provides
insight and deepens understanding of the obstacles faced by policy-makers while implementing
performance pay models.
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Historical Perspective on Educational Compensation

In the past 200 years only 3 approaches in teacher compensations have been widely
implemented: boarding-around, grade- or position-based salary schedule, and the single salary
schedule. Arguably, each method was closely aligned with the social forces of the time period in
which it was dominant. As the dominant social forces changed, so did the method of teacher
compensation to more closely reflect the norms and values of the day (Odden & Kelley, 1997).
Early teachers in the United States were usually compensated by the boarding-around
method. For their educational services, they were paid a small wage and provided free room and
board in their students’ homes (Tyack, 1974). During the early 1800s, when this compensation
form was dominant, the tax base was very limited with the majority of the U.S. population living
in rural areas. School calendars reflected the agricultural cycle and were relatively short in
length. The limited revenue available for paying wages was balanced by the free room and
board. Boarding-around also served the dual function of providing community members a
method for monitoring teacher moral characteristics (Odden & Kelley, 1997).
As the United States transitioned from an agrarian-based society to an urban-based
society, the dominant educational methods also began to shift. Scientific management became
prevalent in manufacturing and industry; a trend soon duplicated in the educational sector. A
need for improved efficiency helped to usher in a consolidation movement resulting in larger and
more uniform schools supervised by administrators. Changing societal needs also helped fuel
calls for reform including pressure to change teacher compensation methods.
As free public schooling became the accepted norm, states began to adopt grade-or
position-based salary schedules with minimum salary requirements to reduce teacher turnover
and meet increased demand. These new salary schedules were generally based on a teacher’s
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experience, gender, race, and grade level taught (English, 1992; Odden & Kelley 1997).
Although the grade-or position-based salary schedules were improvements over the older
boarding-around method, many contained glaring inequities. The blatant differences in pay
between males and females as well as race-based differences led to the eventual demise of this
system.
Opposition to overt discrimination and a demand for improved teaching skills resulted in
the third and current teacher compensation method–the single-salary schedule. Appearing first in
Denver and Des Moines in 1921, this method pays teachers with similar qualifications the same
salary and is neutral with respect to grade, area of specialization, or professional competence.
Pay differentials or step increases are based on years of experience and educational degrees
(Kelley, 1996). The advantages of this system include equitable pay regardless of race, gender,
or ethnicity, as well as the elimination of arbitrary merit salary increases.

Recent Compensation Reform Efforts

By the 1950s, the single-salary schedule emerged as the dominant compensation model in
the United States. This method continues to be the primary form despite recent reform efforts
and the emergence of alternative models. Although there were earlier attempts to reform teacher
compensation, the 1980s brought the issue into the national spotlight. With attention focused on
improving America’s failing educational system, politicians and policy-makers began to call for
improving teacher performance through the use of pay (Odden & Kelley, 1997).
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Merit Pay

Perhaps the most popular and most maligned attempt to link teacher pay to performance
during this period was merit pay. Merit pay plans provide reward bonuses or extra pay to
teachers who demonstrate outstanding performance through the use of a supervisor and/or peer
assessment. These awards are typically one-time bonuses and do not advance the teacher a rank
or step on the salary schedule.
The use of merit pay was relatively low prior to the 1980s with the Education Research
Service reporting just a 4% incidence in 1979 (Calhoun & Protheroe, 1983; Porwoll, 1979). The
publication of A Nation at Risk in 1983 changed the educational landscape drastically as merit
pay became central to many of the reform efforts of the 1980s.
There is some evidence to suggest that merit pay programs may be effective. In an
analysis of data from 56,000 public schools included in the 1997–1998 Schools and Staffing
Survey by the National Center for Education Statistics, it was found that teachers in districts with
merit pay were not demoralized or hostile toward this form of compensation plan. The survey
also found that teachers of disadvantaged and low-achieving students actually supported merit
pay (Ballou & Podgursky, 1993). In a study of one school district, Farnsworth, Debenham, and
Smith (1991) asserted that merit pay can increase teacher effectiveness when properly funded
and administered.
Despite these assertions of effectiveness, the problems associated with merit pay plans
have been more widely reported in the literature (Educational Research Service, 1978; Hatry,
Greiner, & Ashford, 1994; Johnson, 1986; Murname & Cohen, 1986). Studies reported that merit
pay plans create competition among teachers leading to breakdowns in cooperation and an
increase in morale problems. These competitive structures and the cooperation problems they
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foster are incongruent with research on effective schools (Rosenholtz, 1989). Kelley (1996)
found that merit pay plans fostered competition among teachers for fixed resources. This
competition worked against the creation of the collaborative culture found in successful schools.
Another problem with merit pay plans is embedded in the teacher assessment system.
Teacher concern about the fairness of the assessment instrument is the most commonly cited
reason for teacher opposition to merit pay (Hatry & Greiner, 1985; Middleton, 1989; Porwoll
1979). The success of most merit pay plans is dependent on the teacher evaluation process, since
teacher assessment is typically the mechanism involved in the selection of teachers to receive the
reward. Principals or peer teachers must use these assessment instruments to identify the most
outstanding performers to receive merit pay. Given the multitude of variables that influence
performance, the instruments themselves are often ill-equipped and too limited to measure true
teacher effectiveness (Ballou & Podgursky, 1997). Compounding this problem is the perception
that administrators do not evaluate teachers fairly. In a 1983 study, Elam (1989) reported that
63% of all teachers agreed that evaluations, the administrators doing the evaluation, or both
contributed to the perception of unfairness.
Clearly identifying teacher behaviors that are consistent with outstanding performance is
another difficulty encountered when attempting to implement a merit pay system. The difficulty
in identifying effective behaviors often causes expectations for merit pay plans to be vague,
ambiguous, and poorly defined. As a result, teachers are unclear as to what behaviors are
required to receive the merit reward (Murnane & Cohen, 1986). This problem is often coupled
with limited resources which forces supervisors to draw arbitrary lines as to what level
constitutes merit pay and what level does not. The decision on who receives merit pay is not
driven by how many teachers are deserving but rather by the size of the funding allocation. Top
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performers on the assessment receive merit pay until the money runs out regardless of how good
or poor their performance and as a result, teachers have difficulty in identifying what is required
to receive merit pay. This problem ultimately undercuts the effectiveness of the entire merit pay
system (Odden & Kelley, 1997). Agreeing with this assertion is English (1983/1984) who
reported that the selection process of merit pay systems fails to divulge the reasons why one
teacher received an award while others did not. The apparent subjectivity and climate of secrecy
tends to cause misperceptions about the selection process. Similarly, Ballou and Podgursky
(1997) found that misalignment between the merit pay criteria and effective teaching strategies
undermined the evaluation process required for the reward.
Funding is also a source of problems with merit pay. Union opposition has often claimed
that merit pay is a ploy used by policy-makers to pay a few teachers more so that the majority of
teachers can get paid less (Ballou & Podgursky, 1997). English (1983/1984) reported that merit
pay typically does not offer adequate amounts to truly reward teaching excellence. To make a
significant difference in teacher motivation requires substantial increases in funding which
neither school boards nor other government officials are willing to allocate.
Critics of merit pay also assert there is no evidence that merit systems contribute to
increased student achievement, and they suggest the selection process is often tainted by politics.
Further criticisms are that the plans are costly to operate and may actually detract from making
improvements in base teacher pay (Swanson & King, 1997).
With the many problems associated with merit pay, it comes as no surprise that many of
these plans encountered widespread teacher opposition. This opposition eventually resulted in
the demise of many merit pay systems during the 1980s. Echoing the sentiment of its
constituency, teacher unions were among the strongest opponents of merit pay during that period
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(Calhoun & Protheroe, 1983). The National Education Association, the largest teacher’s union,
stated on record that due to the complexity of the job, merit pay and other forms of performance
compensation were inappropriate for paying teachers (Ballou & Podgursky, 1997). Affiliates of
both the National Education Association and American Federation of Teachers filed lawsuits in
Florida to stop merit pay programs (Ballou & Podgursky). As a result of this widespread
opposition, the Florida Meritorious Instructional Personnel Program was discontinued after the
1986–1987 school year.
Whether it is the widespread teacher opposition, inadequate assessment, lack of funding
or implementation difficulties, the problems associated with merit pay plans adopted in the 1980s
often proved to be fatal. Many plans were quickly abandoned soon after they were adopted. A
study by the Urban Institute found that 75% of the school districts that implemented merit pay in
1983 discontinued the practice within ten years (Hatry, Greiner, & Ashford, 1994).

Career Ladders

Another recent compensation reform effort is centered on the career ladder. Sometimes
called differentiated pay, career ladders are alternative compensation plans that seek to identify
the best performers and a reward them with differentiated levels of responsibility, status, and
salary (English, 1983/1984; Swanson & King, 1997). Career ladders also attempt to address the
flat nature of the teaching profession which typically only allows for advancement into the
administrative ranks. Teachers wishing to stay in the classroom are left with few opportunities
for advancement under the single-salary system.
Proponents of career ladders argue that to significantly improve teacher performance
effective teacher compensation systems must provide increased rewards including status,
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responsibility, and money over a long time period of time (Schlechty, 1987). Career ladders meet
these requirements because of their potential to recognize and award quality performance, allow
opportunities for advancement, and increase teacher efficacy (Swanson & King, 1997).
Evidence supporting career ladders is limited as few states still utilize this method of
teacher compensation. One Utah study by the Career Ladder Research Group at the University of
Utah and the School/Community Development Section of the State Office of Education reported
that the design of career ladder plans improved the teacher evaluation process and that over time
the programs would improve teaching (Cornett, 1985). Astuto (1985) also reported that career
ladders were more effective that merit pay.
Career ladders, however, suffer from many of the same limitations as merit pay plans.
Career ladders are expensive to implement and, therefore, are often restricted to a small number
of individuals. This expense has caused many states to provide inconsistent funding or to drop
funding altogether (Swanson & King, 1997).
Florida provides one of the most recent examples of a career ladder funding problem. In
2003, the Florida Legislature enacted section 1012.231, Florida Statute, better known as the
Better Educated Teachers and Students (BEST) program. The BEST legislation required all
districts to implement a career ladder by the 2004–2005 school year that included at least four
teacher levels: Associate teacher, Professional teacher, Lead teacher, and Mentor teacher. The
State of Florida provided $25 million to fund pilot BEST programs for the second half of the
2003–2004 school term and awarded these pilots to four districts. Reaction from teachers and
administrators was mixed. Teacher unions openly opposed the plan calling it an attempt to
circumvent the collective bargaining process by mandating salary schedules without negotiating
in good faith. Skeptics and critics of the career ladder succeeded in postponing the
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implementation of BEST during the 2004 legislative session. The BEST legislation was dealt a
further blow as funding was withdrawn, signaling a possible slow death to this most recent
attempt to implementing a state-mandated career ladder.
Other problems associated with career ladders are similar to those found in merit pay.
Research by English (1983/1984) shows that career ladders did not have universal appeal among
teachers, with newer teachers and men at the top of the scale reporting most favorably. Most of
the extra responsibilities with many plans such as the early Temple, California plan and
Tennessee Master Teacher plan are administrative in nature and are unrelated to classroom
teaching. Additionally, the pay and status differentials of career ladders create divisions among
teachers leading to morale problems. Like merit pay, the selection of teachers for career ladder
advancement is usually embedded in the teacher evaluation process which is fraught with issues
of unfairness and lack of objectivity (Firestone & Bader 1993). Tennessee and North Carolina
career ladders are examples of systems which utilize teacher appraisals for advancement.
However, the instruments utilized failed to adequately distinguish good from excellent teachers
resulting in more teachers qualifying for the advancement than there were positions or funding
available (Cornett, 1985). These problems and other similar concerns with career ladders helped
fuel suspicion, undermine behavior and cause poor morale among teachers (MacPhail-Wilcox &
King, 1988). As a result, many states dramatically reduced or terminated career ladder programs
by 1990 (Swanson & King, 1997).
The teacher compensation reform efforts of the 1980s quickly swept the nation but faced
near extinction by the end of the decade. Problems such as escalating costs, poor teacher
appraisal systems, limited funding, and administrative difficulties led to widespread
dissatisfaction with these new programs. Despite these shortcomings, linking pay to performance
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continues to be popular with politicians and policy-makers looking for student achievement
improvements in a climate of increased accountability. With the 1990s came the next wave of
performance pay for educators as politicians and policy-makers looked to find new ways to use
compensation to motivate teachers while attempting to avoid the pitfalls and mistakes of merit
pay and other unsuccessful programs of the previous decade.

Recent and Current Performance Pay Models in the United States

Despite the widespread failure of merit pay and other reform efforts of the 1980s,
educational reform remained high on the national agenda. From the 1990 Governors’
Association emerged a consensus for states to move toward increasing graduation rates and
improving student competency in reading, writing, science, mathematics, and history (Odden,
1992). Toward these ends, policy-makers forged new state accountability systems, which
included state educational standards and state-wide assessments designed to measure student
progress on the new standards. Performance-based accountability systems designed with rewards
and sanctions were enacted in several states as policy-makers looked for methods to motivate
educators to embrace new reform efforts (Kelly, Heneman III, & Milanowski, 2000). Among
these systems were several well-documented attempts to connect teacher pay to performance.
This section focuses on recent and current performance pay models from different locations in
the United States.
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Kentucky

A lawsuit filed by 66 of Kentucky’s most poverty-stricken districts in the late 1980s
challenged the constitutionality of the state’s method for financing public schools (AEL, 2000).
By 1989, a major reform effort had its genesis as the Supreme Court of Kentucky ruled that the
state had failed to establish an efficient school system. The Kentucky Educational Reform Act
(KERA) and the Kentucky Educational Results Information System (KIRIS) rapidly transformed
the state’s K-12 educational system (Willis, et al., 1999; Hodge, 2001). Schools were now held
accountable for performance in the academic areas (cognitive components) of arts/humanities,
reading, math, science, social studies, vocational/practical living and writing. Additionally,
schools were measured on other indicators (noncognitive components) such as student
attendance, drop-out rates, retention, and transition to adult life. As a part of the accountability
system, schools set two-year goals with the collection of baseline assessment data beginning in
1991. The first accountability cycle began in school years 1992–1993 and 1993–1994 and
continued with a new cycle every two years. It should be noted that the third cycle (1996–1997
and 1997–1998) quickly became immersed in a very public controversy involving a
programming error which miscalculated school scores. This situation quickly resulted in an
overhaul of the entire program (Willis, et al.).
The goals of KIRIS were as follows: 1) to motivate educators to attain higher
performance; 2) to focus students and educators on the goals and standards of KERA; 3) to
encourage integration of these goals into the curriculum and lessons taught; and 4) to provide
better and more reliable information about instruction and performance. A two year
improvement goal or target was established for each school, which was reevaluated at the end of
each accountability cycle. Accountability index scores were calculated from a cognitive and

66

noncognitive index combination and then compared to the school’s baseline to determine how
much change took place during the cycle. Depending on how much change took place, schools
were rated and placed into one of five categories: 1) reward, 2) successful, 3) improving, 4) in
decline, and 5) in crisis. Schools that exceeded their target were labeled reward schools and
received reward funds which could be used for any purpose including staff bonuses. Certified
staff voted on how the money was to be used with the amount of reward dependent on how many
goals were exceeded and how many staff members were assigned to the school. The maximum
reward amount was set by the state at approximately 10% of the average teaching salary in the
five districts with the highest average salary. The reward potential varied based on the number of
schools that attained reward status during a particular award cycle due to the fixed nature of the
funding source. Schools not meeting accountability goals were required to develop improvement
plans and may receive additional assistance and guidance (Willis, et al.).
For the first accountability cycle the maximum reward amount paid was $3,690 and the
minimum amount was $1845 which was 50% of the maximum. During the first operational year,
$60 million was allocated to fund rewards for the operational portion of KIRIS, while $95
million was allocated for the reward program. Funds have always been adequate to cover the
overall expenses of the program (AEL, 2000; Kelley & Protisik, 1997; Kelley, Heneman III, &
Milanowski, 2000; Willis, et al., 1999).
Despite sometimes harsh criticism and close scrutiny, Kentucky’s accountability and
assessment program has managed to survive with its funding largely intact for more than a
decade. The assessment system was revised in 1998 to reflect changes made in response to
systemic concerns (Kelly, Heneman III, & Milanowski, 2000). These revisions included
changing the way school goals were established and eliminating the practice of paying bonuses
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to individual staff members. Called the Commonwealth Accountability Testing System (CATS),
Kentucky’s new accountability system focused on schools with the state providing reward
dollars for improvement against the school’s established baseline. Reward money is for school
success, rather than district improvement, and therefore only the school receives the money from
the state for school purposes (Kentucky Department of Education, 2004).

Arizona

Arizona’s current teacher performance pay system originated from Governor Jane Dee
Hull’s Education 2000. First proposed in March 2000, this plan represented major funding
increases in Arizona’s schools to improve the state’s efforts to attract and retain teachers. In a
special legislative session, Senate Education Committee Chairman John Huppenthal forwarded
an amendment to the plan which provided for performance-based teacher compensation that
would ultimately be incorporated into the bill. After long and difficult debates, Education 2000
was passed by both legislative bodies and signed by Arizona’s governor in July, 2000 (White &
Heneman, 2002).
The funding engine to the new plan was contained in Proposition 301, which went before
Arizona’s voters in November 2000 and was approved by a 53% to 47% margin. An important
element to Proposition 301 is called the Classroom Site Fund (CSF). CSF funds are intended to
go directly to the classroom and are divided into three distribution categories as follows: (a) 20%
of funds for increases in base teacher pay, (b) 40% of funds for performance-based pay, (c) 40%
of funds for class size reduction, the Arizona Instrument to Measure Standards, intervention
programs, professional development, site-based classroom initiatives and others. Overall,
Proposition 301 resulted in at least a $3500 average increase per teacher and performance-based
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compensation of 2% - 8% of total salary (White & Heneman, 2002). The implementation of the
performance-based pay portion of Proposition 301 became the subject of debate within the
legislature. In the end, the legislature failed to provide further clarifying language to relevant law
resulting in substantial diversity among Arizona district’s performance-based pay plans (Arizona
Education Association, 2002; White & Heneman, 2002).
The multitude of different plans developed in Arizona have been the subject of several
surveys. In one such survey, the Arizona School Board Association (ASBA), the Arizona School
Administrators Association (ASA), and the Arizona Association of School Business Officials
collaborated to conduct a telephone survey about the local distribution plans for the Classroom
Site Funds. With 82% of districts responding to the ASBA survey, it was found that performance
pay plans varied dramatically. Of the districts reporting, 29% were using a group-performance
plan whereas 27% were using a combination individual and group performance plan. A small
percentage of districts (9%) were using a knowledge- skills plan (White & Heneman, 2002).
In a January 2002 analysis of Arizona’s performance pay plans, the Arizona Educational
Association reported that 48% of the plans were group-based. Of those districts using groupbased plans, 55% were reported to be using only group-based plans while 45% were using a
combination of individual and group-based performance pay. The analysis also revealed that
11% of districts examined were using only individual performance pay. Student achievement
data were found to be a component of 92% of the Arizona plans (Arizona Education Association,
2002).
It is expected that Arizona’s teacher performance pay plans will continue to evolve as
districts experiment with what components or implementation methods work well and which
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ones do not. Of all districts reporting, 37% assert that their district plans are likely to be revised
in the future (White & Heneman, 2002).

Douglas County, Colorado

One of the longest running pay for performance programs is in Douglas County,
Colorado. The Douglas County Federation of Teachers and the Douglas County School Board
agreed upon a performance pay program set for implementation during the 1993 – 1994 school
year. The plan was overwhelmingly ratified by more than 90% of teachers.
The Douglas County plan is composed of several components. The first component is
base pay, which is similar to the traditional teacher salary schedule with two notable differences.
First, teachers will not receive the traditional step increase for time in service unless they receive
a satisfactory evaluation from their supervisor. Second, teachers not receiving a satisfactory
evaluation are not eligible for any of the other incentive portions of the compensation program
(Odden & Kelly, 1997; Wyman & Allen, 2001).
Another major component of the Douglas County plan is the Outstanding Teacher
Program. The program awards a bonus of $1,250 to teachers who demonstrate outstanding
performance against established criteria. There are four designations with different criteria
ranging from developing a portfolio that demonstrates outstanding performance based on the
National Board for Professional Teacher Standards to the submission of a portfolio which
documents outstanding student growth in the classroom.
The Group Incentive Plan is another component which awards collaboration in the area
of student achievement among groups of teachers within a school. The teachers submit the plan
and later their final report to the district-wide Group Incentive Board, which evaluates the plan

70

and determines if the teacher’s goals were achieved at the end of the year. Group incentive
bonuses range from $400 - $500 per group member.
The Master Teacher component is awarded to teachers who show exceptional student
growth and have National Board certification or have been recognized as an outstanding teacher
for two years. The Master Teacher receives $2,500 per year for a five year period and is eligible
to become a mentor teacher within the district.
Other components of the plan include National Board Certification recognition, Skill
Blocks, and Responsibility Pay. National Board Certification is also recognized as a component
of the Denver plan with teachers who become Nationally Board Certified receiving an annual
incentive bonus of $2,000. Skill Blocks provides skill development sessions that help teachers
obtain skills critical to the goals of the district. Skill Blocks provide incentive bonuses ranging
from $250 to $500. Responsibility pay is another type of bonus incentive awarded to teachers
who take on additional responsibilities at the district level (Odden & Kelly, 1997; Wyman &
Allen, 2001).

Iowa

In 2001, the Iowa legislature passed into law legislation designed to enhance student
learning and improve teacher quality. There are two major components of the plan involving
changes in teacher compensation. First, the Iowa plan develops a career ladder which provides
salary improvements for teachers upon promotion to the next level. Starting as a Beginning
Teacher, teachers are required to successfully complete a mentoring program and a
comprehensive evaluation before moving to the next level, Career Teacher. Career teachers are
provided with a $2,000 differential in pay, thus distinguishing them from beginning teachers.
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The Career Teacher is considered to have completed all mentoring and licensure requirements
and has demonstrated competencies in accordance with the Iowa Teaching Standards. The next
level, Career II Teacher, receives a $5,000 differential above the Career teacher and may be
given mentoring responsibilities. The final level is the Advanced level, with a pay differential of
at least $13,500. These teachers have demonstrated superior teaching skills and are expected to
take on leadership roles within the district.
The second major component to the Iowa plan is the incentive or performance pay
component. Currently being piloted, the incentive pay project is a voluntary program that offers
school-based cash awards to all certified teachers within the school for meeting student
achievement goals. Each district must develop a team-based pay plan linked to the districts’
improvement plan that is approved by the local school board. Each school meeting the objectives
of its plan receives a cash award up to $100 per student. Cash bonuses of approximately $2,000
are awarded annually to educators working in schools where significant leaving gains have
occurred (Blair, 2001; Wilson & Van Keuren, 2001; Wyman & Allen, 2001).

Denver, Colorado

Denver’s teacher performance pay plan evolved from a four-year study which began in
September, 1999. The pilot program in 16 schools was the result of an agreement between the
Denver Classroom Teachers Association (DCTA) and the Denver Public Schools (DPS). The
purpose of the initiative was to pilot a pay plan that linked teacher compensation to student
achievement. Teachers participating in the pilot developed two classroom objectives approved by
the principal. At the end of the year, the teacher submitted evidence that supported whether the
goals had been achieved. Teachers received a bonus of $500 for each objective achieved and an
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additional $500 for participating in the pilot. During the second year of the pilot the teachers
received $750 for each objective met. The pilot was studied by the Community Training and
Assistance Center (CTAC) and was jointly sponsored by DCTA and DPS (Community Training
and Assistance Center, 2004).
On March 19, 2004, the DCTA ratified a new compensation system which was developed
in part during the four-year pilot program. As a part of this new program, Denver teachers could
receive performance pay for improving student achievement, receiving satisfactory evaluations,
working in schools of critical need, obtaining graduate degrees or national certification, and
participating in professional development activities. The plan was slotted for implementation
during the 2005–2006 school year and was partially dependent on voter approval of a $25
million annual tax increase (Colorado Education Association, 2004; Denver Classroom Teachers
Association & Denver Public Schools, 2004; Keller, 2004).

North Carolina

North Carolina’s performance pay program is based on the state’s high stakes
accountability program. Based on student achievement levels, schools are categorized as
exemplary, meets expectations, and adequate. Teachers can receive $1,500 bonus for improved
student performance but may also face termination if student performance drops below expected
levels (Hodge, 2001).
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Charlotte-Mecklenburg

The Charlotte-Mecklenburg School District established the Benchmark Goals Program in
1991 which was implemented in 1992. As a part of this plan the district set student improvement
goals in nine areas: absenteeism, reading, writing, primary readiness, social studies, pre-algebra,
drop-out rate, higher level course enrollment, and end-of-course mastery. Schools earn points by
meeting goals in each area. Schools earning enough points would be labeled exemplary, and all
certified staff would receive a bonus of $1000. Schools earning outstanding status would receive
$750 bonuses (Kelley, Heneman III, & Milanowski, 2000).
As the above models demonstrate, current teacher performance pay plans are diversified
in both method used and amount paid for performance. Similar to the national trend, Florida’s
performance pay plans are also very diverse but are bound by state mandated requirements
recently enacted. The next section of this study briefly examines the diversity of performance
pay models in Florida and the history behind them.

Performance-Based Pay in Florida

With the failed merit pay programs having disappeared from the state only a decade
earlier, Florida legislators again attempted to link teacher compensation to performance in 1998.
During this legislative session, law makers enacted Section 230.23(5)(c), Florida Statute, which
required a portion of a teacher’s salary to be performance-based. The following year saw several
changes to the law which further clarified the legislative intent of the performance pay language.
Now newly labeled as Section 1012.22(1)(c)4, Florida Statute, the legislation requires districts to
adopt a salary schedule that allows school administrators and instructional personnel who
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demonstrate outstanding performance to earn a 5% supplement in addition to their individual
salary. Florida Statute 1012.34(3) also stipulates that “the assessment of instructional personnel
and school administrators must be primarily based on student performance. . . . The assessment
must primarily use data and indicators of improvement in student performance.”
To strengthen the new law, legislators attached a financial penalty for noncompliance.
School boards failing to adhere to the new requirement by June 30, 2002, would have their
disbursement of the Educational Trust Fund withheld until compliance was verified (Florida
Education Standards Commission, 2003).
In June of 2003, the Florida Education Standards Commission published a report which
analyzed the performance pay plans of 66 out of 67 of Florida’s school districts. The analysis
found the plans to be very similar where the legislative language was specific but varied
dramatically in many other respects.
Almost all districts (98.5%) utilized the regular performance appraisal of instructional
personnel as one of the criteria for qualification for the performance reward. Overwhelmingly,
the amount earned was an award of 5% of the teacher’s base pay; however, eligibility for the
reward varied from district to district due to ambiguity in the statutory language. Some districts
allowed all instructional personnel to apply for the reward while others limited the reward to
instructors in FCAT related classes only. Other districts limited application for the reward to
those teachers holding professional service contracts.
Florida legislation requires that student performance be a component of the assessment of
administrators and instructional personnel. As a result, most of Florida’s performance pay plans
have student achievement scores as an integral element. Of the districts analyzed, 41% used the
Florida Comprehensive Achievement Test (FCAT) while two school districts (Lee and Levy)
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allowed the instructional personnel the opportunity to select which assessment to use for
determining learning gains.
During the 2002–2003 school year, Florida districts allocated $36,193,639 for the
purpose of awarding performance pay. However, the amount allocated by each district varied
dramatically with several of the smaller districts allocating as little as $10,000 and larger districts
allocating up to $5,000,000 (Florida Education Standards Commission, 2003).
Unions played a critical role in both the development and implementation of performance
pay plans across the state. Of the 66 districts analyzed, 89.4% had performance pay plans that
were negotiated and ratified by the instructional bargaining unit. Despite this heavy involvement
in the development of the plans, unions were also reported to be actively discouraging members
in several districts from participating in the performance pay plans. This lack of support may
explain the relatively low participation across the state. The highest number of applicants for
performance pay was in Duval County where 900 teachers applied. Most other districts had
significantly lower participation with 20 districts reporting no applicants at all (Florida Education
Standards Commission, 2003).
Requirements for teachers to receive performance pay also varied dramatically from
district to district. Most districts had some sort of application process which screened applicants
based on the eligibility requirements. Many districts also required teachers to submit a portfolio
or some form of documentation. As stated earlier, a satisfactory performance appraisal was a
common requirement, typically coupled with a provision that disqualified the applicant for any
rating of below standard. Districts often encouraged or required community service, district-level
service and district, state or national recognition. Others required National Board Certification or
similar designation. Specialized training or other professional development was a component of
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many of the plans as was graduate or advanced coursework. Some districts encouraged teachers
to take on leadership roles or to serve as a mentor teacher as a component of earning the
performance pay. Almost all districts required some form of student achievement documentation
or proof of substantial learning gains of the students under the applying teacher’s charge. Many
districts had some combination of several or all of the factors listed above (Florida Education
Standards Commission, 2003).
Limited legislative language in the State of Florida followed by limited technical
assistance from the Florida Department of Education resulted in a wide variety of performance
pay plans similar to what existed in Arizona. In the final analysis, no two plans were identical
across the entire state (Florida Education Standards Commission, 2003).

Research Findings on Performance Pay for Educators

One of the often heard criticisms of performance pay programs is that most lack a strong
research base. Compounding this problem is an inadequate research base upon which to build a
program. This scarcity in empirical research is slowly being addressed as more states begin to
implement performance pay models. This section considers research findings in the area of
performance pay for educators. To facilitate this examination, the section is divided into six subsections: attitudes and perceptions, motivation, performance, teacher expectancy, and student
achievement.
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Research Findings on Attitudes and Perceptions

Critical to understanding how performance pay plans function is to be aware of the
attitudes and perceptions of the individuals who are most impacted by performance pay plans –
the teachers. Research on teacher perceptions of performance pay or incentive programs has
produced very mixed results. Boa (as cited by Hodge, 2001) found in his examination of data
from the 1988 Schools and Staffing Survey that the majority of teachers reported favorably in all
areas of incentive pay as follows: added responsibilities (87%), teaching in high-priority
locations (77%), group merit bonus (64%), individual merit pay (53%) and teaching in shortage
fields (52%).
In interviews and surveys conducted with teachers from three school jurisdictions in
Kentucky, Charlotte-Mecklenburg (North Carolina), and Maryland, Kelley, Heneman III, and
Milanowski (2000) also found that the majority of teachers reported that bonuses for
performance were appropriate and that receiving a bonus was highly desirable. Desirability of
the award was not strongly correlated to the teachers’ age, experience, salary, school level, or
percentage of students on free or reduced lunch. Desirability was also not linked to whether a
school had achieved its goals during the prior accountability cycle.
Results of the National Opinion Poll in the United Kingdom, however, portray a
difference in perspective among educators. Teachers were questioned on their perceptions of the
government’s planned performance related pay scheme. The new plan proposed the
implementation of a new teacher appraisal system which would also be used by the head teacher
as a basis for decisions about pay. If implemented, high performing teachers would earn more
money while low performing teachers would receive no pay increase and could even face
termination. The poll reported 62% of teachers rejected the idea of an appraisal influencing
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decisions on pay, and 60% disagreed with the concept of higher pay for the top performers
(Storey, 2000). Similarly, in a Connecticut study on the impact of performance pay (Fine, 1998),
teachers reported that they did not feel student performance was an accurate gauge of their
ability. Additionally, the teachers disagreed with the concept of differential performance pay.
Teachers are not the only group to record an opinion on the subject of the appropriateness
of financial rewards for teacher performance. A Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup poll of the general
public found that 25% of respondents reported that teacher salaries should be closely tied to
student achievement, 35% reported salaries should be somewhat tied to achievement, and 24%
reported there should be no tie between salary and student achievement (Holt, 2001).
A study of a pilot program in Denver conducted by Community Training and Assistance
Center (2004) reported that 82% of parents surveyed indicated that a teacher’s performance as it
relates to student achievement should be financially rewarded. Fewer teachers agreed with this
assertion, with 56% indicating that teachers should be compensated based on their contribution
to student achievement. It should also be noted, however, that the majority of parents (94%) and
teachers (93%) indicated more than one student achievement measure should be required to
evaluate teacher performance.
Administrator perceptions of performance pay have also been a consideration of several
studies. Kelley, Heneman III, and Milanowski (2000) found that Charlotte-Mecklenburg
principals reported positively about using rewards to motivate teachers. In a related study in
Maryland, principals also reported favorably (Kelley, Heneman III, & Milanowski).
In study of administrator perceptions of Arizona teacher performance pay by Bales
(2002), 60% of administrators reported that performance-based pay had a positive impact on
student achievement. Kentucky principals did not report as favorably on the motivational effects
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of performance-based rewards with a mean of 2.3 on a 5 point scale where a 1 indicates strongly
disagree and a 5 indicates strongly agree. Similarly, Kentucky principals did not report
favorably on whether or not the reward program should be continued resulting in a mean of 2.3.
Teacher performance pay programs are generally perceived by teachers to increase focus
on school or program goals. Teachers and principals in Charlotte-Mecklenburg and Kentucky
reported that the performance pay program had a positive impact on accountability and goal
awareness. The presence of a reward program was perceived by teachers as helping to provide
clear direction and improve goal focus (Kelley, Heneman III, & Milanowski, 2000).
In a Denver study of a pilot pay for performance, program participants reported that the
program significantly increased focus on student achievement and strengthened the link between
classroom, school, and district goals. Survey and interview data showed that 85% of teachers
agreed that one of the goals of the performance for pay program was to improve student
achievement, and 78% agreed another goal for the performance pay program was to increase
accountability for student achievement (Community Training and Assistance Center, 2004). This
finding contrasted, however, with those in Maryland where no individual performance pay plan
was present. When surveyed many Maryland teachers reported they were unaware of the school
incentive program or goals (Kelley, Heneman III, & Milanowski, 2000).
Teachers have mixed attitudes about instrumentality or whether they would actually
receive a reward for performance. On a scale of 0 to 100 where 0 was rated as highly unlikely
and 100 as highly likely, Charlotte-Mecklenburg teachers reported an average probability of 72.8
and Kentucky teachers reported an average probability of 54.8. The lower result in Kentucky
could be a result of an earlier promise by state officials to pay a $300 bonus to all teachers which
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was never implemented. Kentucky teachers were also more skeptical about the long-term
survival of the program. (Kelley, Heneman III, & Milanowski, 2000).
Teachers and administrators both reported that they perceive the implementation of
performance pay programs resulted in increased workload and stress level. A study of
Kentucky’s accountability program by the Rand Corporation found that principals reported an
increased burden on their schools as a direct result of the performance pay plan. Additionally,
teachers reported increased stress and low morale as a consequence (Willis, et al., 1999).
Similarly, in studies of both Kentucky and Charlotte-Mecklenburg, teachers reported increased
stress, pressure, and workload as undesirable outcomes of performance pay programs (Kelley,
Heneman III, & Milanowski, 2000).
Unlike the merit pay programs of the previous decade which seemed to increase
competition between teachers, several of the performance programs examined were perceived by
teachers to slightly increase cooperation through the use of school-based rewards. In the study of
the Denver pilot program, 23% of teachers and principals reported increased cooperation while
67% reported cooperation stayed the same. Only 9% of teachers and principals from the Denver
study reported competition had increased, with 83% reporting it stayed the same and 8%
reporting that competition had actually decreased (Community Training and Assistance Center,
2004). Kentucky teachers reported that cooperation and working with other teachers were
positive outcomes of the performance program (Kelley, Heneman III, & Milanowski, 2000).
Performance pay programs were often cited by teachers as containing components that
were perceived by teachers as unfair. For example, teachers expressed concern that it was more
difficult to demonstrate improvement in student achievement in schools with high densities of
student populations perceived as at-risk (Kelley & Protisk, 1997). Teachers in higher grades
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expressed concern about the lack of motivation among older students. Teachers at schools that
had inconsistently won rewards rated performance pay programs as being unfair more often than
teachers at award winning schools (Kelley, Heneman III, & Milanowski, 2000). In the Denver
performance for pay pilot study, teachers raised concerns about the fairness of using certain
objectives for performance-based compensation. The concerns centered primarily on student
diversity and differences in goal difficulty among teachers, data manipulation or calculation
errors, judging teachers on student performance, and the use of standardized tests to measure
achievement. Denver teachers also expressed concern over the bias or skill level of the principal
and his or her influence over the final outcome (Community Training and Assistance Center,
2004).
While less objective than actual student performance data, teacher perceptions of the
impact that performance pay programs have on student achievement is an important
consideration when examining the overall impact of these plans. In a study of North Carolina’s
performance-based program, researchers found that only 28% of teachers felt their students were
more prepared while 61% indicated the program increased student anxiety. Almost half (48%)
responded that the program negatively impacted students’ love of learning (Jones, et al., 1999).
The Denver pilot also reported similar mixed results with more than half (53%) of teachers
responding that the pay for performance had resulted in an increased focus on student
achievement. This view appears to have changed with time. In 2003, respondents in Denver were
asked if pay for performance had a positive impact on student achievement, and 68% of
respondents agreed the pilot positively impacted focus on student achievement (Community
Training and Assistance Center, 2004).
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Research Findings on the Effect of Performance Pay on Teacher Motivation

The motivational effect of performance pay is central to the design of teacher
compensation programs. While there is some evidence to suggest that these programs may be
motivating, a closer examination reveals that the degree to which the program motivates is often
conditional and may also be linked to other factors in addition to pay.
Research by Kelley, Heneman III, and Milanowski (2000) found that the majority of
teachers (87% in Charlotte-Mecklenburg; 77% in Kentucky) surveyed reported being motivated
to achieve goals developed as a result of performance-based programs. Most also reported that
receiving the bonus was highly desirable and a positive outcome of the performance pay
program. Many teachers, however, reported that they were not directly motivated by the financial
bonus. Reaction was also mixed in relation to the size of the bonus. The bonus was considered to
be significant and meaningful to some teachers, while other teachers felt the size of the bonus
was inadequate or of little consequence. For example, Charlotte-Mecklenburg teachers often
indicated the amount of the reward ($400 - $600) was too small to justify the extra work.
Similarly, Kentucky teachers on average reported that the bonus program was not highly
motivating. Teachers who did report being motivated by the bonus were often dissatisfied with
their overall salary (Kelley, Heneman III, & Milanowski).
Teachers reported that public recognition for goal attainment and professional pride were
motivating factors in goal achievement. They were also motivated by the possibility of negative
sanctions for failure to attain established objectives. In a study focusing on the effect of rewards
and sanctions on teacher motivation, Kelley (1998) found that teachers reported being motivated
by the fear of negative publicity associated with sanctions. In a later study Kelley, Milanowski,
and Heneman III (2000) reported that both Charlotte-Mecklenburg and Kentucky teachers
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indicated being motivated by the desire to avoid consequences such as public criticism, loss of
professional pride, loss in job security, or reduced autonomy that went with failure to achieve
accountability goals.
Research Findings on the Effect of Performance Pay on Teacher Performance

The implementation of performance-based compensation systems was often correlated to
significant changes in teacher performance. Kelley, Heneman III and Milanowski (2000) found
that teachers reported making changes in instructional practice to better align instruction to the
assessed curriculum. In an earlier study, Kelley and Protsik (1997) reported results that suggest
teachers modified instruction to enhance student performance as a result of Kentucky’s
performance reward program. Conversely, a majority of teachers in Denver’s performance-based
pilot program (Community Training and Assistance Center, 2004) reported in interviews and
surveys that they had not changed their instructional practices to align with program objectives
during the four years of the pilot, while 53% of respondents reported that the pay for
performance program had no impact on their instructional knowledge and skill.
Many teachers reported that participation in a performance-based pay program resulted in
increased workload and working longer hours. Teachers in both Kentucky and CharlotteMecklenburg reported that working longer hours was an undesirable outcome of the performance
reward program. Many teachers expressed feeling pressure to work longer hours during the day
or over the weekend in order to meet performance goals and objectives (Kelley, Heneman III, &
Milanowski, 2000). Denver teachers participating in the pilot study reported very differently.
Most study participants expressed that they did not change the way they taught to earn
performance bonuses. It should be noted, however, that teachers in the pilot were told by union
representatives and at least one principal that the bonus could be earned by performing as they
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had in the past. The only noted difference was a greater paperwork expectation related to the
objective setting process (Community Training and Assistance Center, 2004).

Research Findings on Teacher Expectancy as related to Teacher Performance Pay

Teacher perceptions of expectancy as it relates to achieving a stated goal or objective
may significantly impact motivation. Expectancy is the belief that an individual or group effort
will result in the accomplishment of a particular goal. Data from the study of Kentucky and
Charlotte-Mecklenburg showed that teacher and school characteristics may significantly
influence teacher expectancy and that there are different factors which can foster higher levels of
expectancy among teachers (Kelley, Heneman III, Milanowski, 2000). Kelley (1998) found that
rewarded schools had higher levels of teacher and administrator expectancy and higher levels of
goal support than non-rewarded schools.
Teacher expectancy varies and is linked to two important factors. The first factor is the
teacher’s assessment of what favorable environmental factors are present in their operational
context. These factors may include school and student characteristics and organizational
environment. The second factor is the teacher’s perception of individual efficacy. In a University
of Kentucky Institute on Education Reform study by the Southern Regional Education Board (as
cited by Hodge, 2001) on performance pay, researchers found a higher degree of perceived
efficacy among teachers who received rewards than by those who did not. Teachers not receiving
awards tended to cite outside factors as significantly influencing student achievement. Kelley,
Heneman III, and Milanowski (2000) also found that variables having a significant effect on
expectancy include feedback, goal conflict, school culture, management style, leadership, and
perceived fairness of the program. Feedback on prior assessments coupled with the opportunity
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to make instructional and curricular adjustments had the most significant effect on expectancy
among the organizational variables. Principal support also had a significant impact among
Charlotte teachers but was less of a factor in Kentucky. Among the attitudinal factors, perceived
fairness of the program had the most significant effect on teacher expectancy.

Research Findings on the Effect of Performance Pay on Student Achievement

Of all the potential outcomes resultant from performance pay plans, improved student
achievement is the one most often sought by politicians and education policy-makers. The
experience of performance pay in public education illustrates not only the wide variety of
performance pay types but also a wide range of results as it relates to impacting student
achievement. This section examines findings from several performance pay programs that have
linked program objectives to student achievement goals.
Studies involving student achievement and performance pay often report mixed results,
making it very difficult to directly tie student achievement gains to the performance pay plan.
For example, in a study of 53 schools in Kentucky, Kelley (1998) asserted that a combination of
rewards, sanctions, and outside assistance had a significant effect on student achievement. In
another study of the Dallas Independent School District, Ladd (1999) reported that the district
improvement plan, which included a performance pay component, did positively effect student
achievement for white and Hispanic 7th grade students but had very little impact on the
achievement of African-American children.
Research by Willis, et al. (1999) on the Kentucky performance reward program produced
similar mixed results in the area of student achievement as discussed earlier. Results released by
the Kentucky Department of Education showed that overall performance did increase from the
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1993 baseline, but the extent of these increases varied considerably. Elementary schools
experienced significant improvement from 1993 to 1998 in both reading and mathematics.
Student achievement also improved in other subject areas to a lesser degree. Middle school
achievement levels were much more varied. In the area of reading, there was growth over the
period from 1993 to 1998 but not nearly as significant as what was experienced at the elementary
level. Mathematics achievement also experienced a slight increase; however, changes in the test
during 1995 make it difficult to identify the cause of the score improvement. Improvement in
science was almost insignificant, and social studies achievement actually improved and then
started to decline from 1996 to 1998. Writing showed a similar pattern of increases and decreases
in achievement level. Finally, high school achievement was generally good but, like elementary
school, the level of improvement varied significantly. Improvement in achievement for both
math and reading was considerable during the study period, although math achievement dropped
slightly in 1998. Achievement improvements in the other areas were typically smaller. While
most of the subject areas experienced an upward achievement trend during this period, there
were also some small, temporary decreases in achievement.
The Denver pilot pay for performance study did show higher mean student achievement
as correlated with the highest quality teacher objectives. In elementary school, students of
teachers with the high quality objectives demonstrated significantly higher mean scores on
standardized tests than did teachers with objectives scoring lower on the rubric in the areas of
reading, language, and math. Similar levels of improvement were found in middle school
mathematics and in writing and reading at the high school level.
The effect of the pay for performance pilot on student achievement is more mixed than
the teacher objective correlations. The mean scores on the Iowa Test of Basic Schools (ITBS)
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math, Colorado Student Assessment Program (CSAP) reading, and CSAP math mean scores
declined in the pilot elementary school. The control school’s mean scores increased on the CSAP
writing while decreasing on the ITBS math test. Conversely, the pilot middle schools performed
significantly better than did the control group on the ITBS reading, CSAP writing, and math.
The normal curve equivalent (NCE) scores for the pilot middle school students increased
significantly over time on the ITBS reading, CSAP writing, and CSAP math, while the controls
declined during the same period. Both the high school pilots and the controls showed significant
increases in mean NCE over the period on most tests. Pilot students at one of the high schools
demonstrated significantly higher increases on the ITBS language and math tests than did the
control students. Pilot students at another high school demonstrated higher scores than control
students on the ITBS language, ITBS math, and the CSAP reading tests, although they also
scored significantly lower on the ITBS reading test.
It was also noted in the study that the longer the teacher participated in the pay for
performance pilot the higher the increase in student achievement. For example, students of twoyear and three-year teachers outscored those of one-year teachers by 2 NCEs higher and 3.2
NCEs higher respectively (Community Training and Assistance Center, 2004).
Although it is the most sought after outcome in teacher performance pay schemes, linking
compensation to student achievement remains a highly contentious and controversial issue
(Wilson & Van Keuren, 2001; Storey, 2000). Critics charge that teacher performance is
dependent upon many different variables outside teacher control. Yet few policy-makers and
educational leaders can ignore that teacher quality is now recognized as the most important
school-related factor impacting student achievement (Solmon, 2004). With increased
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accountability and attention focused on education, the interest in linking teacher compensation to
student achievement continues to increase.

Obstacles to Teacher Performance Pay

Teacher Unions

Teacher performance pay proposals typically encounter intense resistance from teacher
unions (Storey, 2000). Historically, the two largest teacher unions in the United States, the
National Education Association (NEA) and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) have
strongly opposed all forms of pay for performance (English, 1983/1984; Lieberman, 1997). This
opposition primarily stems from the unions’ belief that these systems are designed to avoid
paying higher salaries for all teachers (Lieberman). The NEA representatives have also
expressed concerns over the fairness of such programs and the criteria used by performancebased systems to evaluate teachers (Delisio, 2003).
The influence of the NEA is substantial when it comes to impacting political platforms.
On May 6, 2004, Presidential candidate John Kerry called for new ways to reward teachers for
excellence and success with students to include greater pay. Afterwards, the Kerry campaign
released a statement, which indicated the candidate’s intent to establish new systems to reward
teachers for excellence to include performance pay based on student achievement. NEA
President Weaver and other high ranking NEA officials met with Kerry to express concerns
regarding the use of pay for performance language in the press release. Following the meeting,
the NEA released a confidential memo titled Kerry Backs Away From Pay for Performance
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which detailed the meeting and how Kerry backed away from the pay for performance language
in his new education plan (Wilson, 2004).
Unions in the United States are not alone in opposing performance pay for teachers. The
BBC Online Network (1999) reported that teacher unions in the United Kingdom argued that
performance pay was unfair and failed to address the underlying problem of inadequate pay. The
largest union there, the National Union of Teachers, as well as other smaller unions threatened to
strike if the contract talks failed. The strike was ultimately avoided when the government agreed
to not link performance pay exclusively to student exam results.
Despite opposition by national teachers’ unions, some local associations have supported
the development of teacher performance pay plans. The Arizona Education Association indicated
that it would support teacher performance pay if the measurement of performance was not
limited to student achievement and if teachers could have input into the definition of
performance. In the end, Arizona legislators and union officials compromised by allowing local
districts to design their own plans (White & Heneman, 2002). The Arizona Education
Association also helped campaign for the passage of Proposition 301, which included a
component for performance-based pay for teachers along with other educational funding
increases (Arizona Education Association, 2002). Similarly, the Denver Classroom Teachers
Association collaborated with the Denver Public Schools to conduct a four-year pay for
performance pilot (Community Training and Assistance Center, 2004). The Association also
followed up by lobbying heavily for and finally ratifying the Professional Compensation System
for Teachers (ProComp) on March, 19, 2004. ProComp includes provisions for pay increases
based on performance (Colorado Education Association, 2004).
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Although the Florida Education Association, Florida’s major union, had heavily opposed
the passage of the performance pay legislation, the participation in the development of individual
performance pay plans was very high. As districts are now required to implement performance
pay, most unions participated in developing district plans with 89% of districts reporting plans as
negotiated and ratified by the union. Despite this high level of participation in the development,
teacher participation was relatively low across the state with some districts reporting no
participants at all. While gathering information for a state-wide report on performance-based
pay, researchers for the Florida Educational Standards Commission found that unions in several
districts were actively discouraging teachers from participating in their local performance pay
plan (Florida Educational Standards Commission, 2003).

Organizational Obstacles

Teacher performance pay systems often face more obstacles than union opposition. The
failure of most compensation programs can be traced directly to a lack of alignment with
organizational values and culture (Flannery, Hofrichter, & Platten, 1996). Teacher performance
pay plans mark a definite cultural shift from the pure step and grade systems that have been a
part of public education for the past several decades. Coupled with most performance-based
plans are changes in how teachers are assessed since these measures are often tied to student
achievement. As a result, teacher resistance to performance pay plans was often encountered
during initial implementation.
In a study by Fine (1998) that examined the impact of mandated testing and teacher
performance pay, teachers indicated that they did not feel student performance was an accurate
gauge of their ability. Teachers in this study also disagreed with the concept of differential
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performance pay. Teacher concerns about the fairness of linking pay to student achievement and
the fairness of the assessment instrument may have been the primary reason why teachers
rejected Cincinnati’s teacher performance pay plan by a vote of 73 for the plan and an
overwhelming 1,876 against. Union leadership stated that teacher doubts and fears about the plan
resulted in its demise (Keller, 2002).
Funding issues are also a major obstacle to the implementation of many performance pay
plans. In a study by Kelley, Heneman III, and Milanowski (2000), teachers from both CharlotteMecklenburg and Kentucky expressed skepticism over the long term outlook for performance
pay programs. Iowa’s plan is projected to cost between $300 to $400 million over the next
several years causing legislators and union leaders concern over how to pay for the program, thus
calling into question its longevity. Administrators in Philadelphia recently terminated a piloted
performance pay plan, citing that the plan was far too costly to expand to include all the district’s
nearly 12,000 teachers (Blair, Keller, Manzo, & Kennedy, 2003). Board members in Steamboat
Springs, Colorado, also recently cut short a pay for performance proposal due to the $600,000 of
additional funding required (Keller, 2004).
Florida, which did not provide state-wide funding for its performance-based legislation,
chose to require school districts to carve funds out of existing revenue sources. A similar strategy
may have derailed legislators’ latest teacher compensation reform efforts. When teachers’ unions
and administrators’ associations refused to support any new initiative without full funding,
legislators chose to postpone implementation of the new career ladder initiative for at least one
year.
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Inadequate Research Base

The final obstacle in the implementation of a performance-based compensation system
for teachers is lack of an adequate research base. Cited as one of the main failures of the reform
efforts of the 1980s, which included the greatly despised merit pay plans (Packard &
Dereshiwsky, 1988), this lack of an adequate research base is still a concern today (Hodge,
2001). Policy-makers must rely on partial or tentative evidence when designing performancebased compensation plans. Without ample empirical evidence upon which to base a design,
many of these plans may be doomed to failure as educational leaders are left to deduce the best
course of action with little direction.

Conclusions

Many would agree that individuals who contribute more toward forwarding the goals of
an organization deserve more in the way of financial reward. There is also almost universal
agreement that employee motivation is critical to organizational effectiveness and that an
effective pay for performance system can work to increase employee motivation (Lawler, 2000).
Organizations world-wide have implemented a variety of performance pay models in an effort to
tap into this potentially powerful motivational tool. But designing a compensation system which
effectively motivates employees is extremely difficult, as evidenced by the many flawed or failed
systems detailed in this chapter. Lack of adequate funding, dysfunctional competition, poor
alignment with organizational goals, flawed appraisal systems, and lack of union support are just
a few of the many challenges which have led to the demise of performance pay plans across a
wide variety of organizations around the globe.
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School districts are experiencing similar difficulties as policy-makers struggle to
implement pay for performance programs. The failed merit pay efforts of the 1980s as well as
the many flawed performance pay programs across the nation today are a testament that these
systems are a challenge to effectively design and execute. Underlying many of these attempts is
a failure to connect compensation plans to an adequate research base. As a result, compensation
schemes are often built on faulty assumptions, which not only fail to motivate teachers but in
some cases also cause negative employee behaviors ranging from small attempts of sabotage to
large scale rebellion.
Unfortunately, an adequate research base for school-based performance pay programs
remains far from a reality today. Many of these programs have only been recently implemented,
therefore, it is much too early to gather conclusive evidence to measure programmatic
effectiveness. Research on performance-based compensation plans operating for longer periods
of time has been insufficient at best. More empirical research must be conducted for policymakers to formulate compensation plans which include an effective performance pay component.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the research design and describes the research questions,
population, sample, instrumentation, data collection, and analytical procedures used in this study.

Review of Problem

The problem of this study is to determine the perceptions of a Southwest Florida school
district’s school-based certified staff regarding the implementation of a performance pay
component to the current compensation system.

Review of the Research Questions

1. What are the perceptions of certified school-based personnel regarding teacher
performance pay in regards to:
a) individual efficacy and goal attainment?
b) individual impact on performance?
c) implementation of process?
d) value and equality of reward?
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2. Are the perceptions of certified school-based personnel regarding teacher performance
pay associated with years of experience, association membership, level of education,
school level, past receipt of performance pay, or position?
3. What are the perceptions of certified school-based personnel regarding the impact of
teacher performance pay on their workload?
4. What are the perceptions of certified school-based personnel regarding the impact of
teacher performance pay on their performance?

Research Methodology

The type of research for this proposed study is quantitative. According to Guba (1981),
quantitative research is a controlled, rationalistic inquiry. Randomized selection of subjects and
administration of a standardized instrument are examples of the quantitative methodologies
utilized in this study.

Population and Participant Selection

The population of this study consisted of the school-based instructional personnel
employed by The School District of Lee County. A record of all eligible employees was obtained
from the Department of Personnel Services in collaboration with the Department of Information
Systems. The population for this study included all teachers, counselors, and other members of
the instructional unit eligible for teacher performance pay. Table 3 shows the number and
percentage of instructional personnel and Table 4 shows the years of experience for instructional
personnel included in the study population. Association membership for instruction members in
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the study population is presented in Table 6. Table 7 shows the education levels of the
instructional study population and Table 9 presents the instructional population by school level.
Additionally, school-based administrators were included in this survey. Administrators
were not eligible for teacher performance pay but were eligible for performance awards based on
an evaluation system similar in operation to the one used for teachers. Table 5 shows the years of
experience for administrative personnel included in the study population. Table 8 presents the
educational level and Table 10 presents the school level for the administrators included in this
population.
A random sample of 1,000 members was selected from the instructional population.
Participants were selected using a table of random numbers published by Snedecor and Cochran
(1967). The sample was representative of the target population in terms of association
membership, school type, job classification, educational level, and years of employment.
Additionally, this study included the entire population of 176 school-based administrators for a
combined sample of 1,176 members.

Table 3
Instructional Population By Job Classification
Job Classification

Number

Percentage

3440

92.2%

Counselor

113

3.0%

Other School-based Instructional

180

4.8%

3732

100.0%

Teacher

Total

97

Table 4
Instructional Population By Years of Experience
Years of Experience

Number

Percentage

0-2

661

18%

3-10

1216

32%

11-20

778

21%

21 or more

1077

29%

Total

3732

100%

Table 5
Administrative Population By Years of Experience
Years of Experience

Number

Percentage

0-2

6

3.4%

3-10

68

38.6%

11-20

77

43.8%

21 or more

25

14.2%

176

100.0%

Total

Note. The table reports years of administrative experience within The School District of Lee County only. These data
do not include years of teaching experience and experience as an administrator in another school district.
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Table 6
Instructional Population By Teacher Association Membership
Job Classification

Number

Percentage

Member

1774

48%

Non-Member

1958

52%

Table

3732

100%

Number

Percentage

Bachelor

2353

63%

Masters

1262

34%

Specialist

52

1%

Doctorate

52

1%

Other

13

less than 1%

Total

3732

100%

Table 7
Instructional Population By Education Level
Education Level
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Table 8
Administrative Population By Education Level
Education Level

Number

Percentage

1

0.5%

139

79.0%

Specialist

24

13.6%

Doctorate

12

6.8%

176

100.0%

Bachelor
Masters

Total

Table 9
Instructional Population By School Level
School Level

Number

Elementary

1728

46%

Middle

796

21%

High

672

18%

K-8 or 6-12

355

10%

Special Center

181

5%

3732

100%

Total

Percentage

100

Table 10
Administrative Population By School Level
School Level

Number

Percentage

Elementary

64

36.4%

Middle

41

23.3%

High

40

22.7%

K-8 or 6-12

19

10.8%

Special Center

12

6.8%

176

100.0%

Total

Instrumentation

Instrument Development

Data for this study were collected using a survey instrument, Teacher Performance Pay
Attitudinal Survey (see Appendix B), designed by the researcher. This instrument was developed
to fit the unique requirements and specific nature of this study. The following section will
discuss the process used to design, develop, and pilot the survey instrument prior to its
implementation.
In order to create a reliable and valid instrument, the Teacher Performance Pay
Attitudinal Survey was developed after a review of the literature and utilized guidelines outlined
by Fowler (1993). A prerequisite of survey design was to establish the purpose of the survey.
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The purpose of this survey was to obtain information from certified school-based personnel
regarding their attitudes and perceptions about teacher performance pay. Once the purpose was
established, the behaviors that define the domain were identified and used to provide a
framework for the survey and the subsequent analysis.
The design of the survey based on the identified framework was developed using steps
outlined in Survey Research Methods, 2nd ed. by Fowler (1993). To improve instrument
reliability and to ensure consistent measurement, each participant in the sample was asked the
same set of questions presented in the same manner so that differences in answers were based on
differences in respondents rather than differences in stimuli.
To control differences in stimuli, the researcher followed specific directions for
improving question wording and design outlined by Fowler. After the initial items were
prepared, they were reviewed by an expert in the area of survey and educational research at
Florida Gulf Coast University and the researcher’s dissertation team at the University of Central
Florida to ensure quality question structure and design.
After development the instrument was reviewed by a panel of experts selected for their
knowledge of compensation and pay systems in Florida public schools. This panel was
assembled to validate the appropriateness of the content and questions of the survey as related to
the research area the survey was designed to study. This step was also used as a check for survey
relevancy, question clarity, question precision, and grammatical accuracy. The panel of experts
was composed of the following individuals: Mr. Tom Young, Associate Superintendent for
Employee Relations and Human Resources for the Charlotte County School District; Mr. Steve
Bouzianis, Director of Employee Relations/Human Resources for the Seminole County School
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District; and Dr. Ron Stone, Director of Employee Relations for the Pinellas County School
District.
Each expert was uniquely qualified based on his background, expertise, and experience
with performance pay systems. Mr. Tom Young has worked as a Chief Negotiator, consultant,
and attorney for both teacher unions and school districts. In these roles, he has worked with a
wide variety of employee compensation plans including performance pay plans. Mr. Steve
Bouzianis chaired the state committee for the Florida Educational Standards Commission
(FESC) which collected data on all 67 performance pay plans across the state of Florida. The
resultant report published by the FESC is titled Performance-Based Pay: A Review of Florida
School Districts’ Plans (2003). Dr. Ron Stone was a consultant and Chief Negotiator who has
vast experience in working with districts and unions in the negotiation of compensation
packages.
Members of the panel were asked the following questions:
1. Is the instrument clear, understandable, and easy to read?
2. Does the instrument contain any grammatical errors?
3. Do you consider the content of the survey instrument is valid for the subject it is
designed to study?
4. Do you consider the questions as appropriate for the study subject?
The survey and data collection protocol were revised based on input from these reviewers.
Following development, Fowler recommends formal field pre-testing to determine if
participants understand and respond to survey questions in a consistent manner. To formally field
pre-test the instrument, a pilot survey was conducted with a sample of 50 certified school-based
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personnel employed by The School District of Lee County. The pilot survey served several
purposes.
The first purpose of the pilot was to develop an understanding of the anticipated response
rate for the purposes of predicting response and working to improve response rate. Thirty
participants returned surveys for a response rate of 60%. Second, the pilot was conducted to test
survey distribution, routing, and collection procedures for the purpose of troubleshooting any
difficulties and improving methods. Finally, the pilot was administered to conduct a preliminary
analysis for the purpose of testing analysis procedures and to determine how the data collection
protocols and the survey instrument worked under realistic conditions.
Following the administration of the pilot survey, the researcher met with a focus group of
seven participants which included teachers, a school counselor, and an administrator. There were
several purposes for meeting with a focus group. The first purpose was to determine the amount
of time required to complete the survey. The second purpose was to determine if the survey
directions and questions were clear, understandable, organized in appearance, and free of
grammatical errors. A third purpose for meeting with the focus group was to determine if there
were problems understanding the kind of answers expected or in providing answers to questions
posed. The fourth purpose of the focus group was to determine if the meaning of survey
questions were consistent to all participants. Fowler (1993) recommended taking the steps
outlined in the third and fourth purposes to ensure questions have the same meaning to all
respondents and that respondents perceive that the question provides an acceptable answer in the
response options. The interviews with focus group participants served these purposes in an effort
to improve instrument reliability.
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The researcher met with the focus group and began by concentrating on the overall
instrument. Following protocol recommended by Fowler, each member of the focus group was
asked the following questions:
1. Were the directions easy to read?
2. Were the directions clear and understandable?
3. Was the instrument lay-out easy to follow?
4. Was the print large enough to read and legible?
5. Were there any grammatical errors?
6. How much time did the instrument require to complete?
7. Were there any problems with returning the survey?
The researcher then methodically worked through each question of the instrument with each
member of the focus group by asking the following questions:
1. Was the question clear and understandable?
2. Was the question free from grammatical errors?
3. Was there any problem answering the question or providing a response?What did the
question mean to you?
4. What information was the question asking you to provide?
5. How did you choose to answer the question and why?
The pilot survey implementation, preliminary analysis, and consultation with the focus
group helped improve implementation procedures, survey questions, and direction clarity. The
survey and data collection protocol were revised based on input from the focus group.
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Description of Instrument, Theoretical Frame, and Research Focus

The survey instrument, Teacher Performance Pay Attitudinal Survey, consisted of 28
questions. To increase validity, all questions were developed using the theoretical and research
framework as identified in the preceding chapter.
Questions 1–6 collected demographic data on certified school-based personnel and their
specific school sites.
Questions 7 and 8 focused on the respondents’ understanding of how performance
impacts the process for determining and distributing rewards. Expectancy Theory provided a
basis for these questions as this theory suggests that the respondents’ perception of the likelihood
of a desired outcome impacts the level of performance.
Questions 9–14 focused on the respondents’ perception of teachers’ efficacy. The
theoretical framework underlying this series of questions was Expectancy Theory. Specifically
within the Expectancy Theory frame these questions were based on the following factors: 1)
instrumentality, which determines how closely employees see their behavior as connected to the
desired outcome; and 2) expectancy, which relates to the individual’s perception of whether or
not the behavior is achievable (Odden & Kelley, 1997; Rhodes & Ogawa, 1992). Additionally,
question 13 was connected to Equity Theory. This question examines the perceptions of
individuals regarding the chance of receiving performance pay as compared to others in the work
environment.
The respondents’ perception of the impact teacher performance pay has on real
performance is the focus of questions 15–22. The theoretical framework for these questions is
Expectancy Theory as they focus directly on the reward desirability or valence. Valence centers
on whether the individual perceives the expected reward as worth the effort required. Research
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by Kelley, Heneman III, and Milanowski (2000) examining the impact of school-based
performance rewards on workload, work direction, and stress provided the conceptual
framework for questions 18–22.
The next two questions (23–24) in the survey focus on the respondents’ perceptions of
whether educators should receive additional compensation for outstanding performance or for
performance which meets organizational goals. Research by Kelley, Heneman III, and
Milanowski (2000) on teachers’ perceptions of the appropriateness of performance pay is the
basis for Question 23. Equity Theory also supports this question because it examines educator
perceptions of whether or not an individual believes he or she is being treated equitably or
deserves special recognition based on the degree of input placed into the work. Goal-Setting
Theory serves as the theoretical frame for question 24 by focusing on whether educators should
receive additional compensation for goal achievement.
Question 25 focuses on the perceived fairness of the distribution of awards and whether
the plan is aligned with organizational goals. Equity Theory provides the theoretical framework
for this question. Additionally, Kelley et al. (2000) found that school-based performance awards
achieved the best results when implemented in a manner perceived as fair by employees and in a
manner that offered amounts that were large enough to provide incentive.
Goal-Setting Theory served as the theoretical framework for question 26. This question
centered on whether the performance pay plan structure was aligned with organizational goals.
The basis for the final questions, 27 and 28, was Expectancy Theory. These questions
gather information on the degree to which respondents value the reward.
Table 11 presents a summary of survey item purpose, theoretical base, and research
focus.
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Table 11
Survey Item Purpose, Theoretical Base, And Research Focus
Question

Purpose

Theoretical Base

Research
Question

1–6

Demographic Data

None

1, 2

7, 8

Assess knowledge

Expectancy Theory

1, 2

9-12

Perceptions of Efficacy,
Expectancy & Instrumentality

Expectancy Theory

1, 2

13

Perceptions of Equity

Equity Theory

1, 2

14

Perceptions of Efficacy &
Expectancy

Expectancy Theory

1, 2

15-22

Perceived impact on Workload,
Valence & Performance

Expectancy Theory

1-4

23

Perceptions of Appropriateness

Equity Theory

1, 2

24, 26

Perceptions of Goal Alignment,
& Appropriateness

Goal-Setting Theory

1, 2

27, 28

Perceptions of Reward Value,
& Proportion

Expectancy Theory

1, 2, 4

Instrument Reliability

Reliability is the degree to which an instrument consistently measures what it is intended
to measure (Gay, 1992). Guidelines for designing a reliable instrument from Survey Research
Methods, (2nd ed.) by Fowler (1993) were used to increase the reliability of the instrument,
Teacher Performance Pay Attitudinal Survey. To improve instrument reliability and to ensure
consistent measurement, each participant in the sample was asked the same set of questions
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presented in the same manner so that differences in answers were based on differences in
respondents rather than differences in stimuli. To control for differences in stimuli, the
researcher followed specific directions to improve question wording and ensure consistent
meaning in simplified language for respondents.
Survey items were reviewed by an expert in the area of survey and educational research
at Florida Gulf Coast University and the researcher’s dissertation team at the University of
Central Florida to ensure quality question structure and design. After development, the
instrument was reviewed by a panel of experts selected for their knowledge of compensation and
pay systems in Florida public schools. This panel was convened to validate content and question
appropriateness as outlined earlier in this section. This step was also used as a check for survey
relevancy, question clarity, question precision, and grammatical accuracy.
Formal field pre-testing was performed to determine if participants understood and
responded to survey questions in a consistent manner. For this purpose, a pilot study was
conducted with 50 participants prior to implementation of the full study. From this pilot study, a
focus group of seven participants was selected for an in-depth examination of the survey
instrument. Participants were interviewed regarding the survey structure, question meaning and
intent to ensure consistent participant interpretation as outlined earlier in this section. One of the
primary purposes of the focus group step was to determine if respondents had any difficulty
understanding the kind of answers expected or in providing answers to questions posed.
Additionally, this step was employed to determine if the meaning of survey questions were
consistent to all participants. Fowler (1993) recommends taking these steps to ensure questions
have the same meaning to respondents and that respondents perceive the question includes an
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acceptable answer in the answer options. The interviews with focus group participants served
these purposes in an effort to improve instrument reliability.
The instrument was revised based on input received from the panel of experts,
dissertation committee members, and members of the focus group to improve instrument
reliability.
An estimate of instrument reliability was obtained for the sample during the study.
Rational equivalence reliability estimates internal consistency by determining how all items
relate to all other items and to the total instrument (Gay, 1992). For this study, Cronbach’s
coefficient alpha was used to estimate rational equivalence reliability. To obtain this estimate as
well as improve survey readability and presentation, the instrument was divided into six scales:
a) knowledge and understanding; b) individual efficacy; c) impact on individual performance–
motivation; d) impact on individual performance–negative impact; e) teacher performance pay
implementation–appropriateness; and f) teacher performance pay implementation-fairness. The
scale for each item number is presented in Table 12 and Cronbach’s Coefficient Alpha
reliabilities for each of the scales are presented in Table 13.
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Table 12
Scales of Teacher Performance Pay Attitudinal Survey
Scale

Item Numbers

Knowledge and Understanding

7, 8

Individual Efficacy

9, 10, 11, 12, 13

Impact on Individual Performance-motivation

15, 16, 17, 18, 19

Impact on Individual Performance-negative impact

20, 21, 22

Teacher Performance Pay Implementation-appropriateness

23, 24

Teacher Performance Pay Implementation-fairness

25, 26

Table 13
Coefficient Alpha Reliabilites of Teacher Performance Pay Attitudinal Survey
Scale

Reliability

Knowledge and Understanding

.813

Individual Efficacy

.735

Impact on Individual Performance-motivation

.890

Impact on Individual Performance-negative impact

.888

Teacher Performance Pay Implementation-appropriateness

.804

Teacher Performance Pay Implementation-fairness

.769
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Instrument Validity

Validity is the degree to which an instrument measures what it was intended to measure
(Gay, 1992). To increase the validity of the instrument Teacher Performance Pay Attitudinal
Survey, design guidelines from Survey Research Methods (2nd ed.) by Fowler (1993) were
utilized as discussed earlier in this chapter. According to Gay (1992), content validity is not
expressed quantitatively but instead is determined by the judgment of experts. To ensure content
validity the instrument Teacher Performance Pay Attitudinal Survey was reviewed by a panel of
experts selected for their knowledge of compensation and pay systems in Florida public schools.
This panel was employed to validate if the content and questions of the survey were appropriate
for the survey subject as outlined earlier in this chapter.

Procedures

Permission to conduct this study was obtained from the School District of Lee County
Internal Review Board using the established procedures and request forms. The request forms, a
brief description of the research, and copies of Teacher Performance Pay Attitudinal Survey
were submitted for approval. Formal approval from the District was subsequently granted. Once
the doctoral study was completed, a copy of the completed study was provided to the District’s
Department of Testing and Accountability.

Data Collection Procedures

Members of the selected sample were sent the survey instrument, two copies of the
consent letter (see Appendix C), and an envelope with return address and postage. Participants
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were provided 10 days to complete and return surveys with a signed consent letter. The other
copy of the consent letter was provided for the participant’s records. Upon completing the
survey, respondents were requested to return their responses by U.S. mail to a Florida Gulf Coast
University (FGCU) address set up specifically for this survey. Surveys were separated from the
consent letters by a FGCU staff member and provided to the researcher for analysis. Consent
letters were kept on file by the FGCU staff member during the term of this study. This process
was implemented to preserve the anonymity of the participants.

Analytical Procedures

The following provides a description of how data collected from the instrument Teacher
Performance Pay Attitudinal Survey were analyzed.
The data analysis was designed to address the four key research questions through the
five sections of the research instrument: (a) demographics, (b) knowledge and understanding, (c)
individual efficacy and goal attainment, (d) impact on individual performance, and (e) teacher
performance pay implementation.
For Research Question 1 “What are the perceptions of certified school-based personnel
report regarding teacher performance pay,” the data were presented in total to examine how the
population sample responded as a whole on each item. The response data were analyzed and
presented in percentage form for each item to display level of agreement as an entire sample.
For Research Question 2 “Are the perceptions of certified school-based personnel
regarding teacher performance pay associated with years of experience, association membership,
level of education, school level, past receipt of performance pay, or position,” the data were
disaggregated according to demographic information. An analysis of variance was performed to
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analyze the relationship, if any, that existed among the demographic variables and the level of
agreement. This analysis determined if any particular demographic item, such as years of
experience or job classification, had a significant correlation with an individual’s perceptions on
specific items related to performance pay. Relationships among items relating to perceived
efficacy and beliefs regarding teacher performance pay were examined.
The perceptions of certified school-based personnel regarding the impact of teacher
performance pay on the factors of workload and actual performance was the focus of Research
Question 3 “What are the perceptions of certified school-based personnel regarding the impact of
teacher performance pay on their workload?” For this question, the data were presented in total
to examine how the population sample responded as a whole on each item. The response data
were analyzed and presented in percentage form for each item to display level of agreement as an
entire sample. The extent to which specific demographic factors correlated with certain
perceptions of workload and performance was also investigated using an analysis of variance.
Research Question 4, “What are the perceptions of certified school-based personnel
regarding the impact of teacher performance pay on their performance,” examined individual
efficacy and whether there was a relationship among other variables in the study. Of particular
interest was the relationship of teacher performance pay to perceived efficacy. The extent to
which specific demographic factors correlated with certain perceptions of efficacy was also
investigated using an analysis of variance.
Table 14 presents a summary of the data analysis for each research question.
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Table 14
Data Analysis For Research Questions
Research Question

Data Analysis

Question 1
What are the perceptions of certified
school-based personnel (CSBP) regarding
teacher performance pay?

Data presented as percentages for
responses on all items.

Question 2
Are the perceptions of CSBP regarding
teacher performance pay associated
with years of experience, association
membership, level of education, school
level, past receipt of performance pay,
or position?

ANOVA to identify relationships
and correlations among
demographic variables.

Question 3
What are the perceptions of CSBP
regarding the impact of teacher
performance pay on their workload?

Data presented as percentages for
responses on items 20-22.
ANOVA to identify relationships
among demographic variables.

Question 4
What are the perceptions of CSBP
regarding the impact of teacher
performance pay on their performance?

Data presented as percentages for
responses on items 15-18.
ANOVA to identify relationships
among demographic variables.

The survey instrument provided respondents an opportunity to add additional comments
about performance pay at the bottom of the survey form. Comments were collected by the
researcher and organized by the comment subject matter. The comments were categorized as
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follows: a) knowledge and understanding; b) individual efficacy; c) impact on individual
performance-motivation; d) impact on individual performance-negative impact; e) general
implementation; f) fairness; g) amount of reward; and h) other. These categories reflect the six
scales and two additional areas included in the survey.

Delimitations

This study was delimited to certified, school-based instructional and administrative
personnel employed by The School District of Lee County. The School District of Lee County
was chosen because it was implementing a performance pay component as a part of its overall
compensation plan. Any inferences beyond this group should only be drawn after careful
consideration of the target population.

Limitations

1. This study was limited to one school district due to the specific nature of the performance
pay model currently being implemented.
2. This limitation reduces the generalizability of the study results. The survey responses
were limited to those obtained from participants who voluntarily completed and returned
the survey instrument.
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Summary

This chapter reviewed the research problem, research questions, and provided
descriptions of the population and sample. The instrument Teacher Performance Pay Attitudinal
Survey was also described as were data collection and analytical procedures used in this study.
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CHAPTER 4
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA

This study was to determine the attitudes and perceptions of Southwest Florida schoolbased certified staff regarding the implementation of a performance pay component to the
current compensation system as measured by the Teacher Performance Pay Attitudinal Survey.
The subjects studied consisted of the certified school-based personnel employed by The School
District of Lee County which included both instructional and administrative personnel. This
chapter is divided into two sections. The first section presents the data analysis of participants’
responses to demographic items. The second section presents the analysis of the data as related to
the research questions posed in the study.

Data Analysis of Demographic Items

The survey instrument, Teacher Performance Pay Attitudinal Survey, was administered
to 1,000 school-based instructional personnel employed by The School District of Lee County.
This sample included teachers, school counselors, and other school-based instructional personnel
(i.e. media specialists, consultative teachers, behavioral specialists). Of the instructional
personnel surveyed, 492 responded to the survey for a response rate of 49%. In addition, the
survey was administered to the entire population of 176 school-based administrators composed
primarily of principals and assistant principals. From the administrative personnel, 109 returned
surveys for a response rate of 62%.
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The results for the first six questions of the survey related to demographic information are
presented in table format. For the purposes of this analysis, the instructional responses will be
separated from the administrative responses; instructional responses will be presented first
followed by administrative responses.
A Chi-Square test of significance was conducted to compare the proportions observed in
the study to those proportions expected based on the known population. This test was performed
to determine if the sample distribution was significantly different from the population
distribution on the key demographic items in the study. The results of this test did show a
significant difference between the sample and the population. In the majority of the demographic
areas examined, the sample did reflect the characteristics of the population. A rationale for the
differences is provided in this section.
Table 15 presents the distribution of respondents by job classification. The distribution of
the job classifications within the sample was similar to the distribution within the entire
population. Teachers comprised over 91% of the sample, while the job classifications of
counselor and other school-based instructional personnel comprised approximately 4.1% and
4.8% of the sample respectively. Similarly, the overall population was composed of 92.2%
teachers, 3.0% school counselors, and 4.8% other school-based instructional personnel.
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Table 15
Instructional: What Is Your Current Assignment at Your School This Year?
Job Classification

Number

Percentage

448

91.1%

Counselor

20

4.1%

Other School-based Instructional

24

4.8%

492

100.0%

Teacher

Total

Table 16 presents the sample distribution in the area of years of experience.
Similar to the study population, the sample has the majority of respondents in the 3 to 10
years of experience category (30.7%) and the 21 or more years of experience category (34.3%).
The sample closely approximates the population in years of experience.

Table 16
Instructional: Which Best Describes the Total Number of Years You Have Been Employed as a
Professional Educatior?
Years of Experience

Number

Percentage

0-2

57

11.6%

3-10

151

30.7%

11-20

115

23.4%

21 or more

169

34.3%

Total

492

100.0%
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Table 17 shows the sample distribution in the area of association membership. The
sample was comprised of approximately 57% teacher association members, which differs
slightly from the overall population reported to be composed of 48% teacher association
members. This difference was likely due to the reporting mechanism for association membership
used by the district. Payroll records indicating an individual had a payroll deduction for
association membership dues was used to indicate the number of association members within the
study population. These data do not account for the number of members who pay the association
directly and therefore would not take a payroll deduction for association dues.

Table 17
Instructional: Are You a Member of a Teachers’ Association?
Job Classification

Number

Percentage

Member

280

56.9%

Non-Member

209

42.5%

Missing Data

3

0.6%

Total

492

100.0%

Table 18 shows the sample distribution in the category of educational attainment. The
largest percentage of the respondents (54.7%) held a bachelors degree only, while the second
largest group were those respondents who held a masters degree (40.7%). Similarly the largest
percentage of the study population (63%) held only a bachelors degree while the second largest
group (34%) held a masters degree.
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Table 18
Instructional: Which one Best Describes Your Personal Level of Educational Attainment?
Education Level

Number

Percentage

Bachelor

269

54.7%

Masters

200

40.7%

Specialist

12

2.4%

Doctorate

10

2.0%

1

0.2%

492

100.0%

Missing
Total

Table 19 presents the distribution of the instructional sample by school level. The study
population of all school-based, certified, instructional staff was comprised of 46% elementary
school personnel, 21% middle school personnel, 18% high school personnel, 10% combination
school personnel, and 5% alternative/special center personnel. The study sample was similar to
the population with the largest group of respondents at the elementary level (49.8%), followed by
the middle school level (23.3%) and high school level (22.7%). The percentage of respondents
for K-8 or 6-12 school configurations (1.6%) was lower than the population (10.8%). This
difference in combination school responses may be attributed to how these atypical
configurations were structured in comparison to the structure of the survey instrument. Response
choices on the survey were limited to actual assignment level (i.e. elementary, middle, high)
rather than the school’s actual designation. Respondents were asked to circle one item only.
Eight respondents indicated a combination level assignment on the survey form.
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Table 19
Instructional: Which Category Best Describes Your Current School of Assignment?
School Level

Number

Percentage

Elementary

245

49.8%

Middle

122

24.8%

High

93

18.9%

K-8 or 6-12

8

1.6%

24

4.9%

492

100.0%

Special Center
Total

Table 20 presents the sample distribution for respondents who reported receiving
performance pay within the last four years. The majority of respondents (72.2%) reported
receiving performance pay during this time frame.

Table 20
Instructional: Have You Received Performance Pay at Any Time During the Last Four Years?
Received Performance Pay

Number

Percentage

Yes

355

72.2%

No

128

26.0%

9

1.8%

492

100.0%

Missing Data
Total
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Tables 21 through 23 present the distribution data for the administrators on years of
experience, educational attainment, and school level. In the area of years of experience, the
majority of administrators (63.3%) reported having been employed as a professional educator for
21 or more years. Similar to the study population (79.0%), the majority of administrators
reported holding masters degrees (70.6%) with administrators holding specialist degrees (18.4%)
or doctorate degrees (11.0%) reported less frequently. Respondents also reported in a manner
reflective of the population in the area of school level with the majority indicating an elementary
assignment (36.7%). Reporting on assignment to atypical configurations mirrored the
instructional sample in the difference between the sample distribution and the distribution within
the study population.

Table 21
Administrative: Which Best Describes the Total Number of Years You Have Been Employed as
a Professional Educatior?
Years of Experience

Number

Percentage

0-2

0

0.0%

3-10

11

10.1%

11-20

29

26.6%

21 or more

69

63.3%

109

100.0%

Total
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Table 22
Administrative: Which One Best Describes Your Personal Level of Educational Attainment?
Education Level

Number

Percentage

Bachelor

0

0.0%

Masters

77

70.6%

Specialist

20

18.4%

Doctorate

12

11.0%

109

100.0%

Total

Table 23
Administrative: Which Category Best Describes Your Current School of Assigment?
School Level

Number

Percentage

Elementary

40

36.7%

Middle

24

22.0%

High

33

30.3%

K-8 or 6-12

3

2.7%

Special Center

9

8.3%

109

100.0%

Total
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Table 24 presents data on whether an administrator received performance pay during the
last four years. Similar to the teachers, administrators reported that the majority (84.4%) did
receive performance pay.

Table 24
Administrative: Have You Received Performance Pay at Any Time During the Last Four Years?
Received Performance Pay

Number

Percentage

Yes

92

84.4%

No

16

14.7%

1

0.9%

109

100.0%

Missing Data
Total

Data Analysis for Research Questions

This section presents the analysis of the data related to the research questions posed in the
study. The first research question is “What are the perceptions of certified school-based
personnel regarding teacher performance pay in regards to: a) individual efficacy and goal
attainment; b) individual impact on performance; c) implementation of process; d) value and
equality of reward?” For this research question the data are presented in total to examine how the
population sample responded as a whole on each item. Each item in part II, III, IV, and Va of the
survey asked participants to indicate their level of agreement with the statement provided.
Respondents selected from the following: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, or
no opinion. The response data were analyzed and presented in percentage form for each item to
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display level of agreement as an entire sample. The percentages are presented with responses
indicating general agreement combined under the heading strongly agree/agree, responses
indicating general disagreement combined under the heading disagree/strongly disagree, and
responses indicating no opinion under the heading no opinion. The data for individual items are
disaggregated into instructional responses and administrative responses and presented separately.
Instructional items are presented first.

Perceptions of Knowledge and Understanding

Table 25 presents response percentages for the knowledge and understanding component
of the survey for instructional personnel. Approximately 54% of participants indicated they
clearly understood the process for awarding teacher performance pay whereas 63% indicated that
they did not clearly understand the process for calculating the amount of pay to be disbursed.
Table 26 presents the same data for administrators with approximately 90% of the administrators
indicating that they understood the process for awarding teacher performance pay. A smaller
percentage (63.2%) of the same group indicated that they clearly understood the process for
calculating the amount of teacher performance pay disbursed.
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Table 25
Knowledge and Understanding: Instructional Responses
Question

Strongly/Agree
Agree

Disagree/Strongly
Disagree

No
Opinion

Total

7. I clearly understand the process
for awarding teacher performance
pay to individual teachers.
(n=489)

54.2%

44.6%

1.2%

100.0%

8. I clearly understand the process
for calculating the amount of
teacher performance pay disbursed
to the individual teacher.
(n=486)

34.6%

63.2%

2.2%

100.0%

Note. Three respondents did not answer question 7; six respondents did not answer question 8

Table 26
Knowledge and Understanding: Administrative Responses
Question

Strongly/Agree
Agree

Disagree/Strongly
Disagree

No
Opinion

Total

7. I clearly understand the process
for awarding teacher performance
pay to individual teachers.
(n=109)

89.9%

9.2%

0.9%

100.0%

8. I clearly understand the process for
calculating the amount of teacher
performance pay disbursed to the
individual teacher.
(n=109)

66.1%

33.9%

-

100.0%

Perceptions of Individual Efficacy

Instructional responses in the survey category for individual efficacy is shown in Table
27. Over 91% of respondents indicated that their individual performance had a significant
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influence on student achievement. Similarly, a majority also agreed that they had adequate
resources and administrative assistance to support their efforts in obtaining teacher performance
pay. Most did not agree, however, that their performance influenced whether they would earn
performance pay, and only a slight majority indicated their chance of receiving performance pay
was the same as any other teacher. A majority of instructional respondents also agreed that
student composition had a greater impact on their ability to receive performance pay than did
their individual effort.
Table 28 shows the same data for the administrative respondents. A majority of
administrators indicated that individual performance had a significant influence on student
achievement. Differing from the instructional responses, administrators also agreed individual
performance has a significant influence on the ability to earn performance pay. Responses to the
impact of student composition on the ability to receive performance pay differed from the
instructional responses with 43% indicating agreement that student composition had a greater
impact than individual effort.

129

Table 27
Individual Efficacy: Instructional Responses
Question

Strongly/Agree
Agree

Disagree/Strongly
Disagree

No
Opinion

Total

9. My individual performance as an
educator has a significant influence
on student achievement.
(n=490)

91.2%

8.2%

0.6%

100.0%

10. My individual performance
as an educator has a significant
influence on whether or not I earn
performance pay. (n=476)

44.5%

51.3%

4.2%

100.0%

11. I have adequate resources
(i.e. materials, supplies) to support
my efforts in obtaining teacher
performance pay. (n=478)

60.5%

34.3%

5.2%

100.0%

12. I have adequate administrative
assistance to support my efforts in
obtaining teacher performance pay.
(n=480)

63.3%

30.4%

6.3%

100.0%

13. My chance of receiving teacher
performance pay is the same as any
other teacher.
(n=484)

46.9%

45.9%

7.2%

100.0%

14. Student body composition has a
greater impact on my ability to
receive teacher performance pay
than my individual effort as a teacher.
(n=482)

55.4%

37.3%

7.3%

100.0%

Note. Two respondents did not answer item 9; sixteen respondents did not answer item 10; fourteen respondents did not answer
item 11; twelve respondents did not answer item 12; eight respondents did not answer item 13; ten respondents did not answer
item 14.
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Table 28
Individual Efficacy: Administrative Responses
Question

Strongly/Agree
Agree

Disagree/Strongly
Disagree

No
Opinion

Total

9. My individual performance as an
educator has a significant influence
on student achievement.
(n=107)

98.2%

0.9%

0.9%

100.0%

10. My individual performance as an
educator has a significant
influence on whether or not I earn
performance pay. (n=105)

64.8%

28.6%

6.6%

100.0%

11. I have adequate resources
(i.e. materials, supplies) to support
my efforts in obtaining teacher
performance pay. (n=102)

83.3%

5.9%

10.8%

100.0%

12. I have adequate administrative
assistance to support my efforts in
obtaining teacher performance pay.
(n=102)

81.4%

18.6%

100.0%

13. My chance of receiving teacher
performance pay is the same as
any other teacher.
(n=102)

61.8%

18.6%

19.6%

100.0%

14. Student body composition has a
greater impact on my ability to
receive teacher performance pay
than my individual effort as a teacher.
(n=104)

43.3%

49.0%

7.7%

100.0%

-

Note. Two respondents did not answer item 9; four respondents did not answer item 10; seven respondents did not answer item
11; seven respondents did not answer item 12; seven respondents did not answer item 13; and five respondents did not answer
item 14

Perceptions of Impact on Individual Performance, Motivation, and Negative Outcomes

Responses regarding perceptions of the impact of performance pay on individual
performance and motivation are shown for instructional participants in Table 29 and
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administrative participants in Table 30. This table also addresses the specific questions raised in
Research Question 3, “What are the perceptions of certified school-based personnel regarding
the impact of teacher performance pay on their workload?” and Research Question 4, “What are
the perceptions of certified school-based personnel regarding the impact of teacher performance
pay on their performance?”
More than 80% of the instructional participants indicated general disagreement that
teacher performance pay provides incentive to work harder. Similarly, a strong majority of
instructional participants also indicated disagreement that performance pay encourages them to
participate in staff development, modify assessment, or alter their instructional practice. Most
respondents also disagreed that increasing the size of the bonus would increase their motivation
to improve student achievement. Administrators responded in a similar fashion on the same
items although the percentage of disagreement was not as high.
Instructional respondents were divided regarding the effect of teacher performance pay
on their workload, with almost 48% indicating workload increased and 44% indicating it did not.
They remained divided on the impact of teacher performance pay on their stress level, while
most disagreed that performance pay resulted in longer work hours. Administrators were also
divided with almost 40% indicating teacher performance pay increased workload and 52%
indicating it did not. Similarly, more than 50% of administrative respondents indicated general
disagreement that teacher performance pay resulted in longer hours and increased stress.
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Table 29
Impact on Individual Performance: Instructional Responses
Question

Strongly/Agree
Agree

Disagree/Strongly
Disagree

No
Opinion

Total

15. Teacher performance pay provides
an incentive for me to work harder
toward improving student
achievement. (n=492)

17.1%

80.1%

2.8%

100.0%

16. Teacher performance pay
encourages me to participate in
staff development to improve my
skills as an educator. (n=490)

21.0%

75.9%

3.1%

100.0%

17. Increasing the size of the teacher
performance pay bonus would
increase my motivation to improve
student achievement. (n=489)

18.8%

76.5%

4.7%

100.0%

18. I have altered my instructional
practice as a result of teacher
performance pay.
(n=487)

9.0%

86.7%

4.3%

100.0%

19. I have modified my assessment
methods as a result of teacher
performance pay.
(n=486)

14.4%

81.9%

3.7%

100.0%

20. My workload has increased as
a result of teacher performance
pay.
(n=482)

47.9%

44.0%

8.1%

100.0%

21. I have experienced increased
stress as a result of teacher
performance pay.
(n=484)

46.3%

45.9%

7.8%

100.0%

22. I work longer hours as a
result of teacher performance
pay.
(n=483)

37.7%

52.6%

9.7%

100.0%

Note. Two respondents did not answer item 16; three respondents did not answer item 17; five respondents did not answer item
18; six respondents did not answer item 19; ten respondents did not answer item 20; eight respondents did not answer item 21;
and nine respondents did not answer item 22.
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Table 30
Impact on Individual Performance: Administrative Responses
Question

Strongly/Agree
Agree

Disagree/Strongly
Disagree

No
Opinion

Total

15. Teacher performance pay provides
an incentive for me to work harder
toward improving student
achievement. (n=103)

28.1%

64.1%

7.8%

100.0%

16. Teacher performance pay
encourages me to participate in
staff development to improve my
skills as an educator. (n=103)

40.8%

51.4%

7.8%

100.0%

17. Increasing the size of the teacher
performance pay bonus would
increase my motivation to improve
student achievement. (n=103)

30.1%

61.2%

8.7%

100.0%

18. I have altered my instructional
practice as a result of teacher
performance pay.
(n=102)

12.8%

68.6%

18.6%

100.0%

19. I have modified my assessment
methods as a result of teacher
performance pay.
(n=101)

20.8%

63.4%

15.8%

100.0%

20. My workload has increased as
a result of teacher performance
pay.
(n=103)

39.8%

51.5%

8.7%

100.0%

21. I have experienced increased
stress as a result of teacher
performance pay.
(n=103)

36.9%

50.5%

12.6%

100.0%

22. I work longer hours as a
result of teacher performance
pay.
(n=102)

34.3%

52.0%

13.7%

100.0%

Note. Six respondents did not answer item 15; six respondents did not answer item 16; six respondents did not answer item 17;
seven respondents did not answer item 18; eight respondents did not answer item 19; six respondents did not answer item 20; six
respondents did not answer item 21; and seven respondents did not answer item 22.
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Perceptions of Implementation, Appropriateness, Fairness, and Goal Alignment

Table 31 presents the percentage of responses on items related to perceptions regarding
the teacher performance pay implementation. In this area, more than 70% indicated general
agreement that educators should receive additional compensation for outstanding performance.
Slightly less than 60% of respondents indicated educators should receive additional
compensation for meeting student achievement goals. A majority of respondents, however,
disagreed that the current plan was aligned with school goals. Almost 74% of instructional
respondents also disagreed that the current plan was fair in how it rewards performance.
Administrators responded in a similar fashion with the exception to the item on goal alignment
with 57% indicating that they perceived the current performance pay plan was aligned with
school goals.
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Table 31
Teacher Performance Pay Implementation Part Va: Instructional Responses
Question

Strongly/Agree
Agree

Disagree/Strongly
Disagree

No
Opinion

Total

23. Educators should receive
additional compensation for
outstanding performance.
(n=478)

70.7%

24.7%

4.6%

100.0%

24. Educators should receive
additional compensation for
meeting student achievement
goals. (n=478)

59.0%

36.6%

4.4%

100.0%

25. The current teacher performance
pay plan is fair in how it
distributes performance pay
awards. (n=477)

11.1%

73.8%

15.1%

100.0%

26. The current teacher performance
pay plan is aligned with school
goals in how it rewards
performance. (n=473)

31.9%

46.1%

22.0%

100.0%

Note. Fourteen respondents did not answer item 23; fourteen respondents did not answer item 24; fifteen respondents did not
answer item 25; and nineteen respondents did not answer item 26.
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Table 32
Teacher Performance Pay Implementation Part Va: Administrative Responses
Question

Strongly/Agree
Agree

Disagree/Strongly
Disagree

No
Opinion

Total

23. Educators should receive
additional compensation for
outstanding performance.
(n=107)

75.7%

23.4%

0.9%

100.0%

24. Educators should receive
additional compensation for
meeting student achievement
goals. (n=107)

71.0%

28.1%

0.9%

100.0%

25. The current teacher performance
pay plan is fair in how it
distributes performance pay
awards. (n=108)

36.1%

50.0%

13.9%

100.0%

26. The current teacher performance
pay plan is aligned with school
goals in how it rewards
performance. (n=107)

57.0%

35.5%

7.5%

100.0%

Note. Two respondents did not answer item 23; two respondents did not answer item 24; one respondent did not answer item 25;
and two respondents did not answer item 26.

Perceptions Regarding the Amount and Proportion of Performance Pay

Table 33 through 36 present percentages of responses on items related to educator
perceptions regarding the amount and proportion of performance pay. In Table 27, over 40% of
instructional respondents indicated the amount of performance pay should be more than $2,000
per teacher. Approximately 22% of instructional respondents indicated the amount of
performance pay should be zero. Instructional respondents were more evenly divided when
asked to indicate what proportion of pay should be based on performance with approximately
26% indicating it should be more than 10% of base pay, 30% indicating it should comprise
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between 6% and 10% of base pay, and 25% of respondents indicating the proportion of
performance pay should be zero.

Table 33
Teacher Performance Pay Implementation Part Vb: Instructional Responses (N=445)
27. The amount of the performance pay award should be

Response

Percentage

more than $2000 per teacher

40.5%

between $1000 and $2000 per teacher

29.0%

between $500 and $800 per teacher

6.9%

below $500

1.6%

zero

22.0%

Total

100.0%

Note. Forty-seven respondents did not answer item 27.
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Table 34
Teacher Performance Pay Implementation Part Vb: Instructional Responses (N=439)
28. The proportion of a teacher’s pay related to performance should be

Response

Percentage

more than 10% of base salary

25.7%

between 6% and 10% of base salary

30.1%

between 1% and 5% of base salary

17.8%

less than 1% of base salary

1.4%

zero

25.0%

Total

100.0%

Note. Fifty-three respondents did not answer item 28.

Administrators were more evenly divided on the amount of performance pay with almost
40% indicating performance pay should be more than $2,000 per teacher with the same
percentage indicating the amount should fall between $1,000 and $2,000 per teacher. Almost
44% of administrators indicated that the proportion of performance pay should be 1% to 5% of
base pay.
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Table 35
Teacher Performance Pay Implementation Part Vb: Administrative Responses (N=108)
27. The amount of the performance pay award should be
Response

Percentage

more than $2000 per teacher

39.8%

between $1000 and $2000 per teacher

39.8%

between $500 and $800 per teacher

4.6%

below $500

1.9%

zero

13.9%

Total

100.0%

Note. One respondent did not answer item 27.

Table 36
Teacher Performance Pay Implementation Part Vb: Administrative Responses (N=107)
28. The proportion of a teacher’s pay related to performance should be
Response

Percentage

more than 10% of base salary

14.0%

between 6% and 10% of base salary

25.2%

between 1% and 5% of base salary

43.9%

less than 1% of base salary

0.9%

zero

16.0%

Total

100.0%

Note. Two respondents did not answer item 28.
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Differences in Perceptions on Performance Pay

This section presents the analysis of the data related to Research Question 2, “Are the
perceptions of certified school-based personnel regarding teacher performance pay associated
with years of experience, association membership, level of education, school level, past receipt
of performance pay, or position,” In order to answer this question, an analysis of variance was
performed on the instructional sample to determine if the differences among demographic
variables were significant as related to how teachers, counselors, and other school-based
instructional staff responded to survey questions.
For the purposes of this analysis, the survey questions were divided into the following
sections: 1) knowledge and understanding; 2) individual efficacy; 3) impact on individual
performance–motivation; 4) impact on individual performance–negative impact; 5)
implementation appropriateness; and 6) implementation fairness and alignment. Division was
based on survey sections and scales as identified in Chapter 3. An additional analysis was
performed specifically on Question 14, which is related to the impact of student composition on
the ability to receive performance pay.
A separate analysis of variance was conducted to determine what differences existed
between the instructional respondents and administrative respondents. This analysis compared
differences among the following areas: 1) knowledge and understanding; 2) individual efficacy;
3) impact on individual performance-motivation; 4) impact on individual performance-negative
impact; 5) implementation appropriateness; 6) implementation fairness and alignment; and 7)
student composition.
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Differences in Perceptions for Instructional Respondents

Table 37 presents a summary of the analysis of variance for years of experience. This
analysis found significant differences in how participants responded to the items related to
knowledge and understanding based on years of experience. The Tukey post hoc test was applied
to determine where difference in responses occurred among the groups. The difference found
between respondents with less than 3 years experience and respondents reporting 11 to 20 years
of experience was statistically significant, p<.05. Additionally, a statistically significant
difference was found between respondents with less than 3 years experience and respondents
reporting 21 or more years experience, p<.05. In both cases, the more experienced respondents
reported higher agreement with understanding the process of awarding and calculating teacher
performance pay. The Scheffé post hoc test found a similar statically significant difference
between respondents reporting less than 3 years experience and respondents reporting more than
21 years experience.
In the area of individual efficacy, differences among the groups were also found based on
years of experience. Post hoc tests were applied to determine the nature of the differences. The
Tukey test found that respondents with less than 3 years experience and respondents with 3 to 10
years experience reported statistically significant, higher levels of agreement on items related
individual efficacy than respondents with 21 or more years of experience. The Scheffé post hoc
test found a similar statically significant difference between respondents with 3 to 10 years of
experience and respondents with more than 21 years of experience, p<.05.
Statistically significant differences among groups were also found on the items related to
individual motivation. The Tukey test found that respondents with less than 3 years experience,
respondents with 3 to 10 years experience, and respondents with 11 to 20 years of experience
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reported statistically significant higher levels of agreement on items related to the motivation
impact of performance pay than respondents with 21 or more years of experience, p<.01. The
Scheffé post hoc test also found respondents with 3 to 10 years of experience and less than 3
years experience reported higher levels of agreement than respondents with more than 21 years
experience, p<.01.
Items related to the negative impact of performance pay also showed differences among
the groups. Respondents with less than 3 years experience reported less agreement that the
implementation of performance pay resulted in increased workload, stress, and work hours than
respondents with 3 to 10 years of experience and 11 to 20 years of experience. Similarly,
respondents with 21 or more years of experience also reported less agreement on items related to
the negative impact of performance pay than respondents with 11 to 20 years. The Scheffé post
hoc test found that respondents with less than 3 years experience and those with 21 or more years
of experience reported less agreement on items related to the negative impact of performance pay
than respondents with 11 to 20 years.
On items related to the appropriateness of performance pay, the Tukey post hoc test
found that respondents with less than 3 years experience, 3 to 10 years experience, and 11 to 20
years of experience differed significantly from respondents with 21 years or more experience.
The test showed that respondents with lesser years of experience indicated higher levels of
agreement that educators should receive additional compensation for outstanding individual
performance. The Scheffé post hoc test found that respondents with less than 3 years experience
and those with 3 to 10 years of experience reported more agreement on items related to the
appropriateness of performance pay than respondents with 21 or more years of experience.
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The Tukey post hoc test also showed that respondents with less than 3 years experience
and 3 to 10 years experience indicated significantly higher levels of agreement on items related
to the perceived fairness and alignment of performance pay when compared to those respondents
reporting 21 or more years of experience. The Scheffé post hoc test found a similar difference
but only between the respondents with 3 to 10 years of experience and those with 21 years or
more.
There was no statistically significant difference found among responses related to the
impact of student composition on the ability to obtain performance pay.
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Table 37
Summary Analysis of Variance for Instructional Respondents: Years of Experience
Dependent Variable

Less than 3

3 to 10

11 to 20

21 or more

Knowledge/Understanding
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.09
0.73
57

2.34
0.72
151

2.41
0.87
115

2.44
0.76
169

Individual Efficacy
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.87
0.43
57

2.83
0.51
151

2.67
0.58
115

2.66
0.52
169

Impact on Motivation
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.01
0.45
57

1.89
0.64
151

1.83
0.63
115

1.63
0.55
169

Negative Impact
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.23
0.68
57

2.56
0.76
151

2.78
0.74
115

2.35
0.76
169

Implementation-Appropriateness
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

3.09
0.58
57

3.01
0.70
151

2.79
0.81
115

2.54
0.80
169

Implementation-Fairness/Alignment
Mean
2.05
Std. Deviation
0.57
N
57

2.00
0.61
151

1.87
0.66
115

1.79
0.55
169

Student Composition
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.71
0.87
151

2.85
0.90
115

2.78
0.83
169

F
3.26*

4.81**

8.69**

10.51**

13.39**

4.55**

2.54
2.48
0.76
57

Note. *p<.05. **p<.01.
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Table 38
Summary Tukey and Sheffé Post Hoc Test Analyis for Instructional Years of Experience
Years

Years

Know.

Ind.
Eff.

Motiv.

Neg.
Imp.

Impl. Impl.
Appr. Fair

Student
Comp.

Tukey
Less than 3 years

3 to 10 years
11 to 20 years
21+ years

.16
.04*
.02*

.96
.11
.03*

.55
.20
.00**

.03*
.00**
.77

.88
.06
.00**

.97
.25
.03*

.28
.04
.10

3 to 10 years

less than 3 years
11 to 20 years
21+ years

.16
.84
.63

.96
.09
.01*

.55
.80
.00**

.03*
.07
.06

.88
.08
.00**

.97
.26
.01**

.28
.60
.92

11 to 20 years

less than 3 years
3 to 10 years
21+ years

.04*
.84
.99

.11
.09
.98

.20
.80
.03*

.00**
.07
.00**

.06
.08
.04*

.25
.26
.73

.04
.60
.90

21 years or more

less than 3 years
3 to 10 years
11 to 20 years

.02*
.63
.99

.03*
.01*
.98

.00**
.00**
.03*

.77
.06
.00**

.00**
.00**
.04*

.03*
.01**
.73

.10
.92
.90

Less than 3 years

3 to 10 years
11 to 20 years
21+ years

.22
.07
.03

.97
.16
.06

.62
.28
.00**

.05
.00**
.82

.91
.09
.00**

.97
.33
.05

.36
.07
.16

3 to 10 years

less than 3 years
11 to 20 years
21+ years

.22
.88
.70

.97
.14
.03*

.62
.85
.00**

.05
.12
.10

.91
.13
.00**

.97
.34
.02*

.36
.67
.94

11 to 20 years

less than 3 years
3 to 10 years
21+ years

.07
.88
.99

.16
.14
.98

.28
.85
.06

.00**
.12
.00**

.09
.13
.07

.33
.34
.79

.07
.67
.92

21 years or more

less than 3 years
3 to 10 years
11 to 20 years

.03
.70
.99

.06
.03*
.98

.00**
.00**
.06

.82
.10
.00**

.00**
.00**
.07

.05
.02*
.79

.16
.94
.92

Sheffé

Note. Know=Knowledge and Understanding, Ind. Eff. = Individual Efficacy, Motiv.= Individual Motivation, Neg. Imp.=
Negative Impact, Impl. Appr.= Implementation-Appropriateness, Impl. Fair = Implementation Fairness, Student Comp. = Student
composition
*p<.05. **p<.01.
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Table 39 presents a summary of the analysis of variance for association membership.
Respondent differences were significant in three areas: 1) individual efficacy; 2) negative
impact; and 3) implementation fairness and alignment. Non-members responded with higher
levels of agreement on items related to individual efficacy and performance pay appropriateness,
fairness, and alignment than did union members. On items related to the negative impact of
performance pay, union members responded with higher levels of agreement than non-members.
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Table 39
Summary Analysis of Variance for Instructional Respondents: Association Membership
Dependent Variable

Member

Non-Member

Knowledge/Understanding
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.34
0.80
280

2.39
0.75
209

Individual Efficacy
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.66
0.55
280

2.85
0.48
209

Impact on Motivation
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

1.76
0.59
280

1.86
0.61
209

Negative Impact
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.60
0.76
280

2.38
0.76
209

Implementation- Appropriateness
Mean
2.76
Std. Deviation
0.83
N
280

2.87
0.69
209

Implementation-Fairness/Alignment
Mean
1.83
Std. Deviation
0.62
N
280

2.00
0.57
209

Student Composition
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.71
0.82
209

F
0.473

16.19**

3.12

10.02*

2.62

9.20*

0.54
2.77
0.88
280

Note. *p<.05. **p<.01.

A summary of the analysis of variance for educational attainment is presented in Table
40.

148

Table 40
Summary Analysis of Variance for Instructional Respondents: Educational Attainment
Dependent Variable

Baccalaureate

Masters

Specialist

Doctorate

Knowledge/Understanding
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.34
0.75
269

2.37
0.82
200

2.25
0.92
12

2.72
0.82
10

Individual Efficacy
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.79
0.51
269

2.68
0.54
200

2.33
0.61
12

2.55
0.41
10

Impact on Motivation
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

1.84
0.59
269

1.76
0.61
200

1.76
0.63
12

1.40
0.38
10

Negative Impact
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.53
0.77
269

2.48
0.76
200

2.73
0.62
12

1.93
0.75
10

Implementation-Appropriateness
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.89
0.76
269

2.75
0.79
200

2.38
0.57
12

2.35
0.78
10

Implementation-Fairness/Alignment
Mean
1.91
Std. Deviation
0.59
N
269

1.91
0.61
200

1.50
0.48
12

1.62
0.61
10

Student Composition
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.79
0.89
200

2.92
0.90
12

2.56
0.83
10

F
0.46

4.63**

2.25

2.39

3.90**

2.54

2.54
2.71
0.84
269

Note. *p<.05. **p<.01.
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Significant differences among educational levels were found in the areas of individual
efficacy and the appropriateness of performance pay. For individual efficacy, both the Tukey and
Scheffé post hoc tests revealed a significant difference in the level of agreement between
respondents holding a Bachelors degree only and those holding a Specialist degree. In the area of
the appropriateness of the performance pay distribution and goal alignment, both post hoc tests
failed to reveal a significant difference among the different educational levels.
The summary of the analysis of variance for school level is presented in Table 41.
Significant differences were found in the areas of individual efficacy, student composition, and
the appropriateness of performance pay. The Tukey post hoc test found elementary respondents
answered items on efficacy with a significantly higher level of agreement than did respondents at
the middle, high, and combined school (K-8, 6-12) levels. The combined school respondents
were found to answer these same items with a significantly lower level of agreement than did
respondents from all other levels. The Scheffé post hoc test failed to show any significant
differences.
Further post hoc analysis showed that alternative and special centers had the lowest level
of agreement that student composition impacted the ability to earn performance pay. The Scheffé
post hoc test failed to show any significant differences.
On items related to performance pay appropriateness, the Tukey post hoc test showed that
high schools indicated a higher level of agreement with performance pay appropriateness than
did special centers and alternative schools. The Scheffé post hoc test failed to show any
significant differences.

150

Table 41
Summary Analysis of Variance for Instructional Respondents: School Level
Dependent Variable

Elementary

Middle

High

Alt. School
Special Ctr.

K-8
6-12

Knowledge/Understanding
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.36
0.78
245

2.37
0.77
122

2.36
0.80
93

2.48
0.80
24

2.06
0.73
8

Individual Efficacy
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.84
0.50
245

2.61
0.51
122

2.65
0.54
93

2.86
0.52
24

1.97
0.60
8

Impact on Motivation
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

1.75
0.61
245

1.88
0.58
122

1.83
0.54
93

1.75
0.77
24

1.70
0.56
8

Negative Impact
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.54
0.79
245

2.51
0.71
122

2.46
0.75
93

2.16
0.75
24

2.62
0.78
8

Implementation-Appropriateness
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.75
0.79
245

2.90
0.72
122

2.96
0.70
93

2.43
0.86
24

2.31
1.16
8

Implementation-Fairness/Alignment
Mean
1.90
Std. Deviation
0.60
N
245

1.93
0.60
122

1.91
0.61
93

1.79
0.66
24

1.80
0.57
8

Student Composition
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.63
0.86
122

2.84
0.84
93

2.09
0.88
24

3.42
0.73
8

F

0.79

9.58**

1.12

1.42

3.98**

0.34

6.24**
2.81
0.83
245

Note. *p<.05. **p<.01.

Table 42 presents the summary of the analysis of variance for whether respondents
received performance pay in the past four years. Respondents who reported receiving
performance pay indicated statistically significant higher levels of agreement on items related to
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knowledge and understanding, individual efficacy, the negative impact of performance pay, and
the impact of student composition on the ability to obtain performance pay.

Table 42
Summary Analysis of Variance for Instructional Respondents: Performance Pay Last Four Years
Dependent Variable

Received

Did not Receive

Knowledge/Understanding
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.44
0.77
355

2.18
0.76
128

Individual Efficacy
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.76
0.55
355

2.64
0.48
128

Impact on Motivation
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

1.83
0.62
355

1.72
0.54
128

Negative Impact
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.61
0.75
355

2.15
0.71
128

Implementation-Appropriateness
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.78
0.77
355

2.82
0.79
128

Implementation-Fairness/Alignment
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

1.91
0.61
355

1.89
0.58
128

Student Composition
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.79
0.88
355

2.59
0.79
128

F
10.23**

4.08*

3.10

36.75**

0.64

0.5

4.91*

Note. *p<.05. **p<.01.

152

Differences between Instructional and Administrative Respondents

Differences between perceptions and attitudes of Instructional and Administrative
respondents is presented in Table 43. Significant differences were found in all areas examined in
this analysis. Administrators responded with higher levels of agreement in the areas of
knowledge and understanding, individual efficacy, impact of motivation, appropriateness, and
fairness and alignment, p<.01. Administrators responded with significantly lower levels of
agreement in the areas of the negative impact of performance pay and the impact of student
composition.
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Table 43
Summary Analysis of Variance for Instructional and Administrative
Dependent Variable

Instructional

Administrative

Knowledge/Understanding
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.36
0.78
492

3.02
0.67
109

Individual Efficacy
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.73
0.53
492

3.32
0.38
109

Impact on Motivation
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

1.80
0.60
492

2.05
0.56
109

Negative Impact
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.50
0.76
492

2.35
0.65
109

Implementation-Appropriateness
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.81
0.77
492

2.99
0.77
109

Implementation-Fairness/Alignment
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

1.90
0.60
492

2.44
0.65
109

Student Composition
Mean
Std. Deviation
N

2.74
0.86
492

2.41
0.91
109

F
65.86**

122.34**

16.78**

3.97*

4.72*

71.93**

12.66**

Note. *p<.05. **p<.01.
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Analysis of Comments

Comments by respondents provided additional data relevant to research question 1,
“What are the perceptions of certified school-based personnel regarding teacher performance pay
in regards to: a) individual efficacy and goal attainment; b) individual impact on performance; c)
implementation of process; d) value and equality of reward?” Comments were categorized based
on the main content emphasis of the comment. Category selection was based on the survey scales
and two additional survey categories to include the following: a) knowledge and understanding;
b) individual efficacy; c) impact on individual performance-motivation; d) impact on individual
performance-negative impact; e) general implementation; f) fairness; g) amount of reward; and
h) other. Additionally, comments were categorized as generally positive as related to
performance pay, generally negative as related to performance pay, or neutral.
Table 44 provides the percentage distribution of the comments by category. Of the 199
comments provided, 75% were generally negative, 24% neutral, and 1% generally positive in
content as related to performance pay. Approximately 23% of comments were directed to the
negative impact of the plan, particularly the increase in workload as a result of the extra
paperwork and documentation requirements. The next largest category was general
implementation with 21%. Implementation comments primarily criticized the current plan,
suggested alternative methods of implementing performance pay, or both. Almost 19% of
comments were related to the perceived fairness of the current performance pay system with all
but one of the comments also categorized as generally negative. The motivational impact of the
current plan was emphasized in 14% of the comments, with 82% of these comments generally
negative. Most of the statements in this category commented on being motivated by educating
children, not being motivated by money, or both.
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Table 44
Comment Frequency Distribution
Comment Category

f

Knowledge and Understanding

10

5.0%

9

4.5%

Impact on Individual Performance-motivation

28

14.1%

Impact on Individual Performance-negative impact

45

22.6%

Teacher Performance Pay Implementation

42

21.1%

Teacher Performance Pay Implementation-fairness

37

18.6%

4

2.0%

Other

24

12.1%

Total

199

100.0%

Individual Efficacy

Amount of the Award

%

Summary

This study was designed to determine what certified school-based personnel report
regarding their perceptions of teacher performance pay. A sample of 492 school-based
instructional personnel and 109 school-based administrators completed the survey instrument
Teacher Performance Pay Attitudinal Survey.
On survey items related to knowledge and understanding, the majority of administrators
reported general agreement that they clearly understood the process for awarding and calculating
performance pay. Instructional respondents were more divided than administrators in their
responses with approximately 54% indicating they understood the performance pay process and
almost 35% indicating they understood how the amount of performance pay was calculated.
Instructional respondents with fewer years of teaching experience also reported significantly less

156

agreement on items related to knowledge and understanding than respondents with 11 years of
experience or more.
A majority of instructional respondents (91.2%) and administrative respondents (98.2%)
indicated agreement that individual performance has a significant influence on student
achievement. Further analysis showed that respondents with 10 years or less experience
indicated stronger levels of agreement on items related to individual efficacy than individuals
with 21 or more years of experience. Most instructional respondents disagreed (51.3%) that their
performance influenced whether they would receive performance pay. Instructional respondents
also reported high levels of agreement (55.4%) that student composition has more impact on
their ability to receive performance pay than does their performance.
More than 80% of instructional participants disagreed that teacher performance pay
provides incentive to work harder. Similarly, most also disagreed that teacher performance pay
encourages them to participate in staff development (75.9%), modify assessment (81.9%), or
alter their instructional practice (86.7%). Less experienced instructional respondents reported
significantly higher levels of agreement on items related to the motivational impact of
performance pay than respondents with 21 or more years of experience.
Respondents from all groups indicated high levels of agreement that educators should
receive performance pay; however, most did not agree that the current plan was fair. Over 40%
of instructional respondents indicated the amount of performance pay should be more than
$2,000 per teacher with over 55% indicating performance pay should be more than 5% of base
salary.
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Analysis of variance determined that there were significant differences among different
demographic groups. These differences were most prevalent among the groups with different
levels of experience and between instructional and administrative respondents.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary of the Study

The problem of this study was to determine the perceptions of Southwest Florida schoolbased certified staff regarding the implementation of a performance pay component to the
current compensation system. During this study the following research questions were reviewed:
1. What are the perceptions of certified school-based personnel regarding teacher
performance pay in regard to:
e) individual efficacy and goal attainment?
f) individual impact on performance?
g) implementation of process?
h) value and equality of reward?
2. Are the perceptions of certified school-based personnel regarding teacher performance
pay associated with years of experience, association membership, level of education,
school level, past receipt of performance pay, or position?
3. What are the perceptions of certified school-based personnel regarding the impact of
teacher performance pay on their workload?
4. What are the perceptions of certified school-based personnel regarding the impact of
teacher performance pay on their performance?
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The population examined in this study consisted of certified school-based personnel
employed by The School District of Lee County. A random sample of 1,000 instructional,
school-based participants was selected from the instructional population for inclusion in this
study. Additionally, the entire population of 176 school-based administrators was included in the
study. Members of the selected sample were asked to complete the survey instrument, Teacher
Performance Pay Attitudinal Survey, designed by the researcher. This instrument was developed
to fit the unique requirements and specific nature of this study.
Participants were asked to respond to survey questions to provide information about the
perceptions and attitudes of educators regarding teacher performance pay. A total of 492 schoolbased instructional personnel and 109 school-based administrators responded to the survey.

Discussion of Results

This section presents significant findings of this study as related to the attitudes and
perceptions of school-based certified staff and considers these findings in relation to other
current research. To facilitate this discussion, this section is divided into the respondent
perceptions in the following areas: Motivational, Negative Outcomes, Efficacy and Expectancy,
Appropriateness, Fairness, Implementation, and Differences in Perceptions.

Perceptions on Motivation

The current importance placed on performance pay programs originates from the
presumed role they play in motivating individuals to higher levels of performance, thus
enhancing organizational success (Brown & Heywood, 2002). For school districts, the primary
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goal is to improve student achievement; therefore, motivating staff to work toward this goal is
central to any successful teacher performance pay plan (Odden & Kelley, 1997). Findings from
this study, however, show that over 80% of teachers disagree that teacher performance pay
provides an incentive to work harder toward improving student achievement. These findings
support research by Kelley, Heneman III, and Milanowski (2000) which found that teachers
participating in a Kentucky performance pay program did not report the bonus program was
motivating.
Perceptions regarding the motivational impact of performance pay on changing teacher
behavior were also significant in this study. More than 75% of instructional respondents did not
agree that performance pay encouraged them to participate in staff development, and
approximately 87% did not agree that performance pay motivated them to change their
instructional practice. These findings suggest that the performance pay program of the current
study may have fallen short of its intended goal. Similarly, a majority of teachers in Denver’s
performance pay pilot reported the program did not cause them to change their instructional
practices and had no impact on their knowledge or skill (Community Training and Assistance
Center, 2004). The findings of the current study and Denver study contrast, however, with a
study of Kentucky’s performance-based compensation systems which found that teachers
reported modifying their instructional practice to improve alignment with curricular goals
(Kelley, Heneman III, & Milanowski, 2000; Kelley & Protsik, 1997).
There are notable differences between the Kentucky performance reward program and
the Florida performance reward program of this study which may account for the dissimilarity in
respondent perceptions. The Kentucky plan bases performance on the achievement of school
goals and is a group-based award program. The Florida program is an individual-based plan
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which attempts to align the goals of the plan with the Sunshine State Standards, the curriculum
framework for the State of Florida. Some or all of school goals are also based on these standards.
Although 57% of administrators indicated that school goals were aligned with the goals of the
performance plan, less than 32% of instructional respondents agreed. The alignment of
individual performance to school goals, therefore, is indirect at best.
Comments at the end of the survey often focused on the motivational impact of
performance pay. Fourteen percent of comments addressed teacher performance pay as a
motivator. Specifically, 82% of these comments were negative in relation to the concept of
performance pay. The following two comments are typical of the ones related to motivation:
“This program never has and never will make a difference in the amount of time and effort put
into my calling as a teacher. I’m in it for the kids and the love of teaching, not to become wealthy
obviously.” and “Money does not motivate me to work harder. I work hard because I want my
students to succeed and achieve all they can. Their success is my motivation.”
Administrator perceptions regarding the motivation impact of teacher performance pay
was similar to that of the teachers with approximately 64% of respondents indicating
disagreement that performance pay provides incentive to work harder toward improving student
achievement. This finding is supported by results from a study of Kentucky teacher performance
pay which found that most principals did not report favorably about the motivational effects of
the plan. In a related study, however, Charlotte-Mecklenburg principals reported more positively
about the motivational impact (Kelley, Heneman, & Milanowski, 2000). Similarly, Bales (2002),
found in his study of administrator perceptions of Arizona teacher performance pay that 60% of
administrators reported that performance-based pay had a positive impact on student
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achievement. The contrast between these findings demonstrates that more research is needed
before definitive conclusions can be reached about what motivates teachers (Frohreich, 1988).

Perceptions on Negative Outcomes

The implementation of teacher performance pay did result in almost half of the
instructional respondents reporting an increase in workload and stress. Approximately 38% of
respondents also reported working longer hours as a result of the teacher performance pay
implementation. This finding compares with those reported by Kelley, Heneman, and
Milanowski (2000) where teachers in both Kentucky and Charlotte-Mecklenburg reported
working longer hours as an undesirable outcome of the performance reward program. Increased
stress was also a reported result in the Kentucky program due to concerns about job security and
state intervention. A study by Willis, Koch, Lampe, Young, Ellor, and Odden (1990) also found
that teachers reported the implementation of performance pay resulted in increased stress.

Perceptions on Efficacy and Expectancy

Significant to this study are the findings related to the perceptions and attitudes of schoolbased educators on individual efficacy and expectancy. An important component of teacher
efficacy is the belief that the individual action of a teacher can produce an effect on student
achievement. In this study area, strong agreement was reported by both instructional (91.2%) and
administrative (98.2%) respondents that individual performance has a significant influence on
student achievement. This finding contrasts, however, with the finding on the connection
between individual performance and earning performance pay. A majority of instructional
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respondents (51.3%) did not agree that their individual performance significantly influenced
whether they would earn performance pay. The finding of high agreement with individual
efficacy as related to student achievement suggests that the finding of disagreement that
individual performance significantly influences whether an individual earns performance pay in
the current study was related to instrumentality. More study is required to determine if the
finding of the Florida study is related to expectancy or instrumentality.
These findings compare with findings by Kelley, Heneman III, and Milanowski (2000)
related to teacher perceptions on expectancy and instrumentality. In the study, teachers reported
a degree of skepticism that individual performance would result in the achievement of school
goals and that a reward or bonus would be received even if school goals were achieved.
Student composition was reported by a majority of teachers (55.4%) to have a greater
impact on the ability to receive performance pay than the individual effort of the teacher.
Concerns raised over the Denver performance pay plan also centered on issues of student
diversity and differences (Community Training and Assistance Center, 2004). Similarly, Kelley
and Protisk (1997) reported that teachers expressed concerns that it was more difficult to
demonstrate improvement in student achievement in schools with high densities of student
populations perceived at-risk.

Perceptions on Appropriateness and Fairness

On the issue of educator perceptions regarding the appropriateness of performance pay,
approximately three-fourths of instructional respondents (70.7%) and administrative respondents
(75.7%) agreed that educators should receive compensation for outstanding performance.
Similarly, more than half instructional respondents (59%) agreed that educators should receive
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additional compensation for meeting student achievement goals. Findings from other studies
have produced mixed results with some reporting favorably about the appropriateness of
performance pay (Bales, 2004; Community Training and Assistance Center, 2004; Kelley,
Heneman III, & Milanowski, 2000) while others disagreed with the concept of higher pay for top
performers (Storey, 2000).
The fairness of the performance pay plan was a concern with most teachers. Almost 74%
of instructional staff and 50% of administrators disagreed that the current plan was fair in how it
distributed performance pay. Plan fairness was also frequently raised in the end-of-survey
comments with approximately 19% of comments specifically addressing this issue. Two
examples of typical comments are as follows: “I don’t see how a teacher who has 12 gifted
students can be judged the same as a teacher who has 24 ESOL students. Hardly seems fair.” and
“Based on individual achievement! My exceeds class will achieve more than a third grade
retained class. Not fair to that teacher who’s working just as hard!” Concerns over plan fairness
have been reported in similar studies on performance pay (Heneman, 1998; Kelley, Heneman III,
& Milanowski, 2000; Kelley, Protisk, 1997) and was also commonly cited is a problem with the
merit pay plans of the 1980s (Hatry & Greiner, 1985; Middleton, 1989; Porwoll, 1979).

Perceptions on Implementation

The current performance pay plan in the district under study is based on the state
mandated requirement that school-based teachers and administrators be allowed to earn a bonus
equivalent to 5% of their base pay for demonstration of outstanding performance. Under the
current salary schedule, a 5% bonus resulted in most teachers earning approximately $2,500
depending on level of experience. The state mandated 5% is in alignment with the results of this

165

study which shows that the majority of school-based certified staff report that the amount of the
performance award should be more than $2,000 per teacher. A limitation of this study is that this
item did not provide other alternative responses which might have indicated an even higher
amount than the $2,000 response provided. As a result the question of “How much more than
$2,000?” is not answered. The item on the proportion of teachers’ pay that should be related to
performance suggests a possible answer. The largest percentage (30.1%) of instructional
respondents indicated that the proportion of performance pay should be between 6% and 10% of
base pay. Over 25% responded that the proportion should be more than 10% of base salary.

Differences in Perceptions

The study found many differences in perceptions of teacher performance pay among the
demographic variables. There were significant differences in several survey areas related to
respondent years of experience. In the area of knowledge and understanding, respondents with
less experience indicated lower levels of agreement on items related to perceptions of how well
they understood the process and calculation of performance pay. This finding seems logical since
respondents with more experience would be expected to have a greater understanding of
organizational processes.
Responses differed significantly based on years of experience in the area of individual
efficacy. Respondents with 10 years or less experience reported higher levels of agreement on
these items. This finding is somewhat in contrast with findings of Kelley, Heneman III, and
Milanowski (2000) where there were no significant differences in the effects of factors affecting
individual expectancy perceptions related to teacher experience. Differences in instrumentation
focus and process may account for this finding contrast. It should also be noted that, although the
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differences found in the current study were significant, the actual size of these differences were
relatively small (0.22). Further study is needed to determine if perceptions of efficacy as related
to performance pay diminish with experience.
Responses also differed significantly based on years of experience in the area of the
motivational impact of performance pay. Again, respondents with less experience reported
higher levels of agreement. Similarly, respondents with less experience reported higher levels of
agreement with the appropriateness of performance pay. These findings suggest a possible
connection between perceptions of appropriateness and the motivational impact of performance
pay. More study is needed to explore this possible connection. Further study is also needed to
determine why perceptions of motivation and appropriateness as related to performance pay
appear to diminish with experience.
Responses differed significantly based on whether the respondent was a member of the
teachers’ association or union in the areas of individual efficacy, negative impact, and fairness
and alignment. Union members responded with higher levels of disagreement than non-union
members in all three areas. This finding is supported by the reported union opposition to
performance pay plans in general (English, 1983/1984; Lieberman, 1997) and specific union
concerns regarding fairness (Delisio, 2003)
Differences based on school level in individual efficacy were significant between
elementary schools and other levels. Elementary respondents reported significantly higher levels
of efficacy when compared to middle, high, and combination school respondents. Differences
based on school composition were significant between alternative/special schools and all other
levels with alternative schools reporting lower levels of agreement that student composition
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impacts the ability to receive performance pay. Both findings are related to student demographics
suggesting that further study is needed to determine the basis for these perceptions.
Instructional and administrative respondents differed significantly in all areas examined
in this analysis. Administrators responded with higher levels of agreement in the areas of
knowledge and understanding, individual efficacy, impact of motivation, appropriateness, and
fairness and alignment. Administrators responded with significantly lower levels of agreement in
the areas of the negative impact of performance pay and the impact of student composition.
While administrative responses tended to follow similar patterns of agreement as instructional
respondents in most areas, as a whole administrative patterns were more positive in relation to
perceptions of performance pay.

Conclusions

Although intended to motivate teachers, the teacher performance pay plan examined in
this study is perceived by teachers and administrators as not motivating. A closer examination of
the results of this study provides a possible explanation that points to flaws in plan design.
Applying Expectancy Theory and the findings of this study to the current teacher
performance pay plan suggests possible limiting factors. One area of concern regarding the
performance plan is instrumentality, the belief that specific performance levels are associated
with certain outcomes (Heneman, 1992). More than 51% of instructional respondents disagreed
that individual performance has a significant influence on whether they receive performance pay.
Expectancy Theory would suggest this lack of a connection between their individual
performance and the performance reward limits the motivational impact of the reward. This lack
of a connection between performance and results is also evident in how instructional respondents
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reported on items related to knowledge and understanding. Almost 45% disagreed that they
understood the process for awarding teacher performance pay, and more than 63% disagreed that
they understood the process for calculating the amount of performance pay. The lack of
understanding related to the process for calculating and awarding performance pay potentially
contributes to the lack of a perceived connection between pay and performance.
Concerns over the fairness of the performance pay plan were evident, particularly among
the instructional respondents, with almost 74% of instructional respondents disagreeing that the
plan was fair. The application of Equity Theory to the findings of this study suggests plan design
may have contributed to negative perceptions of plan fairness.
Results of this study point to two possible concerns with the current performance pay
plan. The first area is connected to the increased workload and longer hours resulting from
performance pay reported by a significant percentage of respondents. Workload and longer hours
would be considered inputs, and performance pay would be considered an output. If the
individual contributes more in the way of inputs without receiving additional outputs, then the
ratio of inputs to outputs is out of balance, giving the individual a sense of inequity or lack of
fairness (Adams, 1965). Although the current performance pay plan only compensates
approximately 5% of the eligible population annually, approximately 48% of the instructional
sample reported their workload increased as a result of performance pay. This suggests a
possible disequilibrium between inputs and outputs for a significant portion of the population.
The second related area of concern also focuses on the ratio between individual inputs
and outputs. A significant number of respondents (45.9%) disagreed that their chance of
receiving performance pay is the same as any other teacher, suggesting that despite similar inputs
their chances are not the same as others to receive similar outputs. Responses on student
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composition support this hypothesis since the majority of instructional respondents (55.4%)
report that student composition has a greater impact on the ability to receive teacher performance
pay than individual effort. This finding suggests that teachers perceive an imbalance in the ratio
of inputs to outputs due to student composition resulting in an inequity in the distribution of
performance pay. Several of the comments at the end of the survey support this suggestion. The
following comment is provided as one such example: “A teacher’s class composition determines
the extent to which student growth and academic progress can be shown. Too bad all teachers
can’t have students with at least average I.Q.’s; supportive parents; excellent attitudes; proper
nutrition, clothing, etc. Let’s be fair and get real!”
Study findings that relate to Goal-Setting Theory point out another possible plan design
component which potentially limits the motivational impact of the performance pay plan.
According to the theory, goals that are specific, challenging, and accepted by employees are
motivating (Heneman, 1992). Findings of this study indicate that 59% of instructional and 71%
of administrative respondents agree that educators should receive additional compensation for
meeting student achievement goals. As stated earlier, most respondents did not find teacher
performance pay motivating which suggests a missing connection between student achievement
goals and the performance pay plan. Responses to the item on goal alignment support this
suggestion with less than 32% of instructional respondents indicating agreement that the current
teacher performance pay plan is aligned with school goals in how it rewards performance. This
lack of a perceived connection between the plan and student achievement goals by a majority of
respondents illustrates a flaw in the plan design that potentially limits the motivational impact of
the pay incentive. These findings suggest that without clearly defined goals and objectives,
potential participants in the performance pay plan may not find the financial incentives contained
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in the performance plan motivating. Evidence presented by Locke (1968) supports the view that
monetary incentives alone do not affect performance level independently of individual goals.

Implications

Accountability and results continue to be emphasized in the arena of public education. In
response, local school districts and state policy-makers have turned to teacher incentive plans as
a strategy for motivating improved performance with the goal of improving student achievement
(Hatry, Greiner, & Ashford, 1994). A majority of respondents in this study agree that teachers
should receive additional compensation for outstanding performance and meeting student
achievement goals. Developing compensation strategies which motivate and enhance
performance, however, is a difficult and highly complex process. Such development requires the
alignment of organizational goals and pay systems with individual goals in a manner consistent
with organizational culture. New compensation programs often fail because this alignment is not
present, resulting in a system which is incongruent with the existing culture and its perceptions,
attitudes, values, and norms (Flannery, Hofrichter, Platten, 1996).
Although numerous attempts to link teacher pay with performance have been
implemented over the last several years, many of these efforts were unsuccessful and quickly
abandoned (Odden & Kelley, 1997). The failure of many initiatives from the previous reform
wave has been attributed to the lack of an adequate research base (Packard & Dereshiwsky,
1988), which is still missing from many of the current performance pay plans (Hodge, 2001).
This study adds to this research base and may be useful in the design or revision of performancebased compensation systems in the future.
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The findings of this study clearly show that a majority of school-based instructional and
administrative staff perceive the current performance pay plan fails to motivate teachers to work
harder, modify instructional and assessment strategies, or participate in professional
development. Other findings in this study suggest a possible explanation for this lack of
motivational impact. As stated earlier, more than half of the instructional respondents perceived
their performance had no impact on whether they earned performance pay. Expectancy Theory
suggests that the perception that performance is not directly linked to the reward limits the
motivational impact of the reward. New performance plans or future revisions should account for
this connection by developing plans that more closely connect performance objectives to the
goals of the compensation plan. This connection facilitates educator understanding of the
performance level required to achieve these goals and be considered outstanding and eligible for
performance pay. Compensation funding must also be flexible enough to award all individuals
who meet the performance specified by the performance pay plan.
The findings of this study also suggest that improving the alignment between the
performance pay plan and school goals should be a consideration in any future plan revision.
Improving the link between school goals and the performance plan may positively impact
motivation and may also improve instrumentality. This improvement would allow educators to
see that performance aligned with achieving school goals is connected to performance pay.
Educator concerns about plan fairness were evident in this study suggesting a need for
plan design to address equity issues. This study found that although many teachers indicated that
they worked harder and put in longer hours as a result of performance pay, very few individuals
were actually awarded additional pay. Performance plans should clearly indicate the performance

172

expectation required to obtain performance pay and compensate all individuals that reach this
level of achievement to enhance perceptions of plan fairness.
Many of the participant comments obtained in this study expressed concern over the
increased paperwork required to apply for performance pay. Consideration should be given in
plan design toward greater reliance on existing performance indicators. This design consideration
would reduce additional paperwork requirements that are not directly related to improved
performance.
Performance pay plan design must include attention to concerns focused on differences in
student composition. Plans must be developed so that all teachers have an equal opportunity to
obtain performance pay regardless of the type of students they teach. Equitable plan design will
be facilitated by the involvement of teachers and other instructional staff in the development
process. This recommendation is supported by conclusions of Hatry, Greiner, and Ashford
(1994), who also recommended involving teachers and teacher associations in the design,
implementation, and monitoring of monetary incentive plans.
Florida legislators enacted the 5% performance pay requirement without providing
substantive direction to school districts. As a result, plan designs found throughout the state
contain many of the same design concerns found in the plan central to this study. The
requirement of a substantial reward equivalent to 5% of base pay coupled with the additional
requirements that this 5% reward not count toward retirement and not be used for permanent
salary increases limits the flexibility in performance pay program design. Union opposition to
performance pay and a strong desire to raise salaries equitably for all members results in the
channeling of the majority of compensation funds toward permanent increases to base salary. As
a result, districts set aside a limited amount of funds for performance pay which substantially

173

restricts access to the reward. Limited funds result in competitive processes designed to rank and
discriminate among potential performance pay applicants. Because participants must compete
against other teachers for the reward rather than against a standard, the connection to what
performance level is required to obtain the reward is unclear and must be predicted by the
participating teachers. Differences between the level of performance that is required from year to
year also add to the confusion. The failed merit pay plans detailed in Chapter 2 share many of
these same characteristics.
The findings of this study suggest a need to increase district flexibility in the design of
performance pay programs. Added flexibility and reducing restrictions on compensation design
would allow districts to develop pay structures that align with organizational goals while
avoiding the competitive structures caused by limited resources. Increased flexibility could more
readily facilitate plan design that clearly connects performance to compensation in a manner that
is perceived as more fair and equitable to teachers.

Recommendations for Further Study

This study was limited to one Florida school district. Further research which includes
other districts throughout the state would enhance generalizations to be made regarding attitudes
and perceptions about performance pay by educators.
Future research related to why a majority of educators did not agree that their
performance was connected to receiving the reward would benefit performance pay design.
Determining whether the source of this connection was due to diminished expectancy or limited
instrumentality could be a focus of this research.
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Issues related to the fairness of performance pay systems need further research.
Determining why educators perceived the plan as unfair and isolating variables that cause this
perception would benefit future plan design.
This study found many significant differences in how respondents reported on survey
items, particularly related to level of experience, with findings suggesting that perceptions of
efficacy, motivation, and appropriateness as related to performance pay appear to diminish with
experience. Further research to examine the source of these differences would be beneficial in
the design of future compensation plans.
Significant differences were found between how instructional and administrative
respondents reported on performance pay. A future study to determine the sources of this
difference would benefit plan design.
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APPENDIX A
FINAL PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
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The School District Of Lee County
Final Performance Assessment
Name:______________________________________________ Position/Grade Level:____________________________
School Yr_________
School/Department___________________________________
E – Exceeds Expectations
M – Meets Expectations/Satisfactory
B – Below Expectations/Unsatisfactory
N – Not Targeted for Assessment
INDICATORS/ACCOMPLISHED PRACTICE
1

2
3
4
5

6

7

8

9
10
11

12

Criteria marked B requires additional prior documentation
of identified deficiencies. The assessor must also provide
documentation of exceptional performance.

E

M

B

Student Achievement with Continuous Improvement -- Has worked as a team member to
promote and achieve school improvement goals and engages in continuous quality
improvement of students in school.
Assessment of Student Achievement – Uses assessment strategies (traditional and
alternate) to assist the continuous development of the learner.
Planning For Student Achievement – Plans, implements and evaluates effective instruction
to fit various learning environments.
Subject Matter – Demonstrates knowledge and understanding of the subject matter and
continuously monitors changes in the subject field.
Human Development and Learning – Uses an understanding of human learning and
development to provide a positive learning environment which increases student achievement
and supports the intellectual, personal, and social development of all students.
Learning Environment for Student Achievement – Creates and maintains a positive
learning environment which fosters active engagement in learning, social interaction,
cooperative learning and self-motivation and manages student behavior.
Communication for Student Achievement and Parental Satisfaction – Uses effective
communication techniques with students, parents (i.e. one-to-one telephone calls,
conferences, newsletters, etc.), and all other stakeholders.
Critical Thinking for Student Achievement – Uses appropriate techniques and strategies
which promote and enhance student achievement through critical, creative and evaluative
thinking capabilities of students.
Technology for Student Achievement – Uses appropriate technology in teaching and
learning processes.
Role of the Teacher – Works with various educational paraprofessionals, parents, and other
stakeholders in the continuous improvement of the educational experiences of students.
Diversity Uses – Uses teaching and learning strategies that reflect each student’s culture,
learning styles, special needs and socioeconomic background to increase student
achievement.
State, School & District Requirements – Adheres to the Code of Ethics of the Education
Profession in Florida and meets school and district policy and procedure requirements.
Comments:____________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________
Assessor’s Signature
Date

_________________________________________
Teacher’s Signature
Date
(My signature does not necessarily imply agreement with the assessment but
acknowledges that I have discussed it with the Assessor.)
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Teacher Performance Pay
Attitudinal Survey

Purpose: The purpose of this survey is to obtain information from certified school-based personnel
regarding their attitudes and perceptions of teacher performance pay. All information collected in this
survey is confidential and respondents are anonymous. The data obtained in this survey will be used as the
basis for a dissertation being completed at the University of Central Florida involving the assessment of
teacher attitudes about teacher performance pay systems.
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Part I: Demographic Information
Directions – Please circle one option for each item which best describes your current situation. You may
use a pencil or pen to complete this survey.

1. What is your current assignment at your school this year?
Teacher

Administrator

Counselor

Other Professional Staff

2. Which best describes the total number of years you have been employed as a
professional educator?
Less than 3 years

3 to 10 years

11 to 20 years

21 or more years

3. Are you a member of a teacher’s association?
Yes

No

4. Which one best describes your personal level of educational attainment?
Baccalaureate

Masters

Specialist

Doctorate

5. Which category best describes your current school of assignment?
Elementary School

Middle School

High School

Alternative/Special
Center

6. Have you received performance pay at any time during the last four years?
Yes

No
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Response Key

Directions – Please fill in the appropriate circle for each item to indicate
your level of agreement with the statement for Parts II, III, IV and Va. If
you do not feel you know the correct answer, leave the space provided blank
and move to the next question.

Strongly Agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
No Opinion

SA
A
D
SD
NO

Part II: Knowledge and Understanding
SA

A

D

SD

NO

SA

A

D

SD

NO

SA

A

D

SD

NO

7. I clearly understand the process for awarding teacher performance pay
to individual teachers.
8. I clearly understand the process for calculating the amount of teacher
performance pay disbursed to the individual teacher.

Part III: Individual Efficacy
9. My individual performance as an educator has a significant influence on
student achievement.
10. My individual performance as an educator has a significant influence on
whether or not I earn teacher performance pay.
11. I have adequate resources (i.e. materials, supplies) to support my efforts in
obtaining teacher performance pay.
12. I have adequate administrative assistance to support my efforts in
obtaining teacher performance pay.
13. My chance of receiving teacher performance pay is the same as any other
teacher.
14. Student body composition has a greater impact on my ability to receive
teacher performance pay than my individual effort as a teacher.

Part IV: Impact on Individual Performance
15. Teacher performance pay provides an incentive for me to work harder
toward improving student achievement.
16. Teacher performance pay encourages me to participate in staff development
to improve my skills as an educator.
17. Increasing the size of the teacher performance pay bonus would increase my
motivation to improve student achievement.
18. I have altered my instructional practice as a result of teacher performance
pay.
19. I have modified my assessment methods as a result of teacher performance
pay.
20. My workload has increased as a result of the implementation of teacher
performance pay.
21. I have experienced increased stress as a result of the implementation of
teacher performance pay.
22. I work longer hours as a result of the implementation of teacher performance
pay.
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Response Key
Strongly Agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
No Opinion

Part Va: Teacher Performance Pay Implementation
SA

A

D

SD

23. Educators should receive additional compensation for outstanding
individual performance.
24. Educators should receive additional compensation for meeting student
achievement goals.
25. The current teacher performance pay plan is fair in how it distributes
performance pay awards.
26. The current teacher performance pay plan is aligned with school goals in
how it rewards performance.

Part Vb. Teacher Performance Pay Implementation
Directions – Please circle the letter of the one option that completes the sentences in a manner best
expressing your opinion.

27. The amount of the performance pay reward should be
A. more than $2000 per teacher
B. between $1000 and $2000 per teacher
C. between $500 and $800 per teacher
D. below $500 per teacher
E. zero

28. The proportion of a teacher’s pay related to performance should be
A. more than 10% of base salary
B. between 6% and 10% of base salary
C. between 1% and 5% of base salary
D. less than 1% of base salary
E. zero

You have reached the end of this survey. Thank you for your participation.
If you have any additional comments regarding Teacher Performance Pay, please include these
comments on the bottom of this survey form.
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NO

SA
A
D
SD
NO
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March 22, 2004
Dear Educator:

I am a graduate student at the University of Central Florida. As part of my dissertation
project, I am conducting a survey, the purpose of which is to learn about the attitudes and
perceptions of educators regarding teacher performance pay. I am asking you to
participate in this survey because of your experience as a school-based educator in the
School District of Lee County. This survey should last no more than 10 minutes to
complete. Your participation in this survey is completely voluntary and you will not
have to respond to any question you do not wish to answer. Your identity will be kept
confidential and will not be used in any future report or manuscript.
There are no anticipated risks, compensation or other direct benefits to you as a
participant in this survey. You are free to withdraw your consent to participate and may
discontinue you participation in the survey without consequence.
If you have any questions about this research project, please contact me at (239) 3378503. My faculty supervisor is Dr. Jess House. Questions or concerns about research
participants’ rights may be directed to the UCFIRB office, University of Central Florida
Office of Research, Orlando Tech Center 12443 Research Parkway, Suite 207, Orlando,
FL 32826. The phone number is (407) 823-2901.
Please return this copy of the letter in the enclosed envelope. A second copy is provided
for your records. By signing this letter, you give me permission to report your responses
anonymously in the final manuscript to be submitted to my faculty supervisor as a part of
my course work.
Sincerely,

Gregory K. Adkins

I have read the procedure described above and voluntarily agree to participate in the Teacher
Performance Pay Attitudinal Survey.

_________________________________/___________
Signature of Participate

Date
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